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PREFACE
This Article deals with a variety of issues concerning restrictions on
assignments and subleases contained in non-residential real property
leases. The Article was prepared to provide the California Law Revision
Commission' with background information for its study of this subject.
The opinions, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Arti-
cle are entirely those of the Author and do not necessarily represent or
reflect the opinions, conclusions or recommendations of the Commission.
The purpose of the study is to determine whether there is a need to cod-
ify, clarify or modify California law by legislation.
The Article is divided into six distinct but related studies. Part 1
deals with the-validity and interpretation of restrictions imposed by a
lessor on a tenant's ability to transfer the leasehold. It also covers related
issues involved in a lessor's remedies following breach and abandonment
by a tenant. Part 2 examines the remedies available to a lessor when a
tenant wrongfully violates a transfer restriction. Part 3 covers the reme-
dies available to a tenant when a lessor wrongfully refuses to consent to a
transfer by a tenant. Part 4 deals with the application of transfer restric-
tions to involuntary transfers. Part 5 considers the relationship and dis-
tinction between a restriction on transfer and a restriction on use.
Finally, Part 6 examines the enforceability of a transfer restriction
against a tenant's successor.
I thank Glen (Tim) Neal, my student research assistant, for his ex-
tremely competent and creative assistance on this project. I also thank
the real property lawyers around the state who have taken the time to
review and comment on my work.
1. The California Law Revision Commission is created by statute (Cal. Gov't Code
§§ 8280-8297) and is composed of a member of the California Senate, a member of the Califor-
nia Assembly, seven members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and the Legislative Counsel ex officio. It is directed to examine the common law and
the state statutes and judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachro-
nisms in the law and recommending reforms.
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PART 1
RESTRICTIONS ON LEASE TRANSFERS:
VALIDITY AND RELATED REMEDIES ISSUES
(MUST CONSENTING ADULTS BE REASONABLE?)
I. SCOPE OF PART
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. Later, the tenant transfers or attempts to transfer all or
part of the leasehold to a third party. The transfer will be in the form of
either an assignment to an assignee, or a sublease to a subtenant. A
clause in the lease between the lessor and tenant restricts the tenant's
ability to transfer to a third party. The lessor refuses to allow the trans-
fer. The tenant and the third party either complete the transfer despite
the lessor's objections, or the deal between the tenant and the third party
is ended due to the lessor's objections. A dispute between the lessor and
the tenant ensues. The third party will also be involved in the dispute if
the transfer was completed, and perhaps be involved even if it was not
completed.
This is the basic factual situation that triggers the issues involved in
the Article. The same issues are involved when the transfer restrictions
are contained in a sublease from the tenant to a subtenant, and it is the
subtenant who wishes to transfer to a third party over the tenant/subles-
sor's objections. The restrictions on transfer can take a variety of forms,
discussed in detail below. Generally, restrictions come in two forms.
First, there are direct restrictions, such as a prohibition against transfer
without the lessor's consent. Second, there are indirect restrictions, such
as a lessor's option to recover possession of the premises if a transfer is
proposed, or a lessor's right to participate in profits from the third party
if a transfer is completed. There are other factual variations which will
be discussed where appropriate. The Article is limited to non-residential
leases and the word "commercial" will be used in the broad sense to
include all types of non-residential leases. There is, however, a limited
discussion of the distinct factors present in a residential transaction.
The Article examines existing California law, and in some instances
proposes clarifications or modifications of the law, dealing with the fol-
lowing general issues:
1. What are the limitations, if any, on a lessor's ability to restrict a
transfer by a tenant?
2. Suppose the restriction provisions are silent about the standard
governing the lessor's right to object to a transfer. What standard will be
used-reasonableness or sole discretion?
January 1989]
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3. Suppose the parties agree to provisions that expressly provide for
a standard of sole discretion for the lessor's right to object to transfer.
Will that provision be enforceable, or will a mandatory reasonableness
standard be imposed?
4. What are the limitations, if any, on a lessor's ability to provide
for an option to recover the premises when a transfer is proposed?
5. What are the limitations, if any, on a lessor's ability to provide
for a right to part or all of the profits from the third party if a transfer is
completed?
6. What is the relationship between transfer restrictions and a les-
sor's remedies for breach and abandonment by a tenant?
II. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, a relatively dormant area of California lease law was reex-
amined and thrust into the limelight. In Cohen v. Ratinoff,2 a California
court of appeal reviewed and rejected a portion of the common-law and
current majority view regarding lease transfer restraints. In 1985, in
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. , the California Supreme Court did the
same.
There are three basic components to the common-law and majority
view.4 First, the tenant's leasehold interest is freely transferable, unless
the parties agree to a restriction. Second, the parties are free to abso-
lutely prohibit transfer or to condition transfer upon obtaining the les-
sor's consent, which may be withheld in the lessor's sole discretion.
Third, if the parties agree that the lessor's consent is required for a trans-
fer, but fail to expressly provide for a reasonableness standard, the lessor
can withhold consent in his or her sole discretion. The holdings in Cohen
and Kendall are limited to changing the third component by imposing a
reasonableness standard when the clause does not express a standard.5
This change should be examined. If the change is a good one, the propri-
ety of applying the change to leases finalized prior to Cohen and Kendall
should be examined.
Although dicta, there is broad language in Kendall that sends mixed
signals about the continued validity of clauses that absolutely prohibit
2. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
3. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
4. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the common-
law and majority view.
5. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830; Cohen, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 330, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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transfer or expressly give the lessor sole discretion to withhold consent.6
Additionally, there are unresolved issues concerning the lessor's right to
enforce a clause providing for capture of possession or profit when a
transfer comes up. Despite the solace some find in supreme court foot-
notes, there are issues that should be resolved to provide certainty in
drafting and enforcement of leases. These issues present an important
confrontation between freedom of contract and public policy. The un-
certainties can be resolved by legislation or litigation. It would be a
waste of time and money to leave these issues to piecemeal resolution by
litigation. The history of the enforceability of a "due on transfer" loan
clause in California is a good example of the long time span that can be
involved in clarifying restraint issues.7 The "due on transfer" issues
spawned a long-term growth industry for litigators and seminar
producers.
In 1970, at the urging of the California Law Revision Commission,
the California legislature adopted California Civil Code section 1951.4 as
part of a comprehensive codification of lease remedies.' That section al-
lows the lessor to keep the lease in effect and enforce its provisions after
the tenant has breached the lease and abandoned the property.9 This
remedy is available only "if the lease permits" the tenant to transfer,
subject only to reasonable restrictions. 10 The Code section should be re-
examined to make sure it takes into consideration the recent develop-
ments in the law and the various types of direct and indirect transfer
restrictions.
III. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE OVERVIEW
Before looking specifically at transfer restrictions, it will be helpful
to briefly review the nature and effect of assignments and subleases.
If a tenant transfers the entire balance of the lease term to a third
party, it results in an assignment; if a tenant transfers less, it results in a
sublease.1' If a tenant transfers the entire balance of the lease term, but
6. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496, 709 P.2d at 841-42, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
7. See, e.g., Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180
Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982); Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951-1951.2, 1951.4-1952.6 (West 1985); 9 CAL. L. REVISION
COMM'N RnPs. 153 (1969).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4.
10. Id. § 1951.4(b).
11. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 8, at 94 (2d ed.
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retains a contingent right to recover possession, there is a jurisdictional
split on the result. In California, the result is a sublease.12
The tenant remains liable to the lessor for breaches of the lease that
occur after either an assignment or a sublease.' 3 This is based on their
privity of contract which continues unless the lessor releases the tenant.
Consent to an assignment or sublease does not in itself release the tenant
from liability to the lessor.
14
An assignee and the lessor become liable to one another for breaches
of their respective real covenant obligations that occur during the period
that the assignee has the leasehold.15 This is based on privity of estate
between the lessor and assignee, which arises when the assignee takes
over the tenant's estate. Absent an assumption, the assignee is not liable
for breaches that occurred before the assignment or occur after a
reassignment.
1 6
Generally, a subtenant is not directly liable to the lessor. 17 Absent
an assumption by the subtenant, there is no privity of contract or estate
between the lessor and subtenant. However, if the lease obligations are
not performed, the lessor can terminate the lease and recover possession
from the tenant and the subtenant. 18 Generally, the lessor is not directly
liable to the subtenant for breaches of the prime lease obligations. How-
ever, direct liability might arise in situations where the lessor consents to
a sublease and the subtenant assumes the obligations of the prime lease. 19
There are significant differences in the relationship between a ten-
ant/assignor and an assignee on the one hand, and a tenant/sublessor
and a subtenant on the other. A sublease creates a new tenancy relation-
ship and privity of estate, as well as contract, between the tenant as sub-
1988); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 246[1], at 372.92-.93 (Rohan rev. ed.
1986); ROHAN, 7 CURRENT LEASING LAW & TECHNIQUES, § 5.01, at 5-4 to 5-5 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 243, 73 P.2d 1163,
1168 (1937); Reed v. South Shore Foods, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d 705, 710-11, 40 Cal. Rptr.
575, 577-78 (1964).
13. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.,'40 Cal. 3d 488, 500, 709 P.2d 837, 844,220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 825 (1985); 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, at 372.112.
14. Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal. 2d 594, 328 P.2d 953 (1958); 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, at
372.112.
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 822 (West 1982); 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11 at 372.94-.96;
ROHAN, supra note 11 § 501, at 5-5 to 5-6.
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1466 (West 1982).
17. See Erickson v. Rhee, 181 Cal. 562, 185 P. 847 (1919); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 11,
at 96; ROHAN, supra note 11, at 5-5 to 5-6.
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1161(3), 1164 (West 1982); id. § 1174 (West Supp. 1988).
19. See Cordonier v. Central Shopping Plaza Assocs., 82 Cal. App. 3d 991, 147 Cal. Rptr.
558 (1978); Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 142, 141 Cal. Rptr. 370
(1977).
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lessor and the third party as subtenant. An assignment leaves the
tenant/assignor with no further interest in the property. The relation-
ship between the tenant/assignor and the assignee is purely contrac-
tual."° Examples of important ramifications of this distinction are the
right to bring an unlawful detainer action and the right to exercise
purchase or renewal options contained in the lease. The tenant/sublessor
has a right to bring an unlawful detainer action against the subtenant to
recover possession of the property if the subtenant breaches obligations
to the tenant/sublessor. The tenant/assignor cannot bring an unlawful
detainer action against the assignee.21 When a sublease occurs, generally
the tenant/sublessor retains the right to exercise purchase or renewal op-
tions contained in the prime lease. When an assignment occurs, the op-
tion rights generally pass to the assignee.22
There are important differences in the nature and effect of an assign-
ment and a sublease. The lessor, tenant and third party may have impor-
tant reasons to prefer one form of transfer over the other, and these
preferences may conflict. However, for the purpose of testing the stan-
dard that should apply to a restriction on transfer, an assignment and
sublease are generally treated identically.23
IV. TYPES OF RESTRICTION CLAUSES
There are several types of lease clauses that restrict, directly or indi-
rectly, a transfer of all or part of the leasehold by the tenant. They typi-
cally fall into one or more of the following categories:
1. Silent Consent Standard. The tenant must obtain the lessor's
consent to a transfer, but there is no express standard governing the les-
sor. The clause does not expressly require the lessor to be reasonable,
nor does it expressly permit the lessor to refuse consent in his sole discre-
tion. The Cohen and Kendall cases involve this type of clause.24
2. Express Reasonable Consent Standard. The tenant must obtain
the lessor's consent to a transfer, and a reasonableness standard is ex-
pressly imposed upon the lessor. The common phrase that "consent shall
not be unreasonably withheld" is an example.
20. The tenant's interest in the property, which is necessary for privity of estate, ceases
upon assignment. ROHAN, supra note 11, § 501, at 5-4 to 5-5.
21. Reed v. South Shore Foods, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 2d 705, 40 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1964).
22. Gilman v. Nemetz, 203 Cal. App. 2d 81, 21 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1962).
23. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 492 n.2, 709 P.2d at 839 n.2, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820 n.2.
24. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 494 n.5, 709 P.2d 837, 840 n.5, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 821 n.5 (1985); Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 325, 195 Cal. Rptr.
84, 85-86 (1983).
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
3. Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard. The tenant must ob-
tain the lessor's consent to a transfer, and the lessor is expressly given
sole discretion to grant or withhold consent. For example, the clause
might provide that "consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute
subjective discretion of the lessor."
4. Express Specific Requirements. The tenant's right to transfer,
and the lessor's consent, are conditioned upon express specific require-
ments. The requirements vary depending upon the facts of the particular
lease transaction. For example, the tenant and third party may be re-
quired to furnish evidence that the third party meets certain minimum
credit or operational experience requirements.
5. Consent Required But Exceptions. The lessor's consent is re-
quired per one of the above alternatives, but specific types of transactions
are exempted from the future consent requirements. For example, an
exemption for subleases to the tenant's franchisees or an exemption for
transfers among related corporate entities may be appropriate in some
situations.
6. Absolute Prohibition. Transfer is prohibited. There is no mention
of consent or compliance with requirements.
7. Possession Recovery. If the tenant wishes to transfer, the lessor
may elect to recover possession of the property. The tenant is free to
transfer to the third party only if the lessor chooses not to exercise that
option.
8. Profit Shift. The lessor is entitled to receive part or all of the
profit generated by the transfer transaction.
There are sophisticated variations of the "Possession Recovery" and
the "Profit Shift" types of clauses. Also, these two types can be com-
bined with other types of clauses. For example, the "Express Reasonable
Consent Standard" clause and the "Profit Shift" clause could readily be
combined. The lessor would have the right to impose reasonable objec-
tions, and if the transfer goes through, the lessor shares in the profit from
the third party. The "Express Reasonable Consent Standard" clause
could be combined with a variation of the "Possession Recovery" clause.
For example, the lessor could either make reasonable objections to the
transfer, or recover possession by exercising a right of first refusal match-
ing the terms of the third party offer. There are variations of the other
clauses as well. For example, there may be a provision granting the ten-
ant an option to terminate the lease if the lessor refuses consent for a
reason not set forth in the lease, or one that does not meet the test of
[Vol. 22:405
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commercial reasonableness. 25
V. MOTIVES OF THE PARTIES
The tenant's desire for free transferability, and the lessor's desire for
restrictions on transferability, involve a variety of motives. These mo-
tives show that the transferability issue is an important one for the par-
ties to a commercial lease. Several of these motives are discussed below.
A. Tenant Motives
The tenant who operates a business on the premises may wish free-
dom to transfer when he or she wishes to retire from the business or
move to another location. The need to transfer may be unanticipated due
to illness of the tenant or the business. If the business conducted on the
premises is healthy, the proposed leasehold transfer may also involve a
sale of the business. If a sale of the tenant's business is involved, the
location may be so important to the particular business that it is difficult
to separate a sale of the business from a transfer of the leasehold.
The tenant's space needs may create the desire for freedom to trans-
fer. A tenant may anticipate a need to expand in the future and lease
more space than initially needed. Until the expansion occurs, the tenant
would like to defray the rental cost of the additional space by subletting.
On the other hand, the tenant may initially use all of the space rented but
later have reduced needs. A reduction in business or changes in the busi-
ness technology may eliminate the need for some of the leased premises.
Rather than negotiate a termination of the existing lease and move to a
different location, the tenant may wish to remain and rent the excess
space.
Corporate family events may create the need for a leasehold trans-
fer. For example, there may be an assignment of the lease involved in a
merger of the corporate tenant or a sublease involved in the creation of a
subsidiary. A partnership tenant may wish to incorporate and transfer to
the new entity.
Personal family events may also create a transfer incentive. For ex-
ample, a parent may wish to transfer the leasehold and family business to
a child. This might occur as part of a retirement plan or as part of an
estate plan.
The tenant may wish to use the leasehold as security for a loan.
This could involve three separate steps of transfer. First is the transfer of
25. See F & L Cnter Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 19 Ohio App. 3d 72, 482 N.E.2d
1296 (1984).
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a security interest in the leasehold. Second is the potential foreclosure or
trustee's sale transfer. Third is the retransfer by the lender if it acquired
the leasehold at the foreclosure or trustee's sale.
A variety of other motives may arise out of the many types of com-
mercial lease transactions; however, the motives described above are the
most common.
B. Lessor Motives
The lessor's motives are called into question by the cases involving
leasehold transfer restrictions. At this point, the reader should avoid
placing a value judgment of reasonable or unreasonable on any particular
motive. Moreover, it is important to note that transfer restrictions are
not the only way a lessor can protect some of these motives. For exam-
ple, the lessor might rely on a clause compelling, preventing or regulating
certain uses on or alterations of the premises. When the profit motive is
involved, there are several alternatives available, as discussed below.
The lessor is virtually unrestricted by law, except for prohibitions
against discrimination, 6 in evaluating and choosing a tenant in the first
instance. The lessor would like the same freedom to evaluate and choose
any new occupant, or to retain the original tenant. The tenant is a
known and chosen quantity, and the lessor may prefer not to deal with a
virtually unknown transferee chosen by the tenant.
Various facets of income protection concern lessors. Creditworthi-
ness of the new occupant is a typical concern. If the rent is based on a
percentage of profits, the new occupant's ability to generate profits is a
major consideration. This involves factors such as management ability,
business experience and type of business.27 The particular agreed per-
centage set forth in the lease is generally based on the tenant's particular
type of business. There is a wide variation among rates based on the type
of business, and a change of tenant and business can significantly affect
percentage rental income.28 The lessor may want to preserve the draw-
ing power of a certain tenant in a shopping center. That drawing power
brings people to the center and generates profits for other tenants who
are paying percentage rentals. The drawing power also helps to maintain
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1988).
27. A loss of percentage rentals was involved in one of the post-Kendall cases discussed
below. John Hogan Enter., Inc. v. Kellogg, 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986);
see infra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
28. Arnold, 1987 Percentage Lease Rates, 20, No. 1, THE MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE
EXECUTIVES REPORT, 8 (Mar. 1, 1987).
[Vol. 22:405
LEASEHOLD TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
the overall economic health of the center and facilitates renting space in
the center.
The variety and balance of tenants is another important considera-
tion to a shopping center lessor. Control over the mix of uses is impor-
tant to the lessor for two reasons. First, the mix can have an important
effect on the degree of economic success of the center. Also, the lessor
wants to avoid violating any exclusive rights or non-competition protec-
tion given to other tenants. The lessor may wish to avoid competition
from a new occupant to protect the lessor's business whether in a shop-
ping center situation or not. In addition to mix, the lessor may want to
maintain a certain image for a center or a building. This involves more
than just a control over the general type of business. It can involve fac-
tors such as name recognition, quality of goods and services, ethnic char-
acter of goods and services, and reputation for unique goods or services.
A different occupant may increase the burden on the building or
common areas, or may increase demand for lessor services. For example,
the new occupant may require use of heavy equipment which causes
noise and vibrations which disturb other tenants. The new occupant's
business may require the use of a forklift, which causes extreme bearing
weight on small areas and accelerates deterioration of pavement and
floors. There may be a substantial increase in the use of parking areas,
elevators and other common areas and facilities. There may be an in-
creased demand for lessor-furnished services such as electricity, water
and trash pick-up. Insurance costs and its availability may change. Use
by a new occupant may involve alterations to the building such as parti-
tion walls and signs.
The transaction itself may cause an unwanted increase in the lessor's
real property tax burden. Certain assignments and subleases can cause
an increase in assessed valuation and thus an increase in property taxes.29
The lessor may wish to avoid a transfer of a security interest in the lease-
hold, which could lead to a transfer upon foreclosure or trustee's sale,
and a retransfer by a lender who acquired the leasehold at the foreclosure
or trustee's sale. The lessor may be concerned about having the lease-
hold involved in an involuntary forced sale and ending up with an un-
known new tenant at the end of the process. Also, the lessor may be
concerned about meeting certain conditions the lender has required for
making the loan.30
29. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 61(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1988).
30. This latter concern was involved in one of the post-Kendall cases discussed below.
Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1594, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1987); see infra
notes 269-82 and accompanying text.
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Another concern is that a sublease reduces the lessor's ability to
clear the lease title and recover possession before expiration of the term.
Even if the tenant/sublessor may be willing to voluntarily surrender his
leasehold, the subtenant can block recovery of the premises.31
Another consideration is the competition in renting out space. A
lessor may have a large inventory of unrented space and may desire to
avoid competition from existing tenants who put space up for sublease.
A tenant who subleases and becomes a sublessor may want to re-
strict transfer by the subtenant for many of the same motives discussed
above. In addition, the tenant/sublessor will be concerned that the new
occupant chosen by the subtenant may do something which creates a
breach of the prime lease and jeopardizes the tenant's position under the
prime lease.
C. Profit Motive
The tenant and lessor share the motive to profit from an apprecia-
tion in the rental value of the premises. When the rental value increases
above the agreed rent in the lease, the difference creates a leasehold bo-
nus value. So long as there is no transfer, the tenant indirectly enjoys the
benefit by occupying property which is worth more rent than he is obli-
gated to pay. However, when a transfer occurs, both the landlord and
the tenant would like the profit generated from the third party who
comes into the premises with a higher rental value. It is at that point
that a dispute is likely to occur, and questions of express language and
reasonableness become involved.
VI. STANDARDS GOVERNING RESTRICTIONS
A. The Two General Standards
In theory, leasehold transfer restrictions could be banned altogether
if doing so were to serve some compelling public policy. This draconian
approach has not been taken in the past and it is not likely to occur in the
future. Since transfer restrictions are not prohibited, the question be-
comes what type of standard to apply to them. There are two basic stan-
dards involved in the clauses and discussed by the courts: reasonableness
and sole discretion. The reasonableness standard requires the lessor to
conform to objective commercial reasonableness. The sole discretion
standard allows the lessor to have subjective, personal reasons for deny-
31. Bailey v. Richardson, 66 Cal. 416, 5 P. 910 (1885); Buttner v. Kasser, 19 Cal. App.
755, 127 P. 811 (1912).
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ing transfer, which do not have to meet an objective test of commercial
reasonableness.
The sole discretion standard does not allow the lessor total freedom.
For example, he or she cannot engage in prohibited discrimination.32
California recognizes that a power that may be exercised without reason
should not be exercised for a bad reason.33
B. Sole Discretion Standard: Perhaps Not an Unreasonable Choice
The words "arbitrary" or "capricious" are sometimes used in
describing the subjective standard instead of "sole discretion.",34 These
words evince an unnecessary negative prejudgment. The phrase "sole
discretion" is a more impartial and descriptive label for the subjective
standard.
Does a lessor who chooses and negotiates for a sole discretion stan-
dard do so to be unreasonable? It is simplistic to believe that all lessors
who bargain for a clause without a reasonableness standard wish to be
unreasonable. For example, a lessor with a small transaction and a
short-term lease may simply wish to avoid the expense and time involved
in evaluating new parties during the lease term, or may wish to avoid
litigation over reasonableness.
The ultimate decision of whether a lessor has acted reasonably rests
with a judge or jury. There may be two distinct questions in litigation
concerning compliance with the reasonableness standard. First, is the
specific requirement reasonable? Second, have the third party and the
tenant reasonably complied with the requirement? For example, suppose
a lessor requires the third party to have good credit and sufficient experi-
ence to operate a particular business on the premises. Are credit and
experience reasonable requirements? What is "good" credit and "suffi-
cient" experience? What credit and experience does the proposed third
party have?
Some requirements are vague and perhaps somewhat personal. For
example, a lessor may wish to create and maintain a certain "image" for
his shopping center or building. This appears perfectly reasonable and
even necessary to the lessor. However, the prospect of having a jury of
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1988).
33. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 516-17, 476 P.2d 97, 102-03, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729, 734-35 (1970).
34. See Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 494, 709 P.2d 837, 840, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 821 (1985); Annotation, When Lessor May Withhold Consent Under Unqualified
Provision in Lease Prohibiting Assignment or Subletting of Leased Premises Without Lessor's
Consent, 21 A.L.R. 4th 188, 191 (1983) [hereinafter Annotation, When Lessor May Withhold
Consent].
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people with no interest in the property evaluate the reasonableness of his
or her image and its enforcement may not be appealing to the lessor.
Even specific requirements that seem to be clearly reasonable may
be subject to attack. For example, consider the requirement that the
third party have good credit. There is a comment in the Kendall case
that commercially reasonable grounds for refusing consent include objec-
tions to the financial stability of the third party.3" This seems obvious
and beyond serious challenge, leaving open to dispute and litigation only
the factual question of the particular financial stability required of the
third party. However, the tenant and third party might still mount an
attack on the financial stability requirement itself.
The tenant remains liable to the lessor after the transfer occurs, so
the tenant's financial stability remains accessible to the lessor. 6 Could
the tenant and third party argue that since the lessor will continue to
have the same financial protection from the tenant after the transfer, it is
unreasonable to insist that the third party independently have financial
stability? Would this be requiring greater protection for the lessor than
he or she would have had in the absence of a transfer?37 The lessor is
legitimately interested in performance by the party in possession, not in
instituting collection litigation against an absentee party. Even though
the lessor can mount arguments to counter an attack on the apparent
reasonableness of the requirement, he might still end up having to litigate
the issue. Therefore, it may be reasonable for a lessor wishing to avoid
litigation to do so by expressly providing for a sole discretion standard.
Another example of apparently clear reasonableness is the lessor's
desire to protect percentage rentals. A California court of appeal has
held that as a matter of law the lessor who objects to an assignment that
will result in a loss of percentage rentals acts reasonably.3" Suppose that
a lease" provides for percentage rentals, but it does not contain a clause
limiting use of the premises to any specific business or it contains a clause
allowing the tenant to conduct any lawful business on the premises. Or,
suppose there is a restriction against use for other than a specific busi-
ness, but there is no clause compelling the tenant to continue in business
35. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
36. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
37. A lessor's refusal based on financial stability of the third party has been held unreason-
able when the original tenant offers to act as guarantor. See Adams, Harkness & Hill, Inc. v.
Northeast Realty Corp., 361 Mass. 552, 281 N.E.2d 262 (1972); Annotation, Construction and
Effect of Provision in Lease that Consent to Subletting or Assignment Will Not be Arbitrarily or
Unreasonably Withheld, 54 A.L.R. 3d 679 (1973) [hereinafter Annotation, Construction and
Effect].
38. John Hogan Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg, 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986).
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on the property. Also, suppose that there is a substantial minimum rent
so that it is unlikely that a court will impose an implied obligation on the
tenant to operate a particular business, or to operate at all.39 A change in
the type of business by the tenant could result in a drop in or loss of
percentage rentals; a cessation of business would result in a loss of per-
centage rentals. Does the lessor have a legally enforceable expectation to
rent over and above the agreed minimum rent? Could the tenant and
third party argue that the lessor is unreasonable to insist that he receive
more protection upon transfer than he would have had without one?
This argument is not just an example of a potential attack on an appar-
ently reasonable requirement; it is also an example of the need to con-
sider using other clauses when drafting or applying a transfer restriction
clause. A clause limiting use to a specific business and compelling con-
tinuous operation would go a long way toward protection upon transfer.
There are a variety of transactions that fall into the commercial
lease category. There may be a short-term lease used to provide a small
shop for a sole proprietor or a long-term lease used as a financing tool for
a major project developer. There may be periodic heavy use such as sea-
sonal income tax assistance, or steady and intense use such as an indus-
trial factory. The goals of the parties, and the lease provisions as the
bargained compromises of those goals, are also varied and often complex.
No one size fits all.
The California Supreme Court has recognized the difficulties of ap-
plying a reasonableness standard to commercial leases. In Mattei v. Hop-
per,4 0 a seller attempted to get out of a real property sale contract on the
ground that the buyer's obligation was subject to the broker being able to
arrange satisfactory leases of shopping center buildings. The seller
claimed that this made the buyer's promise illusory and thus, the con-
tract failed for lack of consideration.41 The court mentioned the "multi-
plicity of factors" involved in a commercial lease and declined to apply a
"reasonable man" standard to the satisfaction clause. 2 The court
pointed out that "it would seem that the factors involved in determining
whether a lease is satisfactory to the lessor are too numerous and varied
to permit the application of a reasonable man standard. '43 The court
went on to uphold the contract since the buyer, although not held to a
39. See, Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955).
40. 51 Cal. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958).
41. Id. at 121-22, 330 P.2d at 626.
42. Id. at 123, 330 P.2d at 627.
43. Id.
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reasonable person standard, was obligated to exercise honest judgment.'
A dissenting opinion in a 1981 Idaho Supreme Court decision points
out some of the practical problems that result from a reasonableness
standard.45 The case involved a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause.46
The clause required the tenant to obtain the lessor's consent to a lease-
hold transfer, but it did not contain an express standard of either reason-
ableness or sole discretion. 7 The majority inferred a reasonableness
standard. The dissenting justice commented:
[T]he effect of the decision is to potentially subject every denial
of consent to litigation and approval by a judge. Rather than
the lessor being sure of his right to control his property by re-
taining an unrestricted right to deny consent to assign or sub-
lease, by its decision today this Court has destroyed that right
and vested in the courts the power to determine what the lessor
should have intended and award control of the property based
upon that determination. Certainly, as evidenced by this case,
the parties will rarely agree on what is reasonable under partic-
ular circumstances. Is there any assurance that judges will be
unified in their opinions on what is reasonable? The only assur-
ance to be gained by the rule adopted by the majority today is
that the parties' attempt to write their lease to avoid litigation
will be frustrated.48
A lessor may want to avoid the expense, delay and uncertainty of
litigation. He or she may want to avoid having his or her judgment sec-
ond-guessed in a trial, perhaps years after exercising his or her judgment,
by persons with no interest in the property. The lessor may also wish to
avoid exposure to a risk of substantial punitive damages.49
C. Basic Issues in Choice of Standards
The tension between freedom of contract and public policy is a core
issue underlying transfer restriction questions. Beyond that broad issue,
there are two basic questions.
First, if a clause prohibits transfer of the leasehold without the les-
44. Id. at 126, 330 P.2d at 628.
45. Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 525-27, 633 P.2d 586, 590-92 (1981) (Bakes, C.J.,
dissenting).
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Funk, 102 Idaho at 522, 633 P.2d at 587.
48. Id. at 526, 633 P.2d at 591 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
49. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of other lessor motives
for placing restrictions on lease transfers.
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sor's consent, but does not expressly provide for a standard, is a reasona-
bleness or a sole discretion standard applicable? A "Silent Consent
Standard"50 type clause is the most common example; the tenant is pro-
hibited from assigning or subletting "without the lessor's prior written
consent." In addition to the freedom of contract versus public policy
issue, there is an interpretation question involved: Have the parties
agreed to one standard or the other by not saying more, or have they left
an omission which must be construed and furnished?
Second, can the parties expressly negotiate and provide for a sole
discretion standard, or are there compelling public policy reasons to take
away the freedom to contract and mandate a reasonableness standard?
The "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard"51 type clause and the
"Absolute Prohibition"52 type clause are the most common examples. 3
VII. VIEWS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA
A. Common-law and Majority View
The common-law and majority rule can be simply summarized:
leasehold transfers are freely allowed unless restricted; restrictions are
permitted, but strictly construed.
The leasehold is a transferable property interest. Absent a valid re-
striction in the lease, the tenant may assign or sublease without the les-
sor's consent and without complying with any particular standards or
restrictions. In a rare situation, a restriction might be implied.54 The
lessor is permitted to negotiate an agreement that restricts transfer of the
leasehold. Although the common-law prohibition against restraints on
fee transfers is virtually absolute, restrictions on leasehold transfers are
allowed because of the lessor's continuing interest in the property during
and after the term of the lease.
55
The scope of a restriction clause is strictly construed in order to
allow maximum freedom to the tenant.56 Thus, a particular transaction
will generally escape the restriction unless the clause expressly takes it
into consideration. For example, a simple prohibition against assignment
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. See supra Section IV.
54. See Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 385 N.E.2d 566, 412
N.Y.S.2d 827 (1978).
55. C. MOYNiHAN, supra note 11, at 32; 2 K. POwELL, supra note 11, at 372.97.
56. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 494,709 P.2d 837, 840, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 821 (1985); 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, at 372.100-372.103.
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or subleasing does not take into consideration the type of entity (e.g., a
corporate tenant that continues to hold the lease while its stock is trans-
ferred), 7 the type of interest transferred (e.g., a license or easement) or
the type of transfer (e.g., an involuntary transfer by death). 8 A restric-
tion on one type of transfer does not lead to an inferred restriction on
other types of transfers.
The basic issues involved in the choice of standards are resolved in
the following manner:
1. If a clause prohibits transfer of the leasehold without the lessor's
consent, but does not expressly provide for a reasonableness standard,
the lessor is bound only by the sole discretion standard. 9
2. The parties may expressly provide for a sole discretion standard
and this will be enforceable.'
B. Minority View
Some jurisdictions have reconsidered the common-law and majority
view and rejected it in part. In Kendall, the court commented that "[t]he
traditional majority rule has come under steady attack in recent years."o
61
The Kendall opinion goes on to state:
A growing minority of jurisdictions now hold that where a
lease provides for assignment only with the prior consent of the
lessor, such consent may be withheld only where the lessor has a
commercially reasonable objection to the assignment, even in the
absence of a provision in the lease stating that consent to as-
signment will not be unreasonably withheld.62
The following states are referred to as being in this minority: Alabama, 63
Alaska,' Arkansas,65 Florida,66 Idaho,61 Illinois, 68 New Mexico69 and
57. See Richardson v. La Rancherita, 98 Cal. App. 3d 73, 159 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979); Ser-
Bye Corp. v. C.P. & G. Markets, 78 Cal. App. 2d 915, 179 P.2d 342 (1947).
58. See Stratford Co. v. Continental Mortgage Co., 74 Cal. App. 551, 241 P. 429 (1925).
59. Annotation, When Lessor May Withhold Consent, supra note 34 at §§ 2-3.
60. 2 R. PowELL, supra note 11, at 372.97.
61. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 496, 709 P.2d 837, 841,220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 822 (1985).
62. Id.
63. Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977).
64. Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Ala. 1981).
65. Warmack v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 272 Ark. 166, 612 S.W.2d 733
(1981).
66. Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
67. Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 633 P.2d 586 (1981).
68. Jack Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 104 Ill. App. 3d 933, 433 N.E.2d 941
(1982).
69. Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982).
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Ohio.7" Three other states are mentioned for conflicting or uncertain au-
thority.71 Ohio subsequently reversed its position.72 Also, a later Ohio
case supports the common-law and majority view.7 3 There also have
been cases in Arizona74 and Colorado75 supporting the minority position.
Recent cases considering the issue have not universally adopted the mi-
nority view,76 and the ones adopting the minority view are not all with-
out dissent.7 7 However, this is not necessarily due to a disagreement
with the merits of the minority view. It may be due to the belief that the
legislature, rather than the court, should make the change.7 There may
also be a belief that the minority is the better view, but that changes to
the standard should not be adopted retroactively. An exact count of
states is much less important than determining exactly what the minority
cases do and what they do not do.
Each of the cases mentioned above involved a "Silent Consent Stan-
dard' 79 type clause that prohibited transfer without the lessor's consent
but did not expressly state either a reasonableness or a sole discretion
standard. None of those cases involved a clause expressly providing for a
sole discretion standard and none of those cases hold that an express sole
discretion standard would be unenforceable. Thus, the attack of the mi-
nority upon the traditional common-law and majority view has been
aimed at only one of the two major components of that rule. 0
The minority cases stand for the proposition that a reasonableness
70. Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime and Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584
(1971).
71. The three states are Louisiana, Massachusetts and North Carolina, mentioned in
Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496 n.9, 709 P.2d at 841-42 n.9, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23 n.9 (1985).
72. Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime and Stone Co., App. No. 31451 (Ohio Ct. App.
March 2, 1972) (cited in F & L Center Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d
72, 75, 482 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (1984)).
73. F & L Center Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 72, 482 N.E.2d
1296 (1984).
74. Campbell v. Westdahl, 148 Ariz. 432, 715 P.2d 288 (1985); Tucson Medical Center v.
Zoslow, 147 Ariz. 612, 712 P.2d 459 (1985).
75. Basnett v. Vista Village Mobile Home Park, 699 P.2d 1343 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
76. See, eg., Danpar Assocs. v. Somersville Mills Sales Room, Inc., 182 Conn. 444, 438
A.2d 708 (1980); Mann Theatres v. Mid-Island Shopping Plaza Co., 94 A.D. 466, 464
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1983); Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 284 S.E.2d 534 (1981); Snortland v.
Larson, 364 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1985); B & R Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc., 139 Vt. 122,
422 A.2d 1267 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Homa-Goff Interiors v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (1977); Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985); Funk, 102 Idaho 521,
633 P.2d 586.
78. See, e.g., Homa-GoffInteriors, 350 So. 2d at 1041.
79. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the components of the
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standard will be implied to govern the lessor in the absence of an express
standard. 81 The cases change the effect of a "Silent Consent Standard"82
type clause. Absent an express standard, the common-law and majority
permit the lessor to have sole discretion. 3 The minority requires the
lessor to meet an objective standard of commercial reasonableness.84 A
major argument for the common-law and majority treatment of this type
of clause is that the language is clear, so there is no basis for implying a
reasonableness standard.85 The clause does not expressly mention sole
discretion or reasonableness. The tenant could have bargained for a rea-
sonableness standard, in which case it would be expressed in the lease.
Since it is not in the lease, it was not bargained for, and the lessor is left
with a sole discretion standard.86 The minority does not find the "Silent
Consent Standard" unambiguous regarding the governing standard. 7 If
the clause is considered unclear, two basic policies lead to a reasonable-
ness standard. One is the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.88 The other is the dislike and strict construction of restrictions on
transfer. 89
Many of the minority-view cases use strong language to criticize the
sole discretion standard.9° However, the cases do not directly hold that
the parties cannot bargain and expressly provide for such a standard.
There is no trend of holdings abolishing the part of the common-law and
majority rule that leaves the sole discretion standard to the agreement of
the parties.
The minority view is directed at avoiding unpleasant surprises for
the tenant at the time of transfer-the "Silent Consent Standard" sur-
prise. It is directed at encouraging disclosures and clarifying expecta-
tions. It does not override the freedom of contract of the parties, nor
does it prohibit a negotiated express sole discretion standard.
81. See, e.g., Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496-98, 709 P.2d at 841-43, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
82. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
85. See, e.g., F & L Center Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 19 Ohio App. 3d 72, 482
N.E.2d 1296 (1984).
86. See Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
87. Id. at 502-03, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
88. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
89. Id. at 498-99, 709 P.2d at 843-44, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25.
90. See, eg., id. at 501-04, 709 P.2d at 845-48, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826-28.
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VIII. RESTATEMENT POSITION
The Restatement (Second) of Property adopts the following ap-
proach to leasehold transfers and restrictions:
The interests... of the tenant in the leased property are freely
transferable, unless ...the parties to the lease validly agree
otherwise.91
A restraint on alienation without the consent of the land-
lord of the tenant's interest in the leased property is valid, but
the landlord's consent to an alienation by the tenant cannot be
withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated provision in
the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold
consent.
92
The strict construction approach of the common-law and majority is
continued in the Restatement.93 Thus, the language will be construed in
favor of the tenant and transferability absent clear words of restriction.
The Restatement distinguishes among three types of restraints, cate-
gorized by the remedies available to the lessor. 4 First, if a prohibited
transfer is made, the "forfeiture restraint" allows the lessor either to ter-
minate the lease or to forego his objections to the transfer and enforce the
lease provisions. 95 Second, the "disabling restraint" allows the lessor to
keep the lease in effect and prevent the transfer from taking place.96
Third, the "promissory restraint" ends up almost as one of the other two
types, depending on the remedy available and chosen .for breach of the
promise.97 If the lessor can and does terminate the lease, the effect is the
same as a forfeiture restraint, but with the additional right to damages.
If the lessor can and does seek specific performance of the promise, the
effect is the same as a disabling restraint. Although the lessor may prefer
to have the option to negate the transfer, the disabling restraint is more
disliked than a forfeiture restraint. The disabling restraint prevents
transfer while the forfeiture restraint involves either a transfer back to
the lessor or a permitted transfer to the third party. California appears
to adopt the forfeiture restraint remedy, despite language in the clause
indicating either a disabling or a promissory restraint.9
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.1 (1977).
92. Id. § 15.2.
93. Id. at comment e.
94. Id. at comments b, c & d.
95. Id. at comment b.
96. Id. at comment c.
97. Id. at comment d.
98. See, e.g., People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944); Chapman v. Great
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Kendall and several of the other minority-view cases refer to the
Restatement and use it to support their use of the reasonableness stan-
dard.9 9 The Restatement reflects the minority view by imposing a rea-
sonableness standard on the "Silent Consent Standard" type clause." It
leaves the common-law and majority view intact where the parties have
agreed to and have expressly provided for a sole discretion standard.
The Restatement position allows the lessor to have a provision for "an
absolute right to withhold consent" if it is "freely negotiated." Under
the Restatement, if the tenant has "no significant bargaining power in
relation to the terms of the lease," it is not freely negotiated.101 A clause
that lacks free negotiation is not totally void; transfer is still restricted
but a reasonableness standard applies. 10 2
The policy toward recovery of the premises by the lessor, triggered
by an attempted transfer, depends on the manner in which recovery is
accomplished. There might be a provision allowing the tenant to termi-
nate the lease (as an exclusive remedy) if the lessor unreasonably with-
holds consent. This is sufficiently close to a sole discretion standard to
require that the clause be freely negotiated. A Restatement comment
distinguishes this from a lessor's right of first refusal to acquire the ten-
ant's interest on the same terms offered by a third party. The comment
states that "[s]uch right of first refusal is valid though its exercise will
prevent the transfer by the tenant to another." °10 3 Since the tenant will
receive basically the same deal from the lessor or the third party, there is
no significant damper on transferability.
The Restatement position, like the minority view, is directed at
avoiding unpleasant surprises for the tenant at the time of transfer-the
"Silent Consent Standard" surprise; it is directed at encouraging disclo-
sures and clarifying expectations. It does not override the freedom of
contract of the parties, nor prohibit a negotiated express sole discretion
standard.
Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932); Weisman v. Clark, 232 Cal. App. 2d
764, 43 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1965).
99. See Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 709 P.2d 837, 844, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 825 (1985).
100. REsTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2(2).
101. Id. § 15.2 comment i.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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IX. CALIFORNIA PRIOR TO KENDALL
A. Statutes
California Civil Code section 711 provides that "[c]onditions re-
straining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void.""
There is nothing in this statute, enacted in 1872, to indicate that anything
but the common-law rule was being adopted.105 Restraints on alienation
were considered repugnant to a fee simple interest.1 0 6 They were not
considered repugnant to a leasehold interest.107 California Civil Code
section 820 provides in pertinent part that "[a] tenant for years or at will
has no other rights to the property than such as are given to him by the
agreement or instrument by which his tenancy is acquired."'0° This stat-
ute, enacted in 1872, emphasizes the lease as the source of the tenant's
rights.
B. Cases Prior to Kendall
DeAngeles v. Cotta,1°9 decided in 1923, has been cited as an early
suggestion that restrictions must relate to the lessor's legitimate inter-
ests. 110 The lessor brought an unlawful detainer action based on the al-
leged breach of a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause which
prohibited transfer without the lessor's consent.1 ' The four original ten-
ants, through a series of individual assignments, had transferred their
interests in the lease to two new parties. The trial court found that the
original tenants did not jointly assign the leasehold and the clause did not
prohibit assignment of their individual interests.1 12
The court of appeal reversed, interpreting the clause as a joint and
several covenant not to assign.11 3 The court stated that "[o]wners of
property are justly solicitous as to the character of its occupants and re-
strictions upon the right of a lessee to substitute another tenant without
the lessor's consent are reasonable covenants which ought to be ration-
ally construed."114 The court referred to the California statute that re-
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
105. Id. §§ 5, 711.
106. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 11, at 32.
107. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, at 372.97.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 820 (West 1982).
109. 62 Cal. App. 691, 217 P. 821 (1923).
110. Kehr, Lease Assignments: The Landlord's Consent, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 108, 111 (1980).
111. DeAngeles, 62 Cal. App. at 692-93, 217 P. at 821.
112. Id. at 694, 217 P. at 822.
113. Id. at 696, 217 P. at 823.
114. Id. at 695, 217 P. at 822.
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quires strict construction of a condition involving forfeiture," 5 but went
on to say that "[tlhis does not mean that courts must resort to scholastic
subtleties to save tenants from the consequences of their deliberate
breach of their covenants."'" 6 The court approved the view that courts
should not make a different contract for the parties or defeat their clear
intent by resorting to strained and unnatural construction. 1 7 A petition
for hearing in the California Supreme Court was denied."'
DeAngeles does not involve a court-imposed reasonableness stan-
dard. It does not analyze and express a preference against a sole discre-
tion standard. The case merely shows that strict construction of a
restriction on transfer does not prevent a common-sense interpretation of
the purpose of the clause to protect a lessor.
Kendis v. Cohn," 9 decided in 1928 by the court of appeal, involved a
clause that prohibited assignment or subletting without the lessor's con-
sent.' 20 The clause provided that "lessees may, with the written consent
of... lessors, assign... to any person or persons of good character and
repute and satisfactory to the lessors."'' The court pointed out that a
reasonableness standard was not expressed and would not be inferred.
The lessor "is the sole judge of his own satisfaction, subject only to the
limitation that he must act in good faith."'22 The lessor was the sole
judge of good character and repute, without testing that judgment
against the ordinary reasonable person. However, if he or she were in
fact satisfied, he or she could not act in bad faith by deceitfully denying
satisfaction.
23
The Kendis opinion states that a lessor is still bound by a require-
ment of good faith even though he or she does not have to be judged by
an objective reasonableness standard. 124 A person may be unreasonable
but still act in good faith. Reasonableness is an objective test based on
common experience of the ordinary reasonable person. "Good faith, in
contrast, suggests a moral quality; its absence is equated with dishonesty,
deceit or unfaithfulness to duty.5
125
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442 (West 1982).
116. DeAngeles, 62 Cal. App. at 695, 217 P. at 822.
117. Id. at 695-96, 217 P. at 823.
118. Id. at 696, 217 P. at 823.
119. 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
120. Id. at 48-49, 265 P. at 846-47.
121. Id. at 49, 265 P. at 847.
122. Id. at 66, 265 P. at 854.
123. Id. at 67, 265 P. at 854.
124. Id.
125. Guntert v. City of Stockton, 43 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210-11, 117 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606
(1974).
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The clause in Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc.,' 26 decided in 1960,
prohibited assignment or subleasing without the lessor's written consent,
and it did not expressly provide a consent standard. The tenant con-
tended that the lessor could not "arbitrarily" refuse consent- to a sub-
lease. 127 The court rejected the tenant's contention with the comment
that it was "untenable" and followed the traditional majority view; 2 ' the
"Silent Consent Standard" type clause was governed by a sole discretion,
not a reasonableness, standard.129 The court did not discuss the merits of
that view, nor the reasons that might support a contrary view.
1 30
In 1981, a court of appeal panel imposed a reasonableness standard
on a condominium association. 13 In Laguna Royale Owners Association
v. Darger,132 a condominium association attempted to block a mini-time-
share division by one of the condominium owners. The association as-
serted the absolute right to withhold consent while the unit owner as-
serted the absolute right to transfer.1 33 The court rejected both absolutes
and allowed transfer restrictions subject to a reasonableness standard.
1 34
The association argued that the traditional rule allowing absolute restric-
tions on a tenant applied because the unit owner was technically a subles-
see.' 35 The condominium was developed pursuant to a 99-year ground
lease, and buyers of the units received an undivided interest in the lease-
hold.' 36 The court took a passing shot at the traditional rule when it
stated: "Even assuming the continued vitality of the rule that a- lessor
may arbitrarily withhold consent to a sublease ... there is little or no
similarity in the relationship between a condominium owner and his fel-
low owners and that between lessor and lessee or sublessor and subles-
see." 3 7 The common law has long recognized a distinction between a
leasehold interest upon which restrictions are clearly allowed, and a fee
ownership interest upon which restrictions are virtually prohibited.'38
Since the court distinguished the condominium unit interest from the
126. 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960).
127. Id. at 297, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
128. Id. at 299, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1981).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 679, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
134. Id. at 680, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
135. Id. at 681, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
136. Id. at 673, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
137. Id. at 681, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
138. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 11, at 32; 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, at 372.97.
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typical leasehold interest, the rule in the Richard case was also
distinguished.
3 9
In Cohen v. Ratinoff,'4 a court of appeal squarely faced and rejected
the traditional rule decided in 1983. A commercial lease clause pre-
vented assignment or subleasing without the lessor's prior written con-
sent, and there was no express consent standard-a "Silent Consent
Standard" type clause.' 4 ' After several requests by the tenant for con-
sent to an assignment, the lessor's attorney informed the tenant that the
lessor could be "as arbitrary as he chooses."' 4 This colorful framing of
the issue may have encouraged reevaluation of the traditional rule for the
court held that a lessor may refuse consent only where he or she has an
objectively reasonable objection.
143
The Cohen case was followed in quick succession by five cases deal-
ing with the same issue: Schweiso v. Williams ' 4 in 1984; Prestin v. Mobil
Oil Co. ' in 1984 (applying a federal court's perception of California
law); Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder 146 in 1984; Hamilton v. Dixon 141
in 1985; and, Thrifty Oil Co. v. Batarse14 1 in 1985. All five cases involved
commercial leases. All five involved clauses restricting transfer without
the lessor's consent, but with no express consent standard-a "Silent
Consent Standard" type clause. 149
Schweiso and Prestin imposed a reasonableness standard on the les-
sor.'5 ° In Schweiso, the lessors referred to the restriction clause as a "li-
cense to steal" and they demanded a "transfer fee" as "blood money.
' '
ISI
Some might consider this subtle choice of words used to frame the issue
as the verbal equivalent of an obscene gesture.
The Sade Shoe Co. decision seems to stand for the proposition that a
sole discretion refusal is permitted, but that it may constitute tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage.' 5 2 This prompted the
139. Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. at 681, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
140. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
141. Id. at 328, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
142. Id. at 325, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
143. Id. at 330, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
144. 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 198 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1984).
145. 741 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1984).
146. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1984).
147. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1985).
148. 174 Cal. App. 3d 770, 220 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1985).
149. Prestin, 741 F.2d at 269; Thrifty Oil Co., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 220 Cal. Rptr. at
286; Hamilton, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 640; Sade Shoe Co., 162 Cal. App.
3d at 1177, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 125; Schweiso, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
150. Prestin, 741 F.2d at 273; Schweiso, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 886-87, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
151. Schweiso, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
152. Sade Shoe, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1179-80, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
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Hamilton court to comment that it was "bemused" by that apparently
"incongruous" result.
15 3
The lease in Hamilton was executed in 1970.154 The court expressed
the view that Richard v. Degen & Brody was "clearly the law" at that
time, and it would be improper to rewrite the bargained rights and rea-
sonable expectations fifteen years later. 55 The court also commented
that the abrogation of the freedom to bargain for a sole discretion stan-
dard should come from the legislature, and not the courts.
15 6
It should be noted that the facts in Hamilton show that it is im-
proper to always characterize the tenant as riding the white horse of vir-
tue in a joust with a greedy lessor. Picture the lessor as a sixty-seven year
old widow living alone in a mobile home. Her income came from social
security and rent from the leased property. Her fixed rent had become a
"pittance" due to "shocking double-digit inflation" during the fifteen
years since the lease was executed.1
57
The dispute in the Thrifty Oil case involved a "Silent Consent Stan-
dard" type clause in a sublease.' 58 The subtenant subleased to third par-
ties without even asking for the sublessor's consent.15 9 The sublessor
brought an unlawful detainer action against the subtenant and third par-
ties to recover possession." After a hearing, which took place about
three months before the Cohen decision, the trial court ruled in favor of
the sublessor based on the Richard case. 6' After the Cohen decision, the
subtenant and third parties cited it in a petition to be relieved from forfei-
ture under California Civil Procedure Code section 1179.162 This section
allows relief from forfeiture in limited hardship situations. 163 The trial
court denied the petition because the subtenant had not requested con-
sent."6 The court of appeal found it unnecessary to decide whether
Richard or Cohen applied when interpreting the "Silent Consent Stan-
dard" clause, because no consent had been sought. 165 Regardless of
153. Hamilton, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
154. Id. at 1006, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
155. Id. at 1009, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (citing Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 181 Cal.
App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960)).
156. Id. at 1010, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
157. Id. at 1011, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
158. Thrifty Oil, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 773, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 774, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
163. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179 (West 1982).
164. Thrifty Oil, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
165. Id. at 776, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
which case applied, the court of appeal in Thrifty Oil stated that the sub-
tenant and third parties "properly could not prevail in the unlawful de-
tainer action because of the fact there was a failure to seek consent for
the assignment." '166 However, the court held that the failure to seek con-
sent was not an absolute bar to relief against forfeiture under section
1179.167 The matter was remanded to the trial court to weigh the facts
for forfeiture relief.168 The court gave examples of factors to consider.
One factor is not that consent was not sought but why consent was not
sought.16 9 Another example was the degree of arbitrariness or unreason-
ableness, if any, of the sublessor.1 70 It seems strange that the failure to
ask for consent would block the subtenant and third parties from win-
ning the unlawful detainer, yet not block them from relief against forfei-
ture. Comments in the case indicate that the court might have been
giving the subtenant and third parties the opportunity to prove that ask-
ing for consent would have been a futile gesture.
1 71
In Don Rose Oil Co. v. Lindsley,172 decided in 1984 by the court of
appeal, the court cited Cohen and Prestin with approval, and commented
that "[t]he trend in the law is toward assignability of contract rights."
173
However, this case involved a dispute concerning the right to assign a
petroleum franchise.174 The characteristics of a business franchise and a
commercial lease are sufficiently different so that the case did nothing to
resolve leasehold transfer issues.
This was the variegated background faced by the California
Supreme Court when the Kendall case came before it.
X. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.
A. Facts
There were four transactions leading up to the suit in Kendall.1 75
The following outline may help to identify the transactions and parties
discussed below:
1. Lessor (City) lease Tenant (Perlitchs).
2. Tenant (Perlitchs) - sublease Subtenant (Bixler).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 777, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
168. Id. at 775, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
169. Id. at 778, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
170. Id., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
171. Id. at 776, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
172. 160 Cal. App. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1984).
173. Id. at 759, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
174. Id. at 755, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
175. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
[Vol. 22:405
LEASEHOLD TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
3. Tenant (Perlitchs)- assignment Assignee (Pestana).
4. Subtenant (Bixler)- proposed assignment-Kendall & O'Haras.
5. Proposed assignees of the sublease, Kendall and O'Haras, vs. Assignee
of the prime lease, Pestana.
First, the City of San Jose (lessor) leased airport hanger space to the
Perlitchs (prime tenants). 176 Second, the Perlitchs (prime tenants) sublet
to Bixler (subtenant).177 Third, the Perlitchs (prime tenants/sublessors)
assigned all interest in the prime lease to the Pestana corporation
(assignee of the prime lease and successor sublessor).' 78 Fourth, Bixler
(subtenant) proposed to assign his interests in the sublease, as part of a
sale of his business, to Kendall and the O'Haras (proposed assignees of
the sublease). 179  Kendall and the O'Haras had a stronger financial
position than Bixler (subtenant).180 Bixler (subtenant) requested consent
to the proposed assignment from Pestana (assignee of the prime lease and
successor sublessor).' 8 ' Consent was denied, and Pestana allegedly
demanded increased rent and other deal sweeteners as a condition of
consent.1
8 2
Kendall and the O'Haras (proposed assignees of the sublease)
brought an action against Pestana (assignee of the prime lease and
successor sublessor) for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
damages. 183 They contended in effect that Pestana was bound by a
reasonableness standard and that it had unreasonably withheld and
conditioned consent.' 8 4 The trial court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint without leave to amend and, on appeal, this was deemed to
include a judgment of dismissal of the action.18 The California Supreme
Court reversed.' 6
The plaintiffs, Kendall and the O'Haras, were the proposed
assignees of a sublease.' 8 7 The defendant, Pestana, was the assignee of
the prime lease and a successor sublessor."'8 The disputed clause was
176. Id. at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id., 709 P.2d 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 494, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 493 n.3, 709 P.2d at 839 n.3, 220 Cal Rptr. at 820 n.3.
186. Id. at 507, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
187. Id. at 493, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
188. Id. at 494, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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contained in the sublease.' 89 It prohibited assignment, sublease or other
specific actions without prior written consent of the sublessor.' 90 It was
a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause, and did not expressly provide
for a reasonableness or a sole discretion standard.' 9 ' Other clauses
provided for: a five-year term with options for four additional five-year
terms; a rent escalation every ten years proportionate to the prime lease
rent increase; and use of the premises as an aircraft maintenance
business. The sublease was apparently drafted and executed in 1969
(with a term to commence January 1, 1970).192
The dispute concerned a successor sublessor's refusal to consent to
assignment of the subleasehold by a subtenant. 193 It will be easier to deal
with the issues in the more common context of a lessor, tenant and third
party dispute. Assume that the lessor of a commercial lease used a
"Silent Consent Standard" type clause to refuse or condition consent to a
proposed transfer by the tenant to a third party. The court in Kendall
used this context in its discussion.' 94 The issues and their resolution will
be the same. Also, although the parties in the case were fighting over a
proposed assignment, the court expressly extended its holding to
subleases. 195
B. Kendall Rule and Reasons
The facts involved a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause. 196 The
lease required the tenant to get the lessor's consent for a transfer of the
leasehold. The clause did not expressly provide for either a reasonable-
ness standard or a sole discretion standard.' 97 Faced with the narrow
issue of which standard to use, the majority of the court in Kendall
adopted the minority view that a reasonableness standard should be im-
plied. 198 The decision imposes a reasonableness consent standard on the
lessor of a commercial lease containing a clause that restricts assignment
or subleasing without lessor's consent, and that has no express consent
189. Id. n.5.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
193. Id. at 494, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
194. Id. at 495, 709 P.2d at 841, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
195. Id. at 492 n.2, 709 P.2d at 839 n.2, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820 n 2.
196. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 492, 709 P.2d 837, 839, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 820 (1985); see supra note 24 and accompanying text for an explanation of this type of
clause.
197. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 494 n.5, 709 P.2d at 840 n.5, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.5.
198. Id. at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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standard. The lessor in that situation must have a commercially reason-
able objection to justify refusal to consent.
The court relied on dual bases for the result, flowing from the dual
nature of a lease as a conveyance and as a contract.199 First, the Kendall
court stated that in California unreasonable restraints on alienation are
prohibited. 2"° The court borrowed from the "due on transfer" loan se-
curity situation in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America201 to support and
amplify this proposition. The justification for the restriction is compared
with the quantum of restraint to determine reasonableness. 20 2 The court
saw no modern justification for allowing leases to be exempt from the
general policy.
Second, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in con-
tracts in California.20 3 The contractual nature of a lease brings that duty
into the lease. The court concluded that where the lessor retains the
discretionary power to grant or withhold consent to an assignment or
sublease, the power should be exercised in accordance with commercially
reasonable standards. 2 4
C. Common-law Rule Arguments Rejected
When a clause requires the lessor's consent, the common-law and
majority view would allow the lessor to permit or block transfer in its
sole discretion in the absence of an express reasonableness standard. The
Kendall court addressed arguments supporting the traditional common-
law rule.205
First, the traditional rule emphasizes the lessor's freedom of per-
sonal choice in selecting the tenant. The unconsenting lessor is not obli-
gated to look to someone else for performance. The court said that the
values used in personal selection are preserved by the commercially rea-
sonable grounds used for withholding consent.20 6 Also, the original ten-
ant remains liable to the lessor despite the assignment or sublease. The
court also pointed to certain lease-breach remedy legislation, discussed
below in section E, as support for limits on the lessor's freedom of
199. Id. at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 500, 709 P.2d at 844-45, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
204. Id., 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
205. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501-02, 709 P.2d 837, 845, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 826 (1985).
206. Id. at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
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choice. °7
Another justification the court cited for the traditional rule is that
the absence of an express reasonableness standard results in an unambig-
uous reservation of sole discretion. The tenant failed to bargain for a
reasonableness standard, so the law should not rewrite the contract.2 8
The court implied that the clause was not unambiguous. Also, it pointed
out that recognition of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is
not a rewriting of the contract.20 9 It is important to keep in mind the
type of clause that the court was dealing with when considering the am-
biguity argument: the clause did not expressly provide any consent stan-
dard. Thus the court's discussion-was dicta.
D. Use of "Silent Consent Standard" Clause to Increase
Profit is Improper
Sometimes the rental value of property increases beyond the agreed
rent. 10 Sometimes a lessor uses a proposed assignment or sublease as a
device to demand increased rent as a condition of consent. This was
apparently the situation in Kendall. The court rejected the argument
that the lessor has the right to the increase in rental value in this situa-
tion.211 The lessor made his bargain and could not reasonably anticipate
any greater benefit of increased value than that granted by the lease.212 It
is important to keep the court's criticism of the lessor's profit motive in
the perspective of the facts. The lessor apparently surprised the tenant
with a demand for money that it was not otherwise entitled to under the
terms of the lease.213 It was attempting to improve, not just maintain, its
economic position without the benefit of an express clause. The lessor
could have initially bargained for and expressly included frequent peri-
odic rent increases in the lease; it could have used other express clauses
to increase its return.21 4 In the Kendall lease, there was a provision for
rent escalation every ten years. 215 Apparently, however, there was no
express provision for a rent increase upon assignment or subleasing, nor
207. Id. at 501-02, 709 P.2d at 845-46, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27; see infra notes 217-32 and
accompanying text.
208. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501-02, 709 P.2d at 845-46, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
209. Id. at 503, 709 P.2d at 847, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
210. This accounts for the profit motive shared by both lessor and tenant. See supra subsec-
tion V(CQ.
211. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 504-05, 709 P.2d 837, 845, 848,
220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 826, 829 (1985).
212. Id. at 504, 709 P.2d at 848, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
213. Id. at 494, 709 P.2d at 840, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
214. Id. at 504-05, 709 P.2d at 848, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
215. Id. at 493, 709 P.2d at 839, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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was there any provision for the lessor to receive part or all of the profit
derived by the tenant from the transaction."1 6 Thus, the lessor had little
intrinsic support for contending that it was proper to demand higher rent
as a condition for permitting the transfer.
E. Inferences From Remedy Legislation
In 1970, the California Legislature adopted a comprehensive revi-
sion of the lessor's remedies upon termination of a lease.217 Parts of that
legislation are cited for support by both the Kendall majority21 and dis-
sent.2 19 Civil Code section 1951.2 provides that, except as provided in
section 1951.4, a lease terminates if either of two situations occur: (1) the
tenant breaches and abandons; or (2) the tenant breaches and the lessor
terminates the tenant's right to possession.2 1 Section 1951.2 further pro-
vides that the lessor may recover the excess of the post-termination un-
paid rent over the amount of rental loss that the tenant proves could have
been reasonably avoided. 21 Thus, the tenant may reduce or avoid these
damages by proving what the lessor could receive by reletting to another
tenant. The Kendall majority opinion commented that this "duty to mit-
igate damages" undermines the lessor's freedom to look exclusively to
the tenant for performance.222
Civil Code section 1951.4 permits the lessor to keep the lease in ef-
fect and to continue enforcing its terms against the tenant.22 3 This lock-
in remedy must be included in the lease to apply. Also, it is available
only "if the lease permits" the tenant to sublet, assign, or both, subject
only to reasonable limitations.224 If the lessor's consent is required, the
lease must provide that consent "shall not unreasonably be withheld."22
The remedy is available only if the lessor expressly subjects himself or
herself to a reasonableness standard. The Kendall dissent argued that
the legislature provided the remedy as an incentive to forego the right to
216. Id. at 504, 709 P.2d at 848, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
217. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951-1952.6, except 1951.3, 1952.3 (effective July 1, 1971) (West
1985).
218. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 502, 505, 506, 709 P.2d 837, 846, 848,
849, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 827, 829, 830 (1985).
219. Id. at 510, 709 P.2d at 851-52, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2.
221. Id. § 1951-2(a)(2).
222. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
223. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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withhold consent unreasonably.2 2 6 It follows, the dissent argued, that
the legislature must have recognized the contractual right to withhold
consent unreasonably.227 The majority called this speculation.228 The
majority stated that implied statutory recognition of a common-law rule
that is not the subject of the statute does not codify the rule.229 Also,
such implied recognition does not prevent a court from reexamining the
rule.
2 30
The majority and dissent positions can be reconciled. The dissent
argued that the legislature provided the lock-in remedy in part as an in-
centive for a lessor to forego the right to withhold consent in his or her
sole discretion.23' The majority did not prohibit an express sole discre-
tion standard. It implied a reasonableness standard where there was no
express contrary language.232 Thus, the lessor has the incentive to give
up a sole discretion standard in order to obtain the lock-in remedy, but if
the lessor does not wish to forego the sole discretion standard, the lease
must expressly provide for it.
There is another argument based on section 1951.4; one that was not
specifically mentioned by the dissent. In order for the lock-in remedy to
be available, the lease must permit the tenant to sublet, assign, "or both."
The statute clearly requires that the lessor allow either a sublease or an
assignment or both, without restriction or with reasonable restrictions.
It just as clearly allows the lessor to prevent either a sublease or an as-
signment without the reasonableness standard limitation. This argument
can also be reconciled with the majority position by emphasizing the nar-
rowness of the majority's holding-in the absence of an express standard,
reasonableness will be implied.
The remedy legislation package adopted in 1970 was the product of
an extensive review by the California Law Revision Commission. 233 It
seems that the Commission and the legislature assumed the existence of
the traditional rule in California, but did not specifically consider
whether it should be followed or rejected. The remedies revision was a
major undertaking and understandably occupied their attention. Now
226. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 510, 709 P.2d at 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 506, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 510, 709 P.2d at 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
233. See Abandonment or Termination of a Lease, 8 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 701
(1966); 9 CAL. L. REvISION COMM'N REP. 401 (1968); 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP.
153 (1969).
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that issues concerning restraints on leasehold transfers have become
more pronounced, Civil Code section 1951.4 should be re-examined.
This will be done below.
F Guidelines for Reasonableness
The Kendall decision points out some factors that may be consid-
ered in applying the reasonableness standard. They are: financial re-
sponsibility of the new party; legality and suitability of the use of the
premises; need for alterations of the premises; and nature of occu-
pancy.234 The court mentioned other situations where courts have con-
sidered the lessor's objection to be reasonable. These situations were:
the desire to have one lead tenant in order to preserve the building image;
the desire to preserve tenant mix in a shopping center; and the belief that
a proposed specialty restaurant would not succeed at the location.235
The court considered it unreasonable to deny consent "solely on the basis
of personal taste, convenience or sensibility," or for the purpose of charg-
ing more rent than originally agreed.236 Other examples can be found in
cases involving clauses that contain an express reasonableness standard.
Once a reasonableness standard has been negotiated or imposed, the
question of what is reasonable is generally one of fact.237 This Article is
concerned with the more basic question of when a reasonableness stan-
dard will be imposed. Therefore, there will not be an extensive discus-
sion of cases applying the reasonableness standard.
G. Application to Types of Restriction Clauses
Section D of this Article describes eight different types of transfer
restriction clauses. The Kendall case involved the "Silent Consent Stan-
dard" type clause.238 The clause did not contain an express standard for
consent. The court only had to decide whether to infer a reasonableness
or a sole discretion consent standard in the absence of any express stan-
dard. It inferred a reasonableness standard and thus, departed from the
common-law and majority view on this particular issue. The case has no
impact on the "Express Reasonable Consent Standard ' 239 type clause,
except for language in the case discussing what may or may not be con-
234. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 709 P.2d 837, 845, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 826 (1985).
235. Id. at 502, 709 P.2d at 846, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
236. Id. at 501, 709 P.2d at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
237. Id.
238. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 493-94, 709 P.2d 837, 839-40, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 820-21 (1985).
239. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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sidered reasonable.2' The "Express Sole Discretion Consent Stan-
dard,"241 "Absolute Prohibition ' 24 2 and "Possession Recovery"243 type
clauses were not expressly involved in the Kendall case. Drawing infer-
ences from language used to resolve the narrow issue actually involved in
the case is dangerous. There may be clues in the case to predict the
attitude of the court members who decided Kendall. However, such di-
vining by crystal ball must take into consideration that four out of five in
the majority are no longer on the court2' and both of the dissenters are
still sitting.24 Some feel that the change in court personnel will favor
lessors, at least where questions of reasonableness arise.
The Kendall court used broad general language to both criticize the
traditional common-law rule and to support a reasonableness stan-
dard.24 Much of that language could be applied to an express sole dis-
cretion standard clause. On the other hand, the court referred to the
Restatement as support for modem rejection of the traditional common-
law rule.2 47 The Restatement infers a reasonableness standard in a "Si-
lent Consent Standard" type of clause, but it also allows a freely negoti-
ated "absolute right to withhold consent."24  The court clearly
recognized the impact of the Restatement position. It commented that
the Restatement rule would validate a clause giving the lessor "absolute
discretion" or the power of "absolutely prohibiting" an assignment (or
sublease).249 However, the court added that the case does not involve the
question of the validity of those clause types.
250
Kendall did not deal directly with the "Express Specific Require-
ments' 251 type clause. If there is a question about the reasonableness of a
specific requirement, the general discussion of reasonable objections will
be of help. If there is a question whether the parties can expressly agree
to a specific requirement that does not meet a reasonableness test, the
clue search mentioned above is involved again. Kendall applies directly
to the "Consent Required But Exemptions" type clause if the clause is
silent on the consent standard. If there is an express reasonableness stan-
240. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d at 895, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
241. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Justices Bird, Reynoso, Grodin, and Kas.
245. Justices Mosk and Lucas.
246. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501-05, 709 P.2d at 845-48, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826-29.
247. Id. at 499-500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
248. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2(2).
249. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 499 n.14, 709 P.2d at 844 n.14, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825 n.14.
250. Id.
251. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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dard, Kendall has no impact except for language discussing the meaning
of reasonableness. If there is an express sole discretion standard, there is
no direct answer in the case.
Footnote seventeen in Kendall appears to show approval of a "Profit
Shift"252 type clause that gives the lessor the right to profit from the
assignment or sublease transaction. The Court stated in that footnote:
[Amicus counsel] request[s] that we make clear that, "whatever
principle governs in the absence of express lease provisions,
nothing bars the parties to commercial lease transactions from
making their own arrangements respecting the allocation of ap-
preciated rentals if there is a transfer of the leasehold." This
principle we affirm; we merely hold that the clause in the in-
stant lease established no such arrangement.253
Footnote seventeen also indicated that the court was aiming its
broad criticism of the common-law rule at clauses that do not contain
express language, not clauses that clearly put the tenant on notice of
what to expect.254
XI. CALIFORNIA AFTER THE KENDALL CASE
John Hogan Enterprises, Inc. v. Kellogg,255 decided in 1986 by the
court of appeal, involved a percentage rent lease with a clause that lim-
ited use of the premises to a women's ready-to-wear shop. The tenant
had been operating at a stable profit for several years and producing per-
centage rentals above the minimum rent.256 The tenant entered escrow
to assign the lease to a third party who proposed to operate an antique
store as a hobby. There would not be sufficient revenue to produce per-
centage rentals, so only the minimum rent would be paid by the third
party for the remaining nine years of the term.257 The third party agreed
to pay the tenant $150,000. This amount was "equivalent to the differ-
ence over the remaining nine years of the lease between the minimum
rent and the actual rents the Lessor had historically received. '258 The
252. Id.
253. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 505 n.17, 709 P.2d at 848 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.17.
254. Id.
255. 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986).
256. Id. at 591-92, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
257. Id. at 592, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The original lease provided for a minimum monthly
rent of $2,750. During the three years prior to the lessee's attempt to assign the lease, the
average monthly rent, based on the percentage formula consistently exceeded the minimum
monthly rent. In 1981, the average monthly rent exceeded $4,200; in 1982, it exceeded $4,000;
and in 1983, it exceeded $3,700. Id. at 591, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
258. Id. at 592 n.2, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.2.
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lessor used a "Silent Consent Standard" '259 type clause in the lease to
object to the transfer.
The court applied Kendall and subjected the lessor to a reasonable-
ness standard.2 " It made an irrefutable comment in holding, as a matter
of law, that the lessor met the reasonableness standard: "Refusing to
consent to highway robbery cannot be deemed commercially unjusti-
fied." '261 The court drew an important distinction: a lessor's refusal to
consent in order to increase his or her return above that provided in the
lease is generally considered unreasonable.262 However, it is reasonable
to object to a transfer that would place the lessor in a worse financial
position than he or she bargained for and could expect to continue under
a percentage lease.263
The Hogan court did not directly deal with the use clause. The
clause limited use to a women's ready-to-wear shop.264 The third party
intended to use the premises as an antique shop.2 61 Probably, the court
considered the proposed change of use issue as included in, and overpow-
ered by, the loss of rent issue. There does not seem to be a legitimate
basis in the case to speculate that the court would have allowed the
change in use if there had not been a drop in rent.
In Northridge Hospital Foundation v. Pic 'N' Save No. 9, Inc.,266 a
1986 court of appeal decision, the court cited Kendall for the proposition
that a lease is a contract and as such contained the duty of good faith and
fair dealing implied in all contracts.2 67 However, the case did not discuss
transfer restrictions. Instead, it involved a lessor and tenant attempting
to eliminate a sublease by a voluntary surrender of the prime lease.268
Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard, 69 a 1987 court of appeal decision,
is another case involving the question of reasonableness. Blanchard was
the lessor of a seventy-five year ground lease. Airport Plaza, a corpora-
tion with two shareholders, was the successor tenant of the ground
lease.270 The tenant, as required by the lease, built a shopping center.271
259. See supra text accompanying note 24.
260. John Hogan Enters., 187 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
261. Id. at 594, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
262. Id. at 593, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
263. Id. at 593-94, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
264. Id. at 591, 231 Cal. Rptr. 712.
265. Id. at 592, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
266. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1088, 232 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1986).
267. Id. at 1100, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
268. Id. at 1092, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
269. 188 Cal. App. 3d 1594, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1987).
270. Id. at 1597, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
271. Id. at 1597-99, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 199-201.
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Airport Plaza wanted to borrow money to recoup some of its investment
in the property. It proposed to hypothecate its leasehold as security for
the loan. The loan money was not to be reinvested in the center.272 Air-
port Plaza also proposed to dissolve the corporation and distribute its
assets, including the hypothecated leasehold, to its two shareholders.
273
The lessor objected to the hypothecation and the dissolution.274
A lease clause stated that the tenant could not transfer in whole or
part without the lessor's consent, except as otherwise provided in the
lease.275 This is a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause governed by the
Kendall requirement of reasonableness. 76 The lease provided that the
tenant could hypothecate for purposes of improving the premises.277 It
also provided that the tenant could assign the entire leasehold without
the lessor's consent if Airport Plaza remained liable until all encum-
brances against the property had been paid off.2"8
The Airport Plaza court held that the lessor was reasonable in ob-
jecting to the hypothecation because the lender required terms that va-
ried substantially from the lease.2 79 The court also held that the lessor
was reasonable in objecting to the dissolution of the corporation and as-
signment of its assets to its shareholders2 0 because the lessor's security
would have become impaired; the corporate assets would have become
personal assets of the shareholders and would have been used for pur-
poses other than the shopping center z.28 The court recognized that, gen-
erally, a technical change of ownership or legal form is not a violation of
a transfer restriction when the change does not affect the rights of the
landlord.28 2
Multiplex Insurance Agency, Inc. v. California Life Insurance Co. ,283
decided in 1987 by the court of appeal, involved an action by a general
insurance agent against an insurance company for failure to pay commis-
sions. The court relied on Kendall concerning the propriety of bringing a
tort action for breach of contract.284 The Cohen v. Ratinoff285 case, by
272. Id. at 1597-98, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
273. Id. at 1597, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
274. Id. at 1597-98, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
275. Id. at 1599, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1599, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
278. Id. at 1602, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
279. Id. at 1601, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
280. Id. at 1604, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
281. Id. at 1603, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
282. Id. at 1602, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
283. 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987).
284. Id. at 931, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
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reversing a judgment on the pleadings and remanding, allowed the tenant
to proceed with a bad faith breach of contract cause of action and claim
for punitive damages.28 6 Footnote eleven in Kendall pointed this out,
expressed no view on the merits of the punitive damages claim in Cohen,
and noted that not every breach of the good faith and fair dealing cove-
nant results in a tort action.28 7
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles 288 is a 1987 deci-
sion by a federal district court. An applicant for a taxicab franchise re-
newal sought an order that the franchise could be transferred without
City restriction, other than good moral character of the transferee.289
The court refused to eliminate all restrictions and pointed out that the
franchisee was adequately protected by the Kendall requirement of
reasonableness.29°
Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc.,291 a 1987 court of
appeal decision, involved whether an anti-receivership provision in a
lease was an invalid restraint on alienation. The disputed lease clause
provided that the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the
tenant's assets would constitute a breach of the lease.292 The tenant at-
tacked the clause as an unreasonable restraint on alienation,293 relying on
Civil Code section 711, which provides: "Conditions restraining aliena-
tion, when repugnant to the interest created, are void."' 294 The court said
that section 711 prohibits only restraints that are unreasonable, those not
necessary to protect, or prevent impairment of, a security.295 The court
cited Kendall and two secured loan transaction cases29 6 as authority for
this proposition.297 The court further stated that it could not resolve in
the abstract whether the clause was valid and there was no evidence re-
garding the necessity of the provision to protect security interests.298
285. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
286. Id. at 330, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
287. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 497 n.11, 709 P.2d 837, 842 n.11, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 823 n.11 (1985).
288. 660 F. Supp. 571 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
289. Id. at 575.
290. Id. at 575-76.
291. 195 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 241 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1987).
292. Id. at 1042, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
293. Id. at 1059, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
294. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
295. Superior Motels, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
296. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 948, 582 P.2d 970, 973, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 382 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 636, 639, 526 P.2d
1169, 1172, 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
297. Superior Motels, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
298. Id.
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Kreisher v. Mobil Oil Corp.,299 a 1988 court of appeal decision, deals
with the retroactivity of the Kendall standard of reasonableness. It is
discussed below at Section M of this part of the Article.
XII. PUBLIC POLICIES
The Kendall court relied on two distinct policies to support imply-
ing a reasonableness standard.3" The first is the contract policy of im-
plying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into every contract. The
second is the real property policy against restraints on alienation.
A. Rule Against Restraints on Alienation
1. Common-law background and development
The real property rule against restraints on alienation has ancient
origins in the law of England. It is older than the perennial favorite of
property historians, the rule against perpetuities. 0 1 It is possible that the
policy of free alienability developed as a side effect of rules that were
developed for quite different purposes. °2 The first major statute dealing
with the subject was a product of the English feudal system. Quia
Emptores, adopted in 1290, provided that:
[I]t shall be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own pleasure
his lands and tenements, or part of them; so that the feoffee
shall hold the same lands or tenements of the chief lord of the
same fee, by such service and customs as his feoffor held
before.30 3
This statute was aimed at freeing fee simple estates from the early Eng-
lish practice of subinfeudation. Subinfeudation involved the creation of
layered continuing obligations to successive grantors.3°
Examination of the historical origins of the rule in early England
does little to explain its vitality in the United States today. An early
rationale, which was codified in California, 0 5 is the "repugnancy" argu-
ment. Since a fee simple property interest is transferable, it is repugnant
299. 198 Cal. App. 3d 389, 243 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1988).
300. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1985).
301. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, Introductory note to Part II, at 142.
302. Id.
303. 18 Edw. I, ch. 1 (1289-90), reprinted in 27 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND, Real
Property, I, at 290-91 (3d ed. 1971) (brackets and footnote omitted).
304. For a general discussion of the common law background, see C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 11, at 1-24.
305. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to the nature of the fee simple interest to restrain transfer. °6 One promi-
nent commentator has found this rationale to be less than persuasive.30 v
He argues that if the interest is created subject to an express provision for
forfeiture upon alienation, the very nature of the interest includes its ina-
lienability. 308 Thus, he argues, the repugnancy rationale is a poor expres-
sion of a policy of opposition to such restraints.30 9
Another rationale for the rule against restraints is that there are
only a certain number of recognized estates in real property. If the gran-
tor of a fee simple could eliminate its characteristic of alienability, he or
she would be able to create a new type of estate. 310 Today, such a for-
malistic reason seems hollow as a basis for following the rule.
Courts and treatise writers have cited several social and economic
policies to justify a rule against restraints on fee alienation. For example:
(1) the average market price of property may be increased; (2) wealth
may be increasingly concentrated if owners are unable to alienate prop-
erty; (3) improvement of property will be discouraged if the owners can-
not realize any increased value by a sale; and (4) creditors will suffer if
they cannot reach the asset through security interests.311 Further, aliena-
bility increases productivity-if an owner is unable to make land produc-
tive, he or she will usually sell it to someone who can. If the owner
cannot transfer to a more productive user and is reluctant to make im-
provements, the property will not be devoted to its highest and best
use.
3 12
Some courts and commentators have recognized that restraints on
alienation are not necessarily entirely bad. Restraints may actually facili-
tate development or have some other legitimate purpose that outweighs
the impact of the restraint.31 3 For example, a restraint imposed on all
purchasers of property in a residential development or interests in a con-
306. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 11, at 143; see, e.g., Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213,
159 P. 590 (1916); McCleary v. Ellis, 54 Iowa 311, 6 N.W. 571 (1880); Pattin v. Scott, 270 Pa.
49, 112 A. 911 (1921).
307. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.19, at 439 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
PROPERTY].
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 3 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1134 (2d ed. 1956).
311. 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.3, at 412-14.
312. 3 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 310, § 1117; 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.3, at 413;
see also Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 107 (1874); Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442,
443, 71 N.W. 682, 683 (1897). See generally Maudsley, Escaping the Tyranny of Common Law
Estates, 42 Mo. L. REv. 355 (1977).
313. Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 236-39, 144 A. 245, 247-48 (1929)
(Bond, C. 3., dissenting); 3 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 310, § 1115, at 8.
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dominium or cooperative may secure mutual protection of the purchas-
ers' investments and common expectations. 14 This recognition of
legitimate uses for restraints tends to militate against an absolute prohibi-
tion of restraints. Instead, it results in a balancing of the negative impact
of the restraint against the positive purpose of the restriction.315
The duration of the restraint and the effect of violation are also fac-
tors to consider. A restraint on a fee simple for a limited period may be
viewed more favorably than a perpetual restraint. A forfeiture type re-
straint results in either a waiver of objection to the transfer or a forfeiture
resulting in re-transfer. The forfeiture restraint is viewed more favorably
than a disabling restraint, which negates the restricted transfer.316
Although a perpetual restraint on a fee simple is void,317 Kentucky, and
perhaps other states, would allow a forfeiture restraint of limited dura-
tion on a fee simple.
318
The principal target of the rule against restraints on alienation has
been the fee simple estate. In contrast, most courts uphold forfeiture
restraints on life estates. 319 The life estate is not as alienable as the fee
simple even absent restriction, and there are additional reasons why a
grantor may want to restrict transfer of a life estate.320
The rule against restraints on alienation was not directed against
restrictions on transfers of leasehold estates, except with respect to the
strict construction of restriction language. According to one commenta-
tor, "[the common-law hostility to restraints on alienation had a large
exception with respect to estates for years. A lessor could prohibit the
lessee from transferring the estate to whatever extent he might desire."
'321
The lessor's continuing interest in the property, both during and after the
lease term, is a major interest and a strong incentive for control.322
314. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, Introductory note to Chap. 4, at 158-59.
315. 3 SiMEs & SMrTH, supra note 310, § 1115, at 8; Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21
Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
316. 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.9, at 419.
317. Id. § 26.15, at 430; see, eg., Cushing v. Spalding, 164 Mass. 287, 41 N.E. 297 (1895);
Stansbury v. Hubner, 73 Md. 228, 20 A. 904 (1890).
318. Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1959); Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268,
250 S.W. 963 (1923); Francis v. Big Sandy Co., 171 Ky. 209, 188 S.W. 345 (1916).
319. See, eg., Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N.E. 889 (1890); Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56,
18 S.W.2d 859 (1929); Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897).
320. 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.48, at 485.
321. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 11, § 246, at 372.97.
322. For a more complete discussion of the common-law and majority rule with respect to
leaseholds, see supra Section G.1.
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2. California rule against restraints
In 1872, the California legislature adopted California Civil Code
section 711 which states: "Conditions restraining alienation, when re-
pugnant to the interest created, are void. '3 23  The common-law rule
against restraints, discussed above, considered restraints repugnant to a
fee simple interest, but not repugnant to a leasehold interest.3 24 There is
nothing in the statute to indicate it was doing something other than
adopting the common law. Thus, it must be construed as a continuation
of the common law, not as a new enactment.325
In 1978, the California Supreme Court, in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America,326 clearly adopted a balancing test for the validity of restraints
affecting alienation of fee simple estates. The Wellenkamp family of
cases involved secured credit transactions with restrictions on the encum-
brance, installment sale and conveyance of a fee simple estate.327 The
cases involved deeds of trust securing loans and creating security inter-
ests in fee simple estates. Clauses in the deeds of trust permitted the
lenders to accelerate the due date and call the loans upon transfer (or
encumbrance) of an interest in the property. The Wellenkamp court rec-
ognized that section 711 does not prohibit all restraints, only unreasona-
ble ones.323 A balancing test is applied to determine reasonableness.329
The justification for the restriction is compared with the quantum of re-
straint in order to determine reasonableness. 330 Although Wellenkamp
applied the rule against restraints to transactions apparently not contem-
plated by the common-law rule, loan security interests, the case can be
viewed as liberalizing the common-law rule against restraints on fee sim-
ple estates. The restraints are not automatically void; they are subject to
a balancing test.
Cohen v. Ratinoff,33 decided in 1983, was the first California appel-
late decision to apply section 711 to a leasehold. 332 The court stated that
only unreasonable restraints are invalid and cited the Laguna Royale
323. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
324. See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
325. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (West 1982).
326. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
327. See, eg., Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974); LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
328. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (citing Coast
Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964)).
329. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d 973-74, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
330. Id., 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
331. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
332. An earlier case is distinguishable because it involved a condominium development.
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case.333 Laguna Royale involved basically a condominium transaction,
not a typical leasehold transaction.334 The Cohen court concluded that
the "Silent Consent Standard" type of clause was not inherently repug-
nant to the leasehold interest because the lessor has an interest in the
character of the proposed transferee. 335 However, the court held that
there is an unreasonable restraint if the clause is implemented in such a
manner that "its underlying purpose is perverted by the arbitrary or un-
reasonable withholding of consent. ' 336 In a footnote, the court com-
mented that the tenant argued that the reasoning of Wellenkamp should
apply to leases. 337 The court went on to say: "Since Wellenkamp did not
involve a leasehold interest, it is distinguishable from the instant case."
338
However, the court did not explain its extension of the common-law rule
against restraints, and section 711, to leaseholds. Note that the court
used the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, discussed below,
as an independent basis for imposing a reasonableness standard on the
lessor.339
The Kendall court saw no modem justification for exempting leases
from a general policy prohibiting unreasonable restraints on alienation.
It borrowed the balancing test from Wellenkamp and stated: "Reasona-
bleness is determined by comparing the justification for a particular re-
straint on alienation with the quantum of restraint actually imposed by
it."'34° The court quoted a commentator's doubts about the continued
vitality of the common-law treatment of leaseholds:
A lessor could prohibit the lessee from transferring the estate
for years to whatever extent he might desire. It was believed
that the objectives served by allowing such restraints out-
weighed the social evils implicit in the restraints, in that they
gave to the lessor a needed control over the person entrusted
with the lessor's property and to whom he must look for the
performance of the covenants contained in the lease. Whether
this reasoning retains full validity can well be doubted. Rela-
See supra notes 132-39 for a discussion of Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
333. Cohen, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (citing Laguna Royale Owners
Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981)).
334. Laguna Royale, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal Rptr. 136.
335. Cohen, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 328 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 88 n.2.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 330, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
340. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 498, 709 P.2d 837, 843, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 824 (1985).
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tionships between lessor and lessee have tended to become more
and more impersonal. Courts have considerably lessened the
effectiveness of restraint clauses by strict construction and lib-
eral applications of the doctrine of waiver.341
The Kendall court also cited with approval the Restatement proposition
that the lessor's consent to transfer by the tenant cannot be withheld
unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated lease provision gives the lessor
the absolute right to withhold consent.342
There is no question that the Kendall decision uses strong language
to criticize the common-law and majority rule which allows the lessor to
retain sole discretion over a leasehold transfer. Similarly, there is no
question that the result in Kendall can be accomplished without com-
pletely overturning the common-law and majority rule. The case in-
volved a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause, one which did not
expressly state that consent could be withheld in the lessor's sole discre-
tion. 43 An application of strict construction of restriction clauses and
fair disclosure to the tenant would justify imposition of a reasonableness
standard, absent an express provision to the contrary. This would satisfy
the legitimate concerns expressed in Kendall, but leave the parties free to
bargain and expressly provide for a sole discretion standard, or for other
clauses that expressly exempt the lessor from the scrutiny of a reasona-
bleness standard. Such a result would be consistent with the developing
minority view and the Restatement position cited in Kendall.3 4 It may
also be concluded that it is "reasonable" to allow the parties to bargain
and expressly provide for a sole discretion standard or specific require-
ments that are not subject to litigation.345
The imposition of a reasonableness standard in the absence of an
express sole discretion standard or specific set of requirements seems to
be a fair and logical extension of the strict construction of restraints on
leasehold transfers. This would reduce the chances of unpleasant sur-
prises for the tenant at the time of transfer, and it would encourage les-
sors to bargain for an express clause if they want to avoid the
reasonableness standard. There is some question concerning the fairness
of retroactivity, but otherwise this development in Kendall appears justi-
fied. However, it seems unnecessary and undesirable to extend this de-
341. Id. at 499, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
342. Id. at 499-500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825. For a discussion of the Restate-
ment position, see supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
343. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 503, 709 P.2d 847, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
344. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 54-103.
345. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
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velopment beyond the facts of Kendall to a mandatory reasonableness
standard test for all types of leasehold transfer restrictions, regardless of
express contrary language in the lease. Such an extension is not sup-
ported by the holdings in the developing minority view cases, and it is
not supported by the Restatement position.
One of the reasons mentioned for curtailing restrictions is the
shortage of vacancies. Vacancies fluctuate with time and place, and there
are major factors at work in producing or reducing them. An economic
outlook report in early 1988 was entitled "Slow growth, higher vacancies
cast ominous shadows over commercial real estate in '88. ' ' 346 The report
mentions several factors contributing to vacancies reaching up to 40% in
some areas of Los Angeles County, but does not mention free transfera-
bility of leaseholds as one of them.347
It is possible to hypothesize public ills resulting from restraints on
leasehold transfers, or to encounter anecdotal incidents of individual
problems. However, this Author found no empirical study that showed
that the common-law view, majority view or the Restatement modified
common-law view in fact caused problems serious enough to warrant re-
moving the freedom of contract.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that intellectual criti-
cism of a rule may not accurately reflect an actual problem. In particu-
lar, in Keys v. Romley, 348 an action was brought for damages caused by
surface water run-off. 349 The court admitted that the rule followed in
California since 1873 tended to inhibit the improvement of land.35" The
court stated:
[N]o documentation has been produced to establish that the
rule has in fact impeded urban development in the state. A
number of highly urbanized states follow the rule, and Califor-
nia's phenomenal growth rate, to which no one can be oblivious
and of which this court may take judicial notice, appears un-
stunted by the existence and application of the civil law rule
since 1873.351
Justice Mosk, who was one of the two dissenters in Kendall, made this
comment in the unanimous Keys decision.
It is naive to assume that all lessors would win a negotiation for a
346. L.A. Bus. J., Jan. 11, 1988, at 15, col. 1.
347. Id.
348. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
349. Id. at 398, 412 P.2d 530, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
350. Id. at 402, 412 P.2d at 533, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
351. Id. at 406-07, 412 P.2d at 535, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (footnote omitted).
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clause lacking a reasonableness standard. Even if a lessor won such a
negotiation, California already has a built-in statutory protection against
lessors making massive use of clauses removing the reasonableness stan-
dard. California Civil Code section 1951.4 allows a lessor to use the im-
portant lock-in remedy upon breach and abandonment by a tenant only
if the lease permits the tenant to transfer, subject only to limits that meet
a reasonableness standard.3"2 Some lawyers feel that this remedy is so
important that it makes any discussion of Kendall and sole discretion
standards moot.
Another factor to consider is the remedy available to a lessor for
violation of the restraint by a tenant. California appears to limit the les-
sor to a forfeiture remedy.3" 3 This limitation is traditionally viewed more
favorably than a disabling restraint, which would nullify an attempted
transfer. 4
There appears to be good reason to impose a reasonableness stan-
dard in the absence of an express contrary agreement of the parties.
There does not appear to be a compelling reason to change the rule
against restraints on alienation and take away freedom of contract by
prohibiting an express provision for sole discretion.35 5 The Restatement
position reflects these conclusions.
35 6
Although there are some shorter limits for certain types of leases,
the maximum duration allowed for a lease in California is ninety-nine
years.357 An argument could be made that extremely long-term leases
approach the practical duration of a fee simple, and thus, should be sub-
ject to the same strict prohibition against restraints. It seems that long-
term leases tend to be complex, highly negotiated transactions and best
left to the agreement of the parties. However, if there is a realistic, com-
pelling reason to impose a mandatory reasonableness standard on long-
term leases, the problem could be solved by a time limit after which a
mandatory reasonableness standard would govern. A time limit would
be a more direct solution than an absolute rule applicable to all leases
regardless of duration. However, the exact time picked for a time limit
appears to be a rather arbitrary choice.
352. See infra notes 451-78 and accompanying text for further discussion of section 1951.4.
353. See, eg., People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944); Chapman v. Great
Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932); Weisman v. Clark, 232 Cal. App. 2d
764, 43 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1965).
354. 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, §.26.9, at 419; RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2,
comments b-d, n.4.
355. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Source unknown.
356. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
357. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 717-719 (West 1982 and Supp. 1988).
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Before leaving the alienability issue, it is interesting to note that a
strong and enforceable leasehold transfer restriction clause will probably
enhance the alienability of the lessor's reversion.
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The Kendall court used the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a basis for implying a reasonableness standard into the "Silent
Consent Standard" type clause.358 The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is implied into every contract in California. 359 Basically, the cov-
enant requires that neither party do anything to deprive the other of the
contemplated benefits of the agreement. 31 A lease is considered to be a
contract as well as a conveyance.361 Thus, every lease includes an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing focuses on the bargain of
the parties and their expectations flowing from that bargain. It has been
said that "[g]ood faith performance... occurs when a party's discretion
is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were pre-
served upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively., 362 If the
clause imposes a consent requirement, but does not expressly state a rea-
sonableness standard or a sole discretion standard, Kendall would find a
reasonableness standard contemplated by the tenant and imply that stan-
dard based on good faith and fair dealing.
It is rather easy to use good faith and fair dealing to imply a reason-
ableness standard in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary.
This is what the Kendall court did and nothing else. It would be quite a
different matter to use good faith and fair dealing to mandate a reasona-
bleness standard in the face of express language to the contrary.
Generally, courts will not find an implied covenant regarding a sub-
ject in a contract when the contract comprehensively covers that sub-
ject.363 For example, in Commercial Union Assurance Companies v.
358. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 500, 709 P.2d 837, 844, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 825 (1985).
359. Id.; see also Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d at 768,
686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1979).
360. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825; see also Seaman's,
36 Cal. 3d at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
361. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824; CAL. CIV. CODE.
§ 1925 (West 1985).
362. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1980).
363. See Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955); Cousins
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Safeway Stores, Inc.,'" the California Supreme Court declared that the
extent of the duty of good faith and fair dealing depends upon the nature
of the bargain struck and the legitimate expectations of the parties arising
from the contract.365 Moreover, in the Seaman's case, the court stated
that although the parties may not be permitted to disclaim the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, they are free, within reasonable limits, to
agree upon the standards by which application of the covenant is to be
measured. 66
A 1933 New York decision is credited with the first statement of the
now standard doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.367 More recently,
in VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,36 a federal district court in
New York referred to general contract principles in Corbin's treatise on
contracts to make very specific comments on the relationship between
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and express provisions in the
contract. The court commented:
The general rule [regarding the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing] ... is plainly subject to the exception that the parties
may, by express provisions of the contract, grant the right to
engage in the very acts and conduct which would otherwise
have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
No case has been cited and I know of none which holds that
there is a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing where a party to a contract has done what the provi-
sions of the contract expressly give him the right to do .... As
to acts and conduct authorized by the express provisions of the
contract, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be im-
plied which forbids such acts and conduct.
The allegations that the defendants acted in bad faith are mere
characterizations by the plaintiffs and add nothing to their
claim for relief. Whether or not the acts and conduct of the
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113 P.2d 878, 882 (1941); see also
First Am. Bank & Trust v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 151 Ariz. 584, 729 P.2d 938 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986).
364. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
365. Id. at 918, 610 P.2d 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
366. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
367. See Burton, supra note 362, at 379, where the author states that the doctrine was first
formulated in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933).
368. 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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defendants are in bad faith is to be determined here by whether
or not they had the right to engage in them under the contract.
Since they had such right, defendants cannot be said to have
acted in bad faith.369
The court also mentioned that merely because a party agreed to a bad
bargain does not change the result.370
If the lessor bargains for and gets an express clause negating the
reasonableness standard on a transfer restriction, the tenant is put on
notice that the reasonableness standard is not one of his or her contrac-
tual expectations. It may be considered reasonable for a lessor to want
such a provision. 371 A later claim by the tenant that the lessor should be
subject to a reasonableness standard despite express contrary language
would be an attempt to deny the lessor the benefit of his or her bargained
contractual expectations.
Thus, there appears to be good reason, based on the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, to impose a reasonableness standard
in the absence of an express contrary agreement of the parties. However,
if there is an express agreement to the contrary, there does not appear to
be a compelling reason to take away the freedom of contract by mandat-
ing a reasonableness standard. The Restatement position reflects these
conclusions.372
C. The Restatement Compromise
The Restatement position seems to strike the best compromise be-
tween freedom of contract and public policy. It imposes a reasonableness
standard unless the parties freely negotiate and expressly provide to the
contrary.373 It places the emphasis on reasonable expectations and dis-
closure, rather than on mandating a reasonableness standard in the face
of contrary language.374
This position is a carefully considered solution to the criticisms lev-
eled against the traditional common-law rule. The Restatement is the
source most often referred to by courts that move away from the tradi-
tional rule. If the traditional rule is considered inadequate in some re-
spects by more states, the Restatement position will have an advantage
369. Id. at 777-80.
370. Id. at 480.
371. See supra notes 344-45 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
373. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2.
374. Id.
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over other possible solutions: it will develop a national body of
interpretations.
There is a phrase in the Restatement position that could use some
clarification. The Restatement requires that a clause providing for the
absolute right of the lessor to withhold consent be 'freely negotiated."37
It is clear that total equality of bargaining power is not required; how-
ever, the Restatement does not consider a clause freely negotiated if the
tenant has "no significant bargaining power in relation to the terms of
the lease."'376 The relationship between the phrase "freely negotiated" in
the Restatement and the contract law adhesion doctrine in California is
unclear. California has a well developed body of law defining the param-
eters of the adhesion doctrine as a means of protecting one contracting
party from overreaching by the other.377 Stability and predictability in
contractual relationships are important, especially when dealing with
real property interests. If the Restatement position is adopted in Califor-
nia, consideration should be given to clarifying the requirements of
"freely negotiated." One means of clarification would be to adopt the
adhesion doctrine as the test. Since this doctrine is already an integral
part of California law, there would be no problem of unfairness created
by retroactive application.
Another factor involved in the stability and predictability of con-
tracts is the burden of proof. Contracts and contract provisions should
not be easily set aside. The tenant should have the burden of establishing
the lack of free negotiation, which would result in the invalidity of the
express language. This approach to valuing contract stability has been
taken in other legislation crafted by the California Law Revision
Commission.378
XIII. RETROACTIVITY
The document containing the disputed "Silent Consent Standard"
clause in Kendall was drafted and executed in 1969 (with a term com-
mencing January 1, 1970).111 At that time, the most recent California
case dealing specifically with the consent standard issue was Richard v.
Degen & Brody, Inc.38° That case also involved the "Silent Consent Stan-
375. Id. comment i.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., WrnKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 23-36 & 743-52 (9th
ed. 1987).
378. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1671(b) (West 1985).
379. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 493, 709 P.2d 837, 839, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 820 (1985).
380. 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960).
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dard" clause."' 1 It clearly followed the common-law and majority rule
that the lessor was not bound by a reasonableness standard if the clause
did not express one.3 2 There were no California cases adopting a differ-
ent view at the time. It was not until fourteen years after the disputed
document in Kendall was executed before a California court, in Cohen v.
Ratinoff,s38 squarely faced and rejected the common-law and majority
rule.
The Kendall dissent argued that the lessor's counsel was entitled to
rely on the traditional rule as the state of the law in California when the
document was executed, and it was unfair to reject the common-law rule
retroactively. 84 The dissent expressed the view that the contract was
being rewritten by a retroactive rejection of the traditional rule. 85 Also,
it suggested that if a change was warranted, it should be made by the
legislature.3 6
The majority responded that the traditional rule had not been uni-
versally followed and that it had never been adopted by the California
Supreme Court.387 The court commented that "the trend in favor of the
minority rule should come as no surprise to observers of the changing
state of real property law in the 20th century.1 38  This is a noble
thought, but can it be applied realistically to a lawyer drafting a lease in
1969?
Prior to the Cohen case, the "due on transfer" or encumbrance
clause in a loan security document was the transfer issue receiving atten-
tion in California. The Wellenkamp decision in 1978 was relied upon
heavily in Kendall.3 19 It was certainly possible to draw analogies from
the "due on transfer" or encumbrance cases. However, it does not seem
unreasonable that an attorney would conclude that a clause in a deed of
trust restraining alienation of a fee simple interest would be distinguish-
able from a lease clause restraining assignment and subletting of a lease-
381. Id. at 292, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
382. Id. at 299, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
383. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
384. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 508-09, 709 P.2d at 850-51, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
385. Id. at 511, 709 P.2d at 851, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 496, 709 P.2d at 852, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
388. Id. at 504, 709 P.2d at 847, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
389. Id. at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am.,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978)). Wellenkamp was given only limited
retroactivity. It was not applied when, prior to the date the decision became final, the lender
had enforced the clause by forclosure, or waived enforcement in return for a modification
agreement.
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hold. Indeed, the Cohen court made such a distinction.390 Also, it seems
that the California Supreme Court did not clearly start its journey to-
ward Wellenkamp until 1971 when it decided La Sala v. American Sav-
ings & Loan Association.391 This was after the Kendall document had
been executed.
An Article in the January, 1970 issue of the Hastings Law Journal,
criticized the application of the traditional rule to residential leases and
argued for change.39 2 However, it pointed out that "[e]xcept for dictum
in a Massachusetts district court case, and an apparently controlling de-
cision in Louisiana, this harsh rule is accepted everywhere. ' 393 Addi-
tionally, there was a particularly perceptive prediction in a 1980 Article
in the California State Bar Journal.391 The Article reviewed the cases
and concluded that the principles in the Wellenkamp loan security case
should govern leasehold transfer restrictions .39  Both of these articles
criticizing the traditional rule were published after the document in
Kendall was executed.
Clearly, some lawyers believed California followed the traditional
rule. The lawyers on the court in the unanimous, but vacated, court of
appeal decision in Kendall expressed no doubts. The appellate court, re-
ferring to the "Silent Consent Standard" clause, stated:
[I]t is obvious that the attorney for the lessor agreeing to such a
term was entitled to rely upon the state of the law then existing
in California. And at such time (Dec. 12, 1969) it is clear that
California followed the "weight of authority" in these United
States and allowed such consent to be arbitrarily or unreasona-
bly withheld absent a provision to the contrary.396
That court expressed the view that it would be rewriting the contract of
the parties to apply the minority view to the lease.3 97 It suggested that if
California was going to adopt the minority view, it should be done by
390. Cohen, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 328 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 88 n.2. When dealing with deeds
of trust, distinctions are important. A trustee under a deed of trust has been distinguished
from an ordinary bearer. See Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, 196 Cal. App. 3d
948, 955 n.4, 242 Cal. Rptr. 251, 255 n.4 (1987).
391. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
392. Note, Effect of Leasehold Provisions Requiring The Lessor's Consent to Assignment, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 516, 522 (1970).
393. Id. at 519.
394. Kehr, supra note 110.
395. Id. at 112-14.
396. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 11, 209 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136 (1984),
vacated, 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985) (opinion omitted at 163 Cal.
App. 3d 11).
397. Id. at 138.
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legislation.3 98 The unanimous court of appeal in the now disapproved
decision in Hamilton v. Dixon 399 opined that the Richard case (following
the traditional rule) was "clearly the law" at the time a lease was signed
in 1970, and it would be improper to rewrite the bargained rights and
reasonable expectations of the parties.' The unanimous opinion of the
court of appeal in Thrifty Oil Co. v. Batarse4 1 referred to a trial court
hearing that took place in July, 1983 (about three months before the Co-
hen decision), and commented that "[a]t that time the law was clearly in
accord with Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc. "42
A practice handbook published by the California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar in 1976 contains a sample of a "Silent Consent Standard"
clause with the following comment:
A tenant should insist that the landlord agree not to unreasona-
bly withhold its consent to a proposed assignment, encum-
brance, or subletting, and most landlords agree to give such a
clause. Without such an agreement the landlord can arbitrarily
withhold its consent or attach conditions to the granting of its
consent, and the tenant is without recourse.
403
Until the time that the Cohen case was decided in 1983, major treatises
expressed the view that California followed the common-law and major-
ity view.'
It seems realistic to recognize that the law regarding leasehold re-
straints changed in the 1980s. A change based, at least in part, on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should give careful con-
sideration to the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time the
bargain was struck. In February, 1988 a California court of appeal de-
cided Kreisher v. Mobil Oil Corp."5 The unanimous decision contains a
strong and thorough argument against retroactive application of
Kendall.4 6 It is significant that the current California Supreme Court
denied review.
In Kreisher, the trial court entered judgment against lessor Mobil,
398. Id.
399. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1985) (disapproved in Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985)).
400. Id. at 1009, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
401. 174 Cal. App. 3d 770, 220 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1985).
402. Id. at 773, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
403. M. DEAN, F. NICHOLAS, R. CAPLAN, COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY LEASE PRAc-
TICE § 3.110, at 159 (Cal. CEB 1976) [hereinafter LEASE PRACTICE]..
404. See, e.g., 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, Landlord and Tenant, § 202 (1978); MILLER & STARR, 4
CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 27:92, at 416 (1977).
405. 198 Cal. App. 3d 389, 243 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1988).
406. Id. at 396-97, 243 Cal. Rptr. 666-67.
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based on a jury verdict, for $214,000 compensatory damages and
$2,002,500 punitive damages.' 7 The tenant, a Mobil station franchisee,
based his causes of action on the lessor's failure to comply with a reason-
ableness standard when the lessor refused to consent to a transfer of the
tenant's leasehold and gasoline service station franchise.408 The lease
and franchise agreements both contained a "Silent Consent Standard"
clause." 9 One third party offered the tenant $28,000 for the transfer,
and another offered $3 1,000.411
The relationship between the parties was based on two related docu-
ments: a franchise agreement and a station lease.41 1 The relationship
continued through a series of three-year term contracts going back to
1971.412
The sequence of events leading to litigation started with a notice of
default from the lessor to the tenant. The notice referred to the tenant's
breach of a continuous operation clause and stated the lessor's intention
to terminate if the default was not cured.413 The tenant responded with a
notice of a third party's offer of $28,000 for a transfer and a request for
the lessor's consent.414 The lessor refused without stating a reason, other
than the lessor's intention to terminate the lease and franchise.415 The
lessor then learned of an additional breach, the failure to maintain insur-
ance, and of revocation of the tenant's resale permit by the State Board of
Equalization.416 After giving an additional notice of termination for de-
fault, the lessor served the tenant with a three-day notice to quit.417 The
tenant then notified the lessor of the second third party offer, this one for
$31,000, and asked if the lessor wished either to meet that offer or con-
sent to the transfer.418 The lessor rejected both proposals and com-
menced an unlawful detainer action.419 The tenant vacated prior to any
further judicial action.420
The tenant then filed an action against the lessor for compensatory
407. Id. at 395, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
408. Id. at 393-94, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
409. Id. at 392, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
410. Id. at 393, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
411. Id. at 392, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 392-93, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
417. Id. at 393, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 393, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
420. Id.
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and punitive damages based on eight causes of action.42 1 The three
causes of action that ultimately went to the jury and led to the judgment
were: breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; intentional interference with prospective economic advantage;
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.422
The Kreisher court indicated that contract execution, consent re-
fusal and jury verdict all occurred before the Kendall decision was filed
on December 5, 1985.423 That case subjected lessors to a reasonableness
standard, implied into "Silent Consent Standard" clauses.42 4 The court
reviewed the principles involved in retroactivity, including foreseeability,
reliance, public policy and fairness.425 It then concluded:
Our weighing of the relevant considerations comes down to
this. At all relevant times, the prevailing rule of law was that a
lessor could withhold assent to a proposed assignment for any
reason whatsoever. Mobil displayed considerable and justifi-
able reliance on that rule.... The strength and extent of that
reliance is only partially offset by Mobil's inability to foresee
the nonjudicial portents of a change in the rule. By contrast,
there is no evidence that plaintiff had any inkling of a judicial
change of the rule .... Public policy supporting the change will
not be advanced by applying the change to completed contrac-
tual arrangements involving the stability of real property titles.
As regards the fairness factor, we perceive no satisfying basis
for making plaintiff the windfall beneficiary of a change he did
not foresee or help bring about. Conversely, it is patently un-
fair to penalize Mobil for its nonconformity with standards
which took effect only after it conscientiously determined the
state of the law and relied upon it in reasonable good faith.426
The court reversed the judgment because the refusal to give consent was
at the heart of all the causes of action.427
Since Kreisher involved a petroleum dealer franchise, as well as a
lease, the court also discussed California Business & Professions Code
section 21148.428 That section prohibits a franchisor from withholding
consent to a transfer of the franchise unless certain requirements are
421. Id. at 393-94, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
422. Id. at 394, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
423. Id. at 396, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
424. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
425. Kreisher, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 403-04, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
426. I at 404, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
427. Id. at 405, 243 Cal. Rptr. 673.
428. Id. at 403-04, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72.
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:405
met.4 29 The section became effective on January 1, 1981, and was ex-
pressly made prospective in operation.430 The statute therefore did not
apply to the pre-statute franchise in the case. Note that there could be a
problem if a station dealer had both a franchise and a lease from a petro-
leum company and the two were subject to inconsistent transfer restric-
tions. This problem appears to be avoided by California Business &
Professions Code section 21140 (a)(1). 43 1 It defines a "franchise" to in-
clude the related lease.432 Thus, the same limitations on transfer restric-
tions apply to the dealer's lease.
In the Kendall case, the lease, the refusal to consent and the trial all
occurred before the Supreme Court opinion was filed.433 However, the
tenant in that case did help bring about the change.434 This Article has
mentioned some of the reasons a lessor may have for wishing to avoid
application of a reasonableness standard.435 Another reason might be
the desire to avoid the potential of a punitive damage jury award. Note
that the highest price offered for a transfer in Kreisher was $31,000.436
The punitive damage award was $2,002,500.4"7
XIV. THE SURPRISE PROFIT DEMAND
Unanticipated demands by lessors for profit from a transfer seem to
stir the passions and cause a strong motivation to reject the common-law
and majority view. The Cohen and Kendall cases are good examples.43
The same is true in other states.439 A demand unsupported by express
lease provisions comes as a surprise to the tenant. That creates the prob-
lem. It is not created because the lessor seeks to benefit from an appreci-
ation in the value of his property. In fact, if some lessors had not asked
429. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 21148 (West 1987).
430. Kreisher, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
431. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 21140(a)(1) (West 1987).
432. Id.
433. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rtpr. 818.
434. Id. at 493-94, 709 P.2d at 839-40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21.
435. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
436. Kreisher, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 243 Cal. Rtpr. at 664.
437. Id. at 394, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
438. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1985); Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983).
439. Campbell v. Westdahl, 148 Ariz. 432, 715 P.2d 288 (1985); Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397
So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 1981); Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 633 P.2d 586 (1981); Illinois C.G.R.
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009 (La. 1979); Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v.
Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 379 A.2d 508 (1977), aff'd, 166 N.J. Super. 36,
398 A.2d 1315 (1979); Herlou Card Shop, Inc. v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 73 A.D. 2d
562, 422 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1979); B & R Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc., 139 Vt. 122, 422
A.2d 1267 (1980).
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for more money than was specifically provided for in their leases, some-
times with colorful ambush language," probably little judicial attention
would have been given to this area of the law.
There seems to be agreement that the reasonableness standard is sat-
isfied when a lessor seeks to protect his or her expectations for the agreed
rental return." 1 However, when he goes beyond protecting the agreed
rent and seeks to sweeten the deal without the benefit of an express
clause, problems develop. The profit involved in the dispute typically
arises because of an increase in the rental value of the property in excess
of the amount of the agreed rent. The tenant indirectly enjoys the benefit
of this bonus value while occupying premises worth more than the rent
he or she pays. At the time of transfer, the tenant wants to profit directly
from this bonus value by charging consideration for an assignment or
higher rent for a sublease. The lessor wants to use the transfer as an
event to profit from the increased value.
The desire to profit from an appreciation in property is not intrinsi-
cally evil or lacking in good faith. Both the lessor and the tenant have a
motive to profit from the appreciation. For example, the lessor may ar-
gue that the tenant should look to his business, not the property, for
profit. Conversly, the tenant may argue that he or she bears the risk of a
decrease in rental value so he or she should have the benefit of an in-
crease. Neither party is intrinsically entitled to the appreciation profit.
The benefit of that profit is one to be derived from the bargain made
between them.
A lessor who desires that the rent keep pace with the value of the
property has always had more effective ways of doing so than to withhold
consent under a "Silent Consent Standard" clause." 2 Rent escalation
based on periodic reappraisals is one way. Rent escalation based on a
formula or one of the consumer price indices, although not directly tied
to market value of the premises, is another way. A short-term lease,
either with or without a right of first refusal, will keep bringing the rent
up to a market rate. These methods can be bargained for and expressly
set forth in the lease. The increase in rent and the tenant's loss of bonus
value resulting from these methods come as no surprise to the tenant.
The "Silent Consent Standard"" 3 clause does not have this charac-
440. Lessors have referred to the transfer restriction as a "license to steal" and to a de-
manded transfer fee as "blood money." Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 885, 198
Cal. Rptr. 238, 239 (1984).
441. John Hogan Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg, 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986).
442. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
443. Id.
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teristic of express disclosure to the tenant. Preventing its use for unantic-
ipated exaction of a profit that has not been bargained for is
understandable. It is the surprise factor, imposed on the tenant's deal
without prior negotiation and warning, that creates the problem and not
the profit motive itself.
Judicial decisions designed to avoid the "Silent Consent Standard"
surprise should not be extended to prevent the parties from expressly
agreeing on a profit to the lessor triggered by a transfer. Such an exten-
sion would be economic policy making-a mandatory transfer of value
from the lessor to the tenant at the time of transfer despite an express
contrary agreement. It would also lead to incongruous results. The pol-
icy would be adopted to protect the profit of tenants. Lessors would
probably place more reliance on drafting perfectly acceptable devices to
raise the rent more effectively and more frequently. With a clause pro-
viding for a lessor profit upon transfer, the tenant at least, in most cir-
cumstances, can control the time when the additional profit to the lessor
arises. Also, a tenant may want a "sweetheart" lease with initial rent
below market for a particular tenant, but increasing to market upon
transfer.444
At one extreme is the "Silent Consent Standard" clause involved in
cases that reject the common-law and majority view and impose a rea-
sonableness standard. After imposing the reasonableness standard, cases
such as Cohen and Kendall typically hold that it is unreasonable to use
the clause to extract additional profit." At the other extreme is the
"Profit Shift" clause which expressly allows the lessor to participate in
profit generated at the time of transfer." This profit is part of the origi-
nal bargain, and it does not come as a late surprise hit on the tenant.
Somewhat in between is the "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard"
type clause. 47 This type of clause does not mislead the tenant into be-
lieving that the lessor is subject to a reasonableness standard. Rather, it
has been held that a lessor can seek to improve, rather than just main-
tain, his or her position with this type of clause." 8
Maybe the "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard" 449 would be
444. Cukierman v. Mechanic's Bank (In re J.F. Hink & Son), 815 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1987).
445. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818; Cohen, 147 Cal. App. 3d
321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84.
446. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
447. Id.
448. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 368 So. 2d at 1015; B & R Oil Co., 139 Vt. 122, 422 A.2d 1267
(1980); Herlou Card Shop, 73 A.D.2d 562, 422 N.Y.S.2d 708.
449. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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less objectionable to some, and be less subject to litigation, if it could not
be used to exact additional profit. This would free the clause from the
demands and litigation of a reasonableness standard governing other de-
cisions by the lessor. It would leave the parties free to negotiate and
expressly provide for lessor profit upon transfer. Such a compromise rule
would merely require fair disclosure of future profit entitlements. How-
ever, a prohibition against requiring additional money as a condition of
consent would not be without problems.
If a lessor has a reasonable justification for refusing consent, he
could be in jeopardy if he proposes a waiver of his or her objection in
return for a change in the economic terms of the lease. For example,
suppose it reasonably appears to a lessor that the proposed transferee
poses greater risks due to weak credit or inexperienced management.
Could the lessor agree to take on the greater risk for a greater return?
The frequency of this type of problem could be reduced by requiring the
lessor to have either an express increase in profit clause or a reasonable
justification to support a deal sweetener. Lessors would still be en-
couraged to rely on negotiation and express disclosure clauses in order to
avoid litigation over reasonableness.
There is another problem which is more difficult to avoid, and that
could provide a fruitful source of litigation. If there is a prohibition
against the use of the "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard"
clause45 ' to demand greater profit, it would allow a tenant to attack a
refusal based on the lessor's motivations. There would be difficulties
proving the lessor's motivations. Since a lessor need not justify refusal to
consent, a tenant could have difficulty establishing the prohibited motive
unless the lessor openly stated it. On the other hand, a lessor could have
difficulty defending against a charge of secret profit motive without prov-
ing a reasonable justification for a refusal. Thus, a clause intended to be
simple and to avoid litigation could end up creating more practical
problems and litigation than it avoids.
XV. THE LOCK-IN REMEDY: CIVIL CODE SECTION 1951.4
A. The Remedy Legislation in General
This Article previously discussed certain remedy legislation,
adopted in 1970, and discussed the conflicting conclusions the Kendall
majority and dissent drew from it.451 The California Law Revision Com-
mission went through a lengthy and comprehensive process of reviewing
450. Id.
451. See supra notes 217-33 and accompanying text.
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and proposing modifications to common-law remedies for tenant
breaches.452 With few changes, the resulting legislation is contained in
California Civil Code sections 1951 through 1951.8. These sections
attempt to eliminate some of the problems with the common law and to
create remedies that are essentially fair to both the lessor and the default-
ing tenant.
The basic plan of the legislation, contained in section 1951.2, is to
have upon tenant breach an immediate termination of the lease and an
immediate cause of action for damages, including prospective rental loss
damages.454 The contract rule of mitigation of damages is built in by
allowing the tenant to prove post-termination rental loss that the lessor
could have reasonably avoided.45 5 The termination of the lease is trig-
gered by either of two situations: (1) the tenant breaching and aban-
doning the premises; or (2) the tenant breaching and the lessor
terminating the tenant's right to possession of the premises.456
According to the basic remedy, the tenant can unilaterally trigger a
termination of the lease by breach and abandonment.45 7 The lessor is
given the opportunity by section 1951.4 to prevent this termination and
provide for a lock-in remedy. If the lease specifically provides for the
remedy and this section is complied with, the lessor can lock-in the lease,
that is, keep the lease in effect and continue to enforce its provisions.
Relief is provided to the locked-in tenant by requiring that the lease per-
mit the tenant to assign or sublet (or both), subject only to reasonable
restrictions.
Certain agreements that are often called leases, but which have
unique characteristics, are exempt from the application of the remedies
legislation.45 8 For example, an agreement for exploration for or removal
of natural resources is more in the nature of a profit a prendre than a
lease and is exempt.45 9 There does not appear to be a strong reason to
remove the exemption and subject those transactions to the recommen-
dations below.
452. Abandonment or Termination of a Lease, 8 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 701
(1967); 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 401 (1969); 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP.
153 (1969).
453. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951-1951.8 (West 1985). Present California Civil Code section
1951.3 was not part of the original legislation.
454. Id. § 1951.2.
455. Id. § 1951.2(a)(2).
456. Id. § 1951.2(a).
457. Id. § 1951.3.
458. Id. §§ 1952.4 (natural resource removal) and 1952.6 (public entity bond projects).
459. See Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 1186-91, 242 Cal. Rptr.
403, 407-10 (1987).
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B. Effect of Civil Code Section 1951.4 on Bargaining Over Leasehold
Transfer Restriction
One of the concerns expressed over allowing an "Express Sole Dis-
cretion Consent Standard"" or an "Absolute Prohibition" type of
clause" is the lessor's bargaining power. Section 1951.4 gives the tenant
a built-in edge with leasehold transfer restrictions." 2 The lock-in rem-
edy is a valuable option for the lessor, and he or she can have it only if
the lessor subjects himself or herself to the reasonableness standard.
Neither the "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard" nor the "Abso-
lute Prohibition" clause would qualify for the lock-in remedy.
C. Specific Applications of Civil Code 1951.4
The lock-in is available under section 1951.4(b) only "if the lease
permits" the tenant to do any of the following:
(1) Sublet, assign, or both;
(2) Sublet, assign, or both, subject to "standards or conditions," and
the lessor does "not require compliance with" any "unreasonable" stan-
dard or condition;
(3) Sublet, assign, or both, "with the consent of the lessor," and "the
lease provides" that consent "shall not unreasonably be withheld."
463
Suppose a lease does not restrict the tenant's right to assign or sub-
let. The tenant is automatically allowed to assign or sublet, without re-
striction and without obtaining the lessor's consent. Thus, if nothing is
said one way or the other about leasehold transfers in the lease, the ten-
ant is permitted to assign or sublet. Does the phrase "if the lease per-
mits" in the introductory language of section 1951.4(b) 464 indicate that
the permission must be stated in the lease? Logically, express language
of permission should not be required, since the tenant receives the in-
tended freedom to transfer whether an express clause is present or not. It
can be argued that the "lease permits" if it does not prohibit. However,
it would be helpful to clarify the language.
Suppose a lease contains a "Silent Consent Standard" clause
46
which requires the lessor's consent but does not expressly state a stan-
460. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
461. Id.
462. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4(b) (West 1985).
463. Id. (emphasis added).
464. Id. (emphasis added).
465. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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dard governing consent. Application of the Kendall decision466 will im-
pose a reasonableness standard on the lessor, even though one is not
expressed in the lease. Subsection (3) of 1951.4(b) is satisfied only if "the
lease provides" that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.467
Under the Kendall rule, the lessor cannot unreasonably withhold consent
even if the lease does not so provide.468 The tenant receives the benefit of
the required transfer freedom whether the reasonableness standard is ex-
press or implied. Since the purpose of the statute is satisfied in either
case, the lessor should have the benefit of the lock-in remedy in either
case.
Suppose a lease contains specific requirements or conditions that
must be met for a permissible transfer-for example, the "Express Spe-
cific Requirements" 469 type clause. Subsection (2) of 1951.4(b) mandates
that the lessor "not require compliance" with any "unreasonable" stan-
dard or condition. The tenant should have the burden of proving that
the particular requirement is unreasonable at the time and in the manner
it is applied. This would be consistent with cases involving the reasona-
bleness standard generally. 70 It would be consistent with the placement
of the burden of proving reasonably avoidable rent loss on the tenant by
section 1951.2. It would also be a realistic recognition of the fact that it is
the tenant's fault, a breach of the lease, that sets the whole process in
motion.
Suppose a lease contains specific requirements that are reasonable at
the time they are included in the lease, but later circumstances make
application of one or more of the requirements unreasonable. The fact
that a standard or condition becomes unreasonable after execution of the
lease should not prevent the lessor from using the lock-in remedy if he or
she does not require compliance with the unreasonable requirement.
This position is expressed in the California Law Revision Commission
comment on section 1951.4.471 The language of subsection (b)(2) to
1951.4 can be construed to adopt this position. It requires that the lessor
"not require compliance with" any unreasonable standard or condition.472
466. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1985).
467. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4.
468. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496-97, 709 P.2d at 842, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
469. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 633 P.2d 586 (1981); RESTATEMENT supra
note 91, § 15.2, comment g; 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, at 416-17 (1977) & 439 n.17
(1987 Supp.).
471. 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 168, (1969) (comment to 1951.4).
472. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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However, the language could more clearly express that position.
Suppose that one clause or part of a clause allows the tenant to
transfer subject only to reasonable limitations if, but only if, the lessor is
exercising the lock-in remedy in section 1951.4. Suppose further that
another clause or part of a clause contains an expressly agreed provision
that either absolutely prohibits transfer or gives the lessor the sole discre-
tion to consent or object to transfer in all other circumstances. A clause
presented in a lease practice book published by the California Continuing
Education of the Bar appears to be setting up this type of combination.473
One of the remedy provisions states:
After Tenant's default and for as long as Landlord does not
terminate Tenant's right to possession of the premises, if Ten-
ant obtains Landlord's consent Tenant shall have the right to
assign or sublet its interest in this lease .... Landlord's con-
sent to a proposed assignment or subletting shall not be unrea-
sonably withheld.474
The comment to the clause mentions that it is unclear whether this
clause in combination with an "Absolute Prohibition" will work to pre-
serve the lock-in remedy, but opines that "such an arrangement probably
is permitted.""47
Does this type of combination, which allows transfer under the rea-
sonableness standard only if and when the lock-in is exercised, comply
with section 1951.4? The statute is unclear on this point. On the one
hand, it can be argued that the purpose of the statute is satisfied by the
combination. The tenant is given the freedom to transfer when he or she
requires it, at the tine of the lock-in. However, allowing such a provi-
sion eliminates any benefit the section would give a tenant in bargaining
for a reasonableness standard governing all transfers.
Suppose a lease contains a "Possession Recovery" clause.4 76 It gives
the lessor the option to recover possession of the property if the tenant
attempts to transfer. If the tenant has breached the lease, the exercise of
such a right would terminate the tenant's right to possession and result in
termination of the lease.477 Thus, the actual exercise of such a provision
lets the tenant out from under the lock-in remedy. The unexercised
existence of such a clause in the lease- does not prejudice the tenant's
473. LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.110.
474. Id. § 3.117, at 164.
475. Id. at 165. For a contrary view, see Zankel, Commercial Lease Assignments and the
Age of Reason: Cohen v. Ratinoff, 7 REAL PROP. L. REP. 29, 34 (1984).
476. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
477. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a).
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relief under section 1951.4, so it should not prejudice the lessor's remedy
under that section.
Suppose a lease contains a "Profit Shift" clause. 78 It allows the
lessor to receive part or all of the profit generated by the tenant's lease-
hold transfer. The tenant's relief provided in section 1951.4 is designed
to minimize the tenant's losses after a breach and abandonment. It is not
designed to assure that the tenant will profit from appreciated value of
the leasehold. The existence or exercise of such a clause should not pre-
vent the lessor from exercising the lock-in remedy.
XVI. RESIDENTIAL LEASES
This study is limited to non-residential leases. However, certain
general observations can be made concerning residential tenancies.
A. Uncertainty
The rules applicable to assignment and sublease restrictions in resi-
dential tenancies in California are even less certain than those applicable
to non-residential leases. The Kendall decision implied a requirement of
reasonableness into a "Silent Consent Standard" type clause in a com-
mercial lease. Thus, a reasonableness standard will be imposed when a
clause requires the lessor's consent but does not expressly state a gov-
erning standard. The court expressly refrained from deciding whether its
opinion should be extended to residential tenancies. 7 9 It is interesting to
note that of the four statutes the court referred to as imposing a reasona-
bleness standard on lessors, three apply to residential tenancies only and
the fourth applies to residential and other types of leases. 80 The Kendall
court relied heavily on the Wellenkamp loan security case in reaching its
conclusion, and that case involved residential property.48 1 However, the
characteristics of a residential loan and a residential tenancy are typically
quite different from the commercial context. For example, a loan gener-
ally involves a long-term relationship and a residential tenancy a short-
term one. Thus, there is a considerable difference in the duration and
impact of a transfer restriction.
478. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
479. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 492 n.1,'709 P.2d 837, 839 n.1, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 820 n.1 (1985).
480. Id. at 499 n.13, 709 P.2d at 844 n.13, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825 n.13.
481. Id. at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am.,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978)).
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There is dictum in Schweiso v. Williams,482 an earlier court of appeal
decision, that the court saw no significant difference between a residential
and a commercial lease when dealing with obligations of good faith and
commercial reasonableness. However, the court limited its adoption of a
reasonableness standard to commercial leases.483 So far, no reported
California decision has dealt specifically with lease transferability stan-
dards in a residential lease. There is no clear-cut pattern in cases of other
jurisdictions since most of them involve commercial leases.
B. Consumer Protection
Generally, there is stronger concern for "consumer" protection
when dealing with a tenancy for housing than there is when dealing with
a commercial lease for business operations.484 It has been argued that
the common-law and majority rule operates unfairly on residential ten-
ants when there is a housing shortage, and that implication of a sole
discretion standard into the "Silent Consent Standard" clause does not
meet the reasonable expectations of a residential tenant.4 5 Residential
tenants generally do not hire a lawyer to advise and negotiate concerning
the terms of the residential tenancy. The amount of rent is the major
concern, and it is reasonable to assume that there is usually little bargain-
ing over the other terms of the tenancy. A residential tenant is typically
unconcerned about transfer restrictions at the time of entering into a
lease, and thus does not actively bargain over them.486 If the residential
rental occurs at a time and place of unit shortages, there is little practical
bargaining power.
When a clause requires the lessor's consent but fails to express the
standard governing that consent, there are two basic choices for a stan-
dard: reasonableness or sole discretion. In the absence of express lan-
guage to the contrary, it seems likely that most residential tenants would
expect a reasonableness standard. Since the lessor generally has drafting
control, it is a minimal burden to require a lessor desiring a sole discre-
tion consent standard to expressly state it. If a lessor is required to use
express provisions to avoid a reasonableness standard, language of sole
discretion or absolute prohibition will probably become commonplace.
A tenant who reads the agreement will have notice of the broad restric-
482. Schweiso v. Williams, 150 Cal. App. 3d 883, 886 n.3, 198 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 n.3
(1984).
483. Id.
484. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West 1985) (liquidated damages) and §§ 1941-1942.5
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (habitability and retaliation).
485. Note, supra note 392, at 522.
486. See RoHAN, supra note 11, § 5.01, at 5-10.1.
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tion, but will likely have little incentive or power to insist on a reasona-
bleness standard.
C. Short Term
Residential tenancies are typically short term or on a month-to-
month basis. If the tenancy is for a fixed term, it is seldom for more than
one year. When longer terms are involved, they are usually for a single
family residence (free standing or condominium). A local rent control
ordinance that prohibits the lessor from terminating a tenancy except for
"just cause" can obviously convert a short-term tenancy into a long one.
The impact of a rent control ordinance is considered separately below.
Transferability of the leasehold is an important economic factor to most
commercial tenants, and one that should be carefully considered at the
time of entering into a commercial lease. However, in a short-term resi-
dential tenancy, it is unlikely that a significant "bonus value" (difference
between the agreed rent and the market rental value) will build up.
Thus, it is unlikely that a short-term residential tenant will be concerned
about the ability to reap the benefit of this bonus value by receiving con-
sideration from a third party assignee or subtenant. Also, a lessor in this
situation is not likely to be concerned about getting the bonus value upon
a transfer because the rent can be raised to the market in the short term
whether there is a transfer or not. For example, a "Profit Sharing" or
"Possession Recovery" type of a transfer clause would not likely be
worth the time it takes to draft and enforce it.
The short-term nature of a residential tenancy reduces the problems
faced by a tenant who wants to move, and thus reduces the need to trans-
fer. If a month-to-month tenant wishes to get out of the agreement, a
short time notice (typically 30 days) will do the job. A residential tenant
who enters into a fixed short-term tenancy (e.g., a one year lease) and
who later decides to move will generally have a relatively short term re-
maining. If the tenant elects to get out by breaching the lease and aban-
doning the premises, the tenant will have a relatively short time left on
the term for exposure to damages under California Civil Code section
1951.2, and that section provides for an offset of "reasonably" avoidable
rent losses.4" 7 If the lessor keeps the lease in effect by using the "lock-in"
remedy under California Civil Code section 1951.4, the lessor is subject
to a mandatory reasonableness standard.488
Since the lessor is able to recover possession after a relatively short
487. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2 (West 1985).
488. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4.
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time due to expiration of a fixed term or termination of a periodic ten-
ancy (absent rent control limitations), there may be less need for absolute
control over transfer in the interim. However, when an unlawful de-
tainer action is involved to recover possession, a mandatory reasonable-
ness standard could cause a lessor additional problems when faced with
an unconsented "Arrieta" occupant.489
When a short-term tenancy is involved, the duration of the transfer
restraint is limited and has less practical impact than in a long-term
lease. Also, resolving a dispute over reasonableness by litigation is gener-
ally impractical in a short-term tenancy.
D. Type of Property
The degree of tolerable lessor control over transferability may de-
pend upon the type of residential property subject to the tenancy. One's
attitude toward transfer restrictions in a residential lease can shift dra-
matically depending on the nature of the transaction. Suppose you have
a nice single family residence which has served as your family nest since
you personally designed and built it. It is filled with unique furnishings
collected over the years. You have been temporarily transferred or you
are planning an extended trip and need to rent your home, furnished, to
provide income for loan payments, taxes, insurance and maintenance.
You select your tenant according to your own personal standards, prefer-
ences and instincts. Should you be required to have a "commercially
reasonable objection" to prevent a transfer by this tenant? In some situa-
tions, the lessor, as well as the tenant, may be considered to be in need of
consumer protection.
On the other hand, suppose that a major apartment development
and management company owns hundreds of virtually identical apart-
ment units throughout the state, with professional on-site management
and security. Do you mind imposing a reasonableness standard on that
lessor?
The Restatement recognizes the distinction between these two situa-
tions when applying a reasonableness standard. It points out that "[a]
reason may be reasonable in relation to residential property that Is the
personal home of the landlord that would not be reasonable as to other
residential property."'49
If the validity and scope of a transfer restriction depends upon the
489. Arrieta v. Mahon, 31 Cal. 3d 381, 644 P.2d 1249, 182 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1982); see also
CAL. CWV. PROC. CODE §§ 715.020(d) (West 1987) and 1174.3 (West Supp. 1988).
490. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment g and illustration 8 at 105-06.
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type of residential property involved, it is difficult to make clear distinc-
tions that can be easily applied. There are a variety of situations where
legislation has made a distinction between one-to-four unit residential
transactions and other residential transactions. 49 1 This would cover the
hypotheticals posed above, and it might be a reasonable, although less
than perfect, compromise distinction.
E. Mobilehomes
The expense and difficulty of moving a mobilehome put mobilehome
site tenancies in a distinct category. The lessor's ability to restrict trans-
fer of the tenancy is strictly limited when title to the mobilehome is trans-
ferred. The limitations are contained in a separate article of the
comprehensive "Mobilehome Residency Law," particularly in California
Civil Code sections 798.73-798.74 (sale of mobilehome), 798.78 (death
transfer and later sale), and 798.79 (foreclosure transfer and later
sale). 92 It seems that these limitations should be preserved due to the
unique nature of the mobilehome tenancies.
F Continuing Liability
A tenant who assigns or sublets to a third party remains liable to the
lessor for breaches of the tenancy obligations in the absence of a release,
and a lessor's consent to the transfer is not a release. If the tenant can
terminate the tenancy without breach, the typical residential tenant is
better off terminating the tenancy rather than risking continuing expo-
sure to liability related to premises no longer controlled by the tenant.
Thus, a "freedom to transfer" may be an illusory benefit for most ten-
ants, and a trap for some who transfer to a person who turns out to be
irresponsible.
The degree of protection provided to the lessor by this continuing
liability depends on the continued availability and solvency of the origi-
nal tenant.
G. Rent Control
A rent control ordinance that strictly limits the lessor's ability to
491. See, eg., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1976) (anti-deficiency protection on
third party loan); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 1988) (sale and other transfer disclo-
sures); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1675 (West 1985) (strict limitations on liquidated damages); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2373j) (West Supp. 1988) (broker agency disclosures); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2924(i) (West Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2956 (West Supp. 1988) (disclosures in resi-
dential real property credit sales).
492. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.73-74, 798.78-79 (West Supp. 1988).
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terminate a tenancy, or ability to decline to renew it, dramatically
changes the potential term of a residential lease. When a local jurisdic-
tion adopts rent control, it is likely to include some form of "just cause"
limitations on the lessor's power to end the tenancy (e.g., rent default,
extensive rehabilitations, move-in by lessor or family, etc.). These limita-
tions restrict the lessor's power to terminate the tenancy, but typically
leave the tenant free to terminate it.
If a lessor were to be subjected simultaneously to a "just cause" limit
on termination, and a mandatory reasonableness standard on tenant
transfers, the result would be a rather unique tenaricy. A typical
monthly periodic tenancy would become an indefinitely long-term ten-
ancy (theoretically perpetual), with occupants chosen by successive ten-
ants. The tenant would have the unilateral right to terminate on thirty
days notice without cause.
A tenant enjoys the benefits of a bonus value (here, the difference
between the controlled rental and a free market rental) while occupying
the premises. This serves the basic purpose of the controlled rentals, and
it does not seem necessary to go further and limit the lessor's ability to
restrict transfers by the tenant.
One type of ordinance allows the lessor to raise the rent to the mar-
ket rate when the tenancy terminates and the unit is relet. Suppose that a
lessor could not prevent transfer, and a tenant could transfer the un-
terminated tenancy at the same controlled rental. The original tenant,
who no longer occupies the unit, could receive profit in the amount of the
bonus value from the third party. The new transferee occupant, by pay-
ing an "assignment fee" or sublease rent to the original tenant, would pay
more than the controlled rental. The lessor would lose the ability to
catch the rent up to the free market rental.
Under another type of ordinance, the rent remains controlled even
when the tenancy terminates and the unit is relet. The lessor cannot
require a higher rent from the new occupant whether the former tenancy
is terminated or transferred. In theory, the new occupant does not have
to "buy" the bonus value from the present tenant because the new occu-
pant will be protected by the rent ceiling under a new tenancy. In prac-
tice, if there is a shortage of rent controlled units available, an existing
tenant may be able to "sell" his or her position if the lessor cannot re-
strict transfers.
Obviously, there are ways a rent control ordinance can be designed
to deter a windfall profit to the vacating tenant at the expense of the new
occupant and the owner. However, the point is that free transferability
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by the tenant is not necessary to accomplish the public purpose of rent
control, and in some instances it might be counterproductive.
H. Basic Issues
This study contains several conclusions, summarized in Section Q,
concerning the validity and interpretation of transfer restrictions in non-
residential leases. Underlying the conclusions are two basic issues that
need to be resolved with respect to residential tenancies.
First, absent express language in the agreement to the contrary,
should a lessor who objects to a transfer be held to a reasonableness con-
sent standard? In other words, if the lessor wishes to have a sole discre-
tion standard apply, should that be required to be express in the
agreement? If there is no language expressing a different standard, it
seems that a reasonableness standard conforms to the likely expectations
of a residential tenant. A requirement to expressly disclose a sole discre-
tion standard to a residential tenant is a minimal and reasonable burden.
Second, should the lessor be able to contract away the reasonable-
ness standard in a residential tenancy? In other words, should there be a
mandatory reasonableness standard or should the express language of the
transfer restriction govern? Here there is a more difficult balancing of
policies.
The general approach of the conclusions regarding restrictions in
commercial leases is to require disclosure by express agreement, and to
allow enforcement of expressly agreed strict restrictions on transfer ac-
cording to their terms. The following policy issues will have to be re-
solved with regard to residential leases:
(1) Is there a compelling policy reason to depart from the commer-
cial lease approach when a residential tenancy is involved?
(2) If a different approach is adopted (for example, a mandatory
reasonableness standard):
(a) Should there be a distinction based on the duration of the
tenancy?
(b) Should there be a distinction based on the type of residential
property involved?
(c) Should there be special provisions for tenancies subject to
rent control?
XVII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Relating to Commercial Lease Transfer Restrictions
The following conclusions are based on the assumption that,
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although they are not necessarily equal in bargaining power, the parties
are not involved in a contract that would be invalidated in whole or part
under the adhesion doctrine in California.
1. The freedom of the parties to negotiate and contract concerning
restrictions on leasehold transfers should be preserved unless there is a
compelling public policy reason to interfere.
2. Disclosure of restrictions by express provisions should be en-
couraged in order to provide clear expectations for the parties.
3. A tenant may freely transfer unless the lease imposes a
restriction.
4. Restrictions on leasehold transfers are permitted but strictly
construed. Ambiguities are construed in favor of transferability.
5. A "Silent Consent Standard" clause is one that requires the les-
sor's consent to a leasehold transfer by a tenant, but that does not contain
an express standard governing the lessor's consent.493 The clause does
not expressly state that the lessor is subject to a reasonableness standard
nor does it expressly state that the lessor has the freedom of a sole discre-
tion standard.
The traditional common-law and majority view holds that the lessor
is free to use subjective sole discretion in withholding consent. There are
several recent cases from other states that imply into this type of clause a
reasonableness standard to govern the lessor.4 94 These cases still repre-
sent a minority view but might be considered to indicate a trend. How-
ever, there are also some recent cases that decline to adopt the minority
view. The Restatement (Second) of Property implies a reasonableness
standard into this type of clause.495 The California Supreme Court, in
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. ,496 also adopted the minority view and
implied a reasonableness standard into this type of clause.
The implication of a reasonableness standard into the "Silent Con-
sent Standard" clause is justified by public policy. However, careful con-
sideration should be given to the possibility of unfairness resulting from
the retroactive application of this rule.
6. An "Express Reasonableness Standard" clause is one that re-
quires the lessor's consent to a leasehold transfer by the tenant, and that
by express agreement of the parties imposes a standard of reasonableness
493. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2.
494. See B & R Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc., 139 Vt. 122, 422 A.2d 1267 (1980),
Carleno v. Vollmert Tire Co., 36 Colo. App. 446, 540 P.2d 1149 (1975).
495. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2.
496. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
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on the lessor.497
The common-law and majority view, the minority view, and the Re-
statement (Second) of Property consider this type of clause valid.
If the reasonableness standard is complied with, this clause does not
violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and it does not violate
the rule against restraints on alienation.
7. An "Express Sole Discretion Consent Standard" clause is one
that requires the lessor's consent to a leasehold transfer by the tenant,
and that by express agreement of the parties gives the lessor the sole dis-
cretion to refuse consent.4 98 An "Absolute Prohibition" type clause is
one in which express agreement of the parties absolutely prohibits lease-
hold transfers by the tenant.4 99
It should be noted that the "Sole Discretion Standard" and "Abso-
lute Prohibition" type clauses do not comply with California Civil Code
section 1951.4, so the lessor would not be able to use the lock-in remedy
provided in that section.
The common-law and majority view consider these types of clauses
valid. There is no trend of holdings in out-of-state cases rejecting this
view. The clauses are valid according to the Restatement (Second) of
Property if "freely negotiated."" ° Although there is some language in
Kendall criticizing the common-law and majority view in general, the
holding of that case does not prevent the use of such clauses.5 0 1
Public policies do not justify prohibiting the freedom to contract for
these types of clauses. The Restatement position presents a fair balance
between policy and freedom of contract. However, the phrase "freely
negotiated" should be clarified.
It is unlikely that a tenant in a freely negotiated long-term lease
would agree to this type of restriction for the full term. Thus, negotia-
tions usually take care to avoid such a long-term sole discretion or abso-
lute prohibition restriction. However, there may be concern that such
restrictions on a lease term approaching fee simple characteristics could
cause substantial adverse consequences. If this is a realistic concern, it
could be solved by a time limit after which a mandatory reasonableness
standard would govern the lessor. A time limit would be a more direct
solution than an absolute prohibition of such clauses in all leases, regard-
less of term. The particular time chosen for the limit would, however, be
497. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment h.
498. Id. at comment i.
499. Id. at comment d.
500. Id. at § 15.2(1).
501. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 506, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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largely arbitrary.50 2
8. The recent litigation over this area of the law has been generated
in large measure by lessors' attempts to "sweeten," rather than preserve,
the deal made in the lease. The lessor's demand comes as an apparent
surprise at the time of the proposed transfer. Consideration should be
given to requiring an express lease clause to support a lessor's demand
for participation in bonus value profit by increase in-rent or otherwise. If
the express provision is present, it has been negotiated and provided for
at the time the lease is entered into. The express provision converts the
demand from a surprise into one of the reasonable expectations of the
parties. However, a prohibition against a lessor's demand for money in
exchange for consent might create more problems than it solves: it could
deter legitimate compromises; and it could create difficult litigation over
motivations.
50 3
9. Specific requirements or conditions for a leasehold transfer by the
tenant, expressly agreed to by the parties in the lease, should be free from
attack as unreasonable, unless and until the lessor exercises the lock-in
remedy pursuant to California Civil Code section 1951.4.
10. A lessor's right to elect to recover possession of the premises
when a tenant proposes a leasehold transfer, expressly agreed to by the
parties in the lease, should not be considered an unreasonable restraint
on alienation or a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
11. A lessor's right to receive part or all of the profit generated by a
leasehold transfer by a tenant, expressly agreed to by the parties in the
lease, should not be considered an unreasonable restraint on alienation or
a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. Relating to the Lock-in Remedy in Civil Code Section 1951.4
California Civil Code section 1951.4 allows the lessor to keep the
lease in effect and enforce its terms (i.e., "lock-in" the lease) after the
tenant has breached the lease and abandoned the premises.504 However,
this remedy is available only "if the lease permits" the tenant to make a
leasehold transfer subject only to reasonable limitations. The following
conclusions relate to that code section.
1. If a lease does not restrict transfer, the tenant is automatically
free to assign or sublet without the lessor's consent. It should not be
502. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of these types of clauses.
503. See supra notes 438-50 and accompanying text.
504. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4(b) (West 1985).
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necessary to expressly grant the right to assign or sublet in order to com-
ply with section 1951.4.
2. If a lessor's consent is subject to an implied reasonableness stan-
dard (e.g., a "Silent Consent Standard" clause), it should be considered
in compliance with the requirements of section 1951.4. It should not be
necessary to have the reasonableness standard expressed in the lease.
3. For purposes of compliance with section 1951.4, specific re-
quirements or conditions for a leasehold transfer by the tenant, expressly
agreed to by the parties in the lease, should be presumed to be reason-
able. An example is the "Express Specific Requirements" type of
clause.505 If there is a later dispute over reasonableness, the tenant
should have the burden of proving that a particular standard or condi-
tion is unreasonable at the time and in the manner it is applied.
4. It is possible that a particular requirement or condition,
although reasonable at the time of entering the lease, becomes unreasona-
ble due to changed circumstances. As long as the lessor does not require
compliance with the unreasonable standard or condition, the existence of
an unreasonable requirement or condition in the lease should not prevent
the lessor from using the remedy in section 1951.4.
5. A lease might provide that the tenant can transfer subject only
to reasonable restrictions if, but only if, the lessor is exercising the rem-
edy provided in section 1951.4. In all other respects, the lease provides
for a sole discretion standard or an absolute prohibition against transfer.
It is not clear whether this combination is permissible under the present
statute. There are competing considerations in resolving the issue, but it
should be resolved and clarified.
6. The remedy in section 1951.4 should not be denied to a lessor
just because of the presence in the lease of an expressly agreed provision
giving the lessor the right to elect to recover possession of the premises
when a tenant proposes a leasehold transfer. Note, however, that the
exercise of this right would terminate the lease and deny the lessor the
lock-in remedy.
7. The remedy in section 1951.4 should not be denied to a lessor
just because of the presence in the lease or the exercise of an expressly
agreed provision giving the lessor the right to receive part or all of the
profit generated by a leasehold transfer by a tenant.
505. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.4(b)(2)-(3).
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PART 2
LESSOR REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
RESTRICTIONS
I. SCOPE OF PART
This Part examines the remedies available to the lessor when a ten-
ant wrongfully violates a transfer restriction in a commercial lease of real
property.
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. A clause in the lease restricts the tenant's ability to trans-
fer to a third party without the lessor's consent.50 6 Later, the tenant
transfers or proposes to transfer all or part of the leasehold to a third
party. The transfer will be in the form of either an assignment to an
assignee, or a sublease to a subtenant. The lessor properly refuses con-
sent to a proposed assignment or sublease. The propriety of the refusal
assumes that the restriction clause is valid and that the lessor complies
with the applicable consent standard.50 7 The tenant and the third party
complete the assignment or sublease without the lessor's consent or over
the lessor's objections (or it has been done without requesting the lessor's
consent).
What are the lessor's remedies in California? Should the remedies
be clarified or modified?50 '
II. CALIFORNIA CASES
There is a pertinent series of California cases extending back to the
1800s. The cases are consistent in their description of the effects of an
unconsented transfer. The chronological development of the series is dis-
cussed briefly below.
In the 1893 case of Randol v. Tatum,5 09 the California Supreme
Court stated that "an assignment in violation of the covenant was not
absolutely void" and that the "lessor did not have the option of declaring
the assignment void," but the lessor could elect "to avoid the lease and
506. For a discussion of the types of restriction clauses, see supra notes 24-25 and accompa-
nying text.
507. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of clause validity and
consent standards.
508. These same issues are involved when the transfer restriction is contained in a sublease
from the tenant/sublessor to a subtenant, and the tenant/sublessor seeks remedies against the
subtenant.
509. 98 Cal. 390, 33 P. 433 (1893).
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end the term."' x The case involved a lessor's action against the sureties
on a rent bond.511 The sureties responded that rent had been properly
tendered by an assignee and thus, there was no default.512 The lessor
argued that the assignment was without his consent, in violation of the
lease, and thus, a tender by the assignee was improper.5 13 Also, he
seemed to argue that the assignee could have no leasehold rights except
by a lease violation, and thus the sureties could not rely on the assignee's
offer of performance.5 14 However, since the lessor did not terminate the
lease, the assignee was the legal owner of the leasehold and the proper
person to pay the rent.51 5
In the 1897 case of Garcia v. Gunn,516 the California Supreme Court
stated: "It seems to be the law that.., the lessor has only the option to
forfeit the lease for the breach of the condition, and that the assignment
is not void but passes the term, and the only remedy is for breach of the
covenant.,517 This was a claim and delivery action for goatskins brought
by an assignee of a lease of Guadalupe Island. 18 The suit was against
parties who had taken the skins from wild goats on the island. 19 The
defendants unsuccessfully argued that since the assignment had been
without the lessor's consent, the assignee was not entitled to possession of
the island at the time the skins were taken. 20
In the 1909 case of Potts Drug Co. v. Benedict,5 21 the California
Supreme Court stated that an assignment is not void if the lessor's con-
sent has not been obtained.522 In Potts, the leased premises were totally
destroyed by fire after the assignment was made but before the assignees
took possession. 523 The tenant sued the assignee for the balance due on
the sale of the leasehold estate.524 The assignee unsuccessfully argued
that the leasehold interest had not passed at the time of the fire, due to
the lack of the lessor's consent. 25
510. Id. at 396-97, 33 P. at 435.
511. Id. at 393, 33 P. at 433-34.
512. Id., 33 P. at 434.
513. Id. at 393-95, 33 P. at 433-35.
514. Id. at 398, 33 P. at 436.
515. Id.
516. 119 Cal. 315, 51 P. 684 (1897).
517. Id. at 318, 51 P. at 685.
518. Id. at 316-17, 51 P. at 684-85.
519. Id. at 317, 51 P. at 685.
520. Id. at 318, 51 P. at 685.
521. 156 Cal. 322, 104 P. 432 (1909).
522. Id. at 327, 104 P. at 434.
523. Id. at 326, 104 P. at 434.
524. Id. at 324, 104 P. at 433.
525. Id. at 326-27, 104 P. at 434-35.
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In the 1928 case of Buchanan v. Banta,26 the California Supreme
Court stated that when there is an unauthorized breach of the covenant
not to assign, "the lessor has only the option to forfeit the lease for such
breach; the assignment is not void, but voidable only at the option of the
lessor, which option he must exercise according to law." '527 In this case,
the lessor brought an unlawful detainer action against the defendants,
claiming that they owed rent under a month-to-month tenancy after a
lease surrender.5 28 The defendants successfully argued that they had the
status of assignees of the lease and were therefore entitled to credit for
prepaid rent under the lease.529
The court in Buchanan referred to the 1927 case of Miller v.
Reidy,53 decided by the California Court of Appeal. Miller involved an
unconsented transfer. The third party transferee ignored the lessor's, de-
mand that he vacate.5 31 The lessor accepted rent from the transferee, but
attempted to reserve his rights.5 2 Particularly, he put a statement on
rent receipts stating that the rent was received without prejudice to the
lessor's rights under the lease. 33 The Buchanan court quoted Miller
with approval:
This was a clear attempt to eat the cake and still keep it. His
actions belie his words. Waiver is a question of intention. For
the lessors month after month to accept rents specified in the
lease, and at the same time declare that there was a forfeiture,
results in an irreconcilable inconsistency .... If an unauthor-
ized assignment had been made the lessors had the right to de-
clare the term at an end, or they could have waived the breach
and let the lease continue. Nowhere within that agreement nor
in the law is there a stipulation or provision that they might do
both.
5 34
In Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum Co., 35 decided in 1932, the
California Supreme Court stated:
The assignment of a lease in violation of a covenant against
526. 204 Cal. 73, 266 P. 547 (1928).
527. Id. at 76-77, 266 P. at 548 (citations omitted).
528. Id. at 74, 266 P. at 547.
529. Id. at 74-75, 266 P. at 547-48.
530. 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 (1927).
531. Id. at 759-60, 260 P. at 359.
532. Id. at 760, 260 P. at 359.
533. Id.
534. Buchanan, 204 Cal. at 77-78, 266 P. at 548-49 (quoting Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App.
757, 762, 260 P. 358, 360 (1927) (citations omitted)).
535. 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932).
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
assignment without the consent of the lessor is nevertheless a
binding assignment which passes the leasehold estate.... Such
an assignment in violation of the covenant is, however, subject
to the option in the lessor to forfeit the lease. The only remedy
for the breach of such a covenant would be the exercise by the
lessor of his option to forfeit the lease. 36
In Chapman, the tenant, without the lessor's consent, granted a lender a
leasehold mortgage which was recorded.5 37 Later, the tenant assigned
the lease to an assignee with the lessor's consent.5 31 The assignee, with
knowledge of the leasehold mortgage, exercised an option to purchase
contained in the lease.139 The lessor conveyed the leasehold to the as-
signee, and there were subsequent reconveyances.5 4° The mortgagee
brought an action to establish that the lien on its mortgage was still at-
tached to the title when the assignee exercised the option to purchase.
5 41
One of the arguments raised against the mortgagee was that the lien
could not attach because the mortgage violated the clause prohibiting
assignment without the lessor's consent. The court held that the mort-
gage did not violate this clause, and even if it did, it was valid in the
absence of a lease forfeiture by the lessor.5 42 In the 1944 case of People v.
Klopstock,143 the California Supreme Court stated that a series of assign-
ments without the lessor's consent:
were merely voidable, not void; there was no ipso facto termina-
tion of the lease by reason of the lessee's failure to obtain the
lessor's written consent to assignment. Since the lessor did not
elect to exercise its option to avoid the original assignment in
the manner prescribed by law, its notice . . . that it did not
recognize the validity of the assignment gave no legal force to
its demand therein that such assignee remove all property
owned by it from the leased premises .... While the course of
action pursued by the lessor ... was sufficient to apprise the
assignee that it might be dispossessed ... the lessor's option to
void the objectionable transfer depended upon its declaration of
a forfeiture upon proper notice as provided by law. But the les-
sor did not take advantage of the exclusive remedy available to
536. Id. at 427, 14 P.2d at 761.
537. Id. at 422-23, 14 P.2d at 759.
538. Id. at 423, 14 P.2d at 759.
539. Id. at 423-24, 14 P.2d at 759.
540. Id. at 423, 14 P.2d at 759.
541. Id. at 422, 14 P.2d at 758.
542. Id. at 427, 14 P.2d at 761.
543. 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944).
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it for termination of the lease, and accordingly [the subsequent
assignee] succeeded to all the rights of the lessee. 5 "
Klopstock involved the assignee's successful claim of entitlement to com-
pensation in an eminent domain action.
The court in Klopstock referred to the 1942 case of Northwestern
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Consumers Rock & Cement Co.,545 decided by the
California Court of Appeal, involving a like lease and a like initial uncon-
sented assignment. Northwestern Pacific involved an unlawful detainer
action by the lessor. The trial court denied possession to the lessor, but
ordered the defendant assignee to pay the reasonable rental value of the
premises, which was in excess of the rent provided in the lease.546 This
award of rental value was reversed on appeal.5 47 Since the lease and the
assignment remained in effect, the agreed rent still governed. The lessor
refused consent to the assignment, refused tender of rent, and notified the
assignee that it refused to recognize the validity of the assignment.
548
The Klopstock court quoted, with approval, Northwestern Pacific:
If the lessor desired to stand upon the covenant against assign-
ment, he could have given notice of his election to declare a
forfeiture of the lease and could have sued for breach of the
covenant. He could also have had his remedy in unlawful de-
tainer if possession had been thereafter withheld following
proper notice. But we find no authority indicating that the les-
sor had the option of merely giving notice of the invalidity of
the assignment without declaring a forfeiture .... 549
In the 1964 case of Sexton v. Nelson,55 the California Court of Ap-
peal stated:
A lease is not terminated ipsofacto upon its transfer in violation
of a provision therein declaring its nontransferability .... The
breach of a provision against assignment confers upon the les-
sor, at his election, the right to effect a forfeiture of the lease in
the manner authorized by law. If the lessor does not elect to
declare a forfeiture because of such a breach, the assignment in
question is valid. If he does elect to declare a forfeiture he must
544. Id. at 901-02, 151 P.2d at 643 (emphasis in original).
545. 50 Cal. App. 2d 721, 123 P.2d 872 (1942).
546. Id. at 722, 123 P.2d at 872.
547. Id. at 723, 123 P.2d at 872-73.
548. Id. at 722-23, 123 P.2d at 872.
549. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d at 901, 151 P.2d at 643 (quoting Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. Con-
sumers Rock & Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 721, 723, 123 P.2d 872, 873 (1942)).
550. 228 Cal. App. 2d 248, 39 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1964).
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give notice of his intention in the premises. 5
The lessor brought an action seeking to have a lease declared terminated
by reason of violation of a transfer restriction, among other reasons.
55 2
There was no evidence that the lessor had attempted to declare a forfei-
ture. Even if the lessor had attempted to do so, the court held that a
transfer of the tenant corporation's stock did not violate the transfer re-
striction.55 3 In the 1965 case of Weisman v. Clark,"5 4 the California
Court of Appeal stated:
An assignment in violation of the covenant is not void and does
not void the lease but passes the term, and the only remedy for
such a violation is an action for breach of covenant. Such a
restriction against assignment is the personal covenant for the
benefit of the lessor unless he elects to take advantage of the
breach and thus the assignment remains valid until he does
SO.
555
The court also said that the lessor "had the option to decide whether or
not he wanted to declare a forfeiture or proceed with the lease. '5 56 The
tenant had formed a corporation and had assigned the lease to the corpo-
ration in exchange for a portion of the stock. Later, the tenant and other
stockholders sold their stock to defendant. A short time later, the restau-
rant being operated on the premises closed and the corporation was ad-
judged bankrupt. The tenant sued for the balance due on the stock sale.
The defendant unsuccessfully claimed that there was a failure of consid-
eration because the lessor had not consented to the transaction.
5 57
The Weisman court also commented on waiver by virtue of the les-
sor's conduct. "There is no waiver on the part of the lessor due to an
acceptance of rent without actual knowledge of the assignment or sub-
lease. Such knowledge must be actual, not constructive.
'5 5 8
In the 1966 case of Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 1 9 the California Court of
Appeal dealt with an issue of waiver and stated: "If the lessor accepts
payments of rent from the assignee, even under a stipulation reserving
the right to declare a forfeiture, the right is waived."' "' However, the
551. Id. at 258, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (citations omitted).
552. Id. at 252-53, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
553. Id. at 258, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
554. 232 Cal. App. 2d 764, 43 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1965).
555. Id. at 768, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (citations omitted).
556. Id. at 768, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
557. Id. at 766, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
558. Id. at 769, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (citations omitted).
559. 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 53 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1966).
560. Id. at 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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court held that an express non-waiver clause allows the lessor to accept
rent while deciding whether to forfeit the lease. 6'
III. LEASE TERMINATION REMEDY
The basic principles developed in the California cases mentioned
above can be summarized as follows:
62
1. A prohibited transfer is voidable, not void. Thus, the interest
passes from the tenant to the third party, subject to the right of the lessor
to take remedial action.
2. A prohibited transfer does not automatically terminate the lease.
3. The lessor can elect to terminate the lease and recoyer possession
of the property.
5 63
4. If the lessor fails to terminate the lease, the transfer remains
effective.
5. A lessor may waive the right to terminate the lease by conduct,
for example by accepting rent with actual knowledge of the transfer.56
A "non-waiver" clause may protect the lessor from this type of implied
waiver. 65
The major California cases developing these principles involve as-
signments, not subleases. There are, however, cases that indicate that a
sublease will be treated in the same manner.5 66 There does not appear to
be any substantial reason why the same rules concerning the validity of
the transfer, the lessor's election to forfeit the lease or let the transfer
stand, and waiver by conduct should not also apply to a sublease.
561. Id. at 342-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
562. The following cases mention principles numbered I through 4: Weisman v. Clark, 232
Cal. App. 2d 764, 768, 43 Cal. Rptr. 108, 110-11 (1965); Sexton v. Nelson, 228 Cal. App. 2d
248, 258, 39 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413 (1964); People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 901-02, 151 P.2d
641 (1944); Buchanan v. Banta, 204 Cal. 73, 76-77, 266 P. 547, 548 (1928); Miller v. Reidy, 85
Cal. App. 757, 762, 260 P. 358, 360 (1927); Garcia v. Gunn, 119 Cal. 315, 318, 51 P. 684, 685
(1897); Potts Drug Co. v. Benedict, 156 Cal. 322, 327, 104 P. 432, 434-35 (1909); Randol v.
Tatum, 98 Cal. 390, 396-97, 33 P. 433, 435-36 (1893).
563. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1161(4), 1162, 1164 (West 1982) and § 1174 (West
Supp. 1988). A prohibited assignment or sublease provides statutory grounds for an unlawful
detainer action by the lessor to terminate the lease and recover possession" from the tenant, an
assignee, or a subtenant.
564. Weisman, 232 Cal. App. 2d at 769, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 111; Miller, 85 Cal. App. at 762,
260 P. at 360.
565. Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 335, 340 (1966).
566. Guerin v. Blair, 33 Cal. 2d 744, 746-47, 204 P.2d 884, 885 (1949) (personal property
lease); Licht v. Gallatin, 84 Cal. App. 240, 245, 257 P. 914, 916 (1927) (although court treated
transaction as sublease, it might have been partial assignment); Gray v. Maier & Zobelein
Brewery, 2 Cal. App. 653, 658, 84 P. 280, 282 (1906); see also 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and
Tenant § 494 (1970); M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 7.304d (2d ed. 1983).
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Although there are significant differences between an assignment and a
sublease, 67 these differences do not affect the basic alternatives of forfeit-
ing the lease or leaving the lease and the transfer in effect. This similarity
in treatment for remedy purposes is consistent with the similarity in
treatment for purposes of determining the validity and consent standard
of the transfer restriction.
5 68
However, if the lessor sues the third party for breaches of the lease
covenants, the differences between an assignment and a sublease can have
an effect. There is no privity of contract or estate between the lessor and
a subtenant (absent an assumption by the subtenant), but there is privity
of estate between the lessor and an assignee (and also privity of contract
if there is an assumption by the assignee.)169 This is discussed below in
the section on damage remedies.
IV. DAMAGE REMEDIES
A. In Connection With Lease Termination
When the lessor terminates the lease because of the tenant's breach,
California Civil Code section 1951.2 provides that the lessor may recover
the worth at the time of award of the following items:
1. Rent Before Termination: "unpaid rent which had
been earned at the time of termination"; 70
2. Deficiency Damages Between Termination and Award:
"the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been
earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the
amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have
been reasonably avoided";- 71
3. Deficiency Damages After Award: "the amount by
which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time
of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee
proves could be reasonably avoided";572
4. Miscellaneous Damages: "[a]ny other amount neces-
567. For a discussion of the differences, see supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
568. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 492 n.2, 709 P.2d 837, 839 n.2, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 820 n.2 (1985).
569. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
570. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951.2(a)(1) (West 1985). Subsection (b) calls for the addition of
interest to provide the "worth at the time of award."
571. Id. § 1951.2(a)(2). Subsection (b) calls for interest to provide the "worth at the time of
award."
572. Id. § 1951.2(a)(3). Subsection (b) calls for a discount to provide the "worth at the time
of award."
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sary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately
caused by the lessee's failure to perform his obligations under
the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be
likely to result therefrom.
573
This Author has not found any case directly applying section 1951.2
in connection with a lease termination following a wrongful transfer.
However, there is no apparent reason why it would not apply. Lease
termination and damages are consistent remedies.5 74
If the lessor brings an unlawful detainer action to terminate the lease
and recover possession, an additional action to recover damages may be
necessary. The items of money recovery allowed in an unlawful detainer
action are quite limited in order to preserve its summary nature.57 The
lessor can bring a separate action for damages not recoverable in the un-
lawful detainer action.576
B. Absent Lease Termination
Suppose that the lessor elects not to terminate the lease, or engages
in conduct that results in a waiver of the right to terminate the lease.
The wrongful assignment or sublease remains in effect. Is the lessor enti-
tled to recover damages, if any, caused by the assignment or sublease?
These damages might result from such facts as a loss of percentage rent-
als, or the transferee's change in use causing increased insurance premi-
ums,5 7 7 fire damage,5 78 or hazardous substance liability. 579 There might
be a violation of a use restriction clause as well as a transfer restriction
clause. Generally, a lessor is entitled to leave a lease in effect and recover
damages for breach of a covenant.58 0 There seems to be no reason to
make a distinction when a transfer restriction clause is involved.
The California cases discussed above state that the assignment or
573. Id. § 1951.2(a)(4).
574. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91 § 13.1. Dictum in Northwestern Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Consumers Rock & Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 721, 123 P.2d 872 (1942), discussed supra at
notes 545-49 and accompanying text, suggests that the lessor "could have given notice of his
election to declare a forfeiture of the lease and could have sued for breach of the covenant." Id.
at 723, 123 P.2d at 873.
575. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174(b) (West Supp. 1988); see also Vasey v. California
Dance Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 742, 139 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1977).
576. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1952(b) (West 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174.5 (West Supp.
1988); see also Danner v. Jarrett, 144 Cal. App. 3d 164, 192 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1983).
577. See Rouiaine v. Simpson, 84 N.Y.S. 875 (1903).
578. See Lepla v. Rogers, 1 Q.B. 31 (1893).
579. Reid and Trapp, Liability for Release of Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA:
Landlord and Tenant Issues, 6 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 23, 25 (Spring, 1988). -
580. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 13.1(2).
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sublease is valid unless the lessor elects to terminate the lease. Language
in some of the cases implies that the only way for the lessor to enforce a
transfer restriction clause is to terminate the lease. For example, the
court in Buchanan stated that when the transfer restriction covenant is
breached, "the lessor has only the option to forfeit the lease for such
breach." '81 In the Chapman case, the court stated: "The only remedy
for the breach of such a covenant [a covenant not to assign without the
lessor's consent] would be the exercise by the lessor of his option to for-
feit the lease." '582 However, those cases did not involve claims for dam-
ages without lease termination. The use of the terms "only option" or
"only remedy" were used in connection with the question whether the
unconsented transfer could be treated as void absent a lease termination.
Thus, the damage issue was not directly addressed.
A treatise on California law supports the right to a damage action
for breach of covenant even in the absence of a lease forfeiture. 83 It
states: "If the lessor elects not to declare a forfeiture, his only remedy is
for breach of covenant against the lessee, which does not affect the valid-
ity of the assignment." '584 Unfortunately, the case cited as authority did
not involve a lessor's action for damages for breach of the transfer re-
striction covenant.5 85 The treatise also states: "The breach of a covenant
against assignment also gives the lessor the option to sue for damages for
breach, or in unlawful detainer if possession is withheld after notice to
vacate." '586 Again, the case cited as authority did not involve a lessor's
action for damages for breach of the transfer restriction.
5 8 7
I have not found any California case expressly allowing or expressly
denying damages to the lessor who fails to terminate the lease. However,
there is a case that denied damages based on reasonable rental value.588
There, the lessor sued for possession and reasonable rental value damages
in excess of the agreed rent.589 Since the lease was not terminated, the
lessor was not entitled to possession, and could not collect rental value in
581. Buchanan v. Banta, 204 Cal. 73, 76, 266 P. 547, 548 (1928).
582. Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 427, 14 P.2d 758, 761 (1932).
583. 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 404, § 199.
584. Id. at 232.
585. The treatise cited Licht v. Gallatin, 84 Cal. App. 240, 257 P. 914 (1927). The court in
Licht, 84 Cal. App. at 245, 257 P. at 916, quoted from Garcia v. Gunn, 119 Cal. 315, 318, 51
P. 684 (1897). Garcia did not involve a lessor's action for damages for breach of the transfer
restriction covenant.
586. 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 404, at 232.
587. The treatise cited People v. Klopstock, 24 Cal. 2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944).
588. Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Consumers Rock & Cement Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 721,
123 P.2d 872 (1942).
589. Id. at 722, 123 P.2d at 872.
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excess of the rent provided in the lease.590 This case did not involve an
action for damages caused by breach of the transfer restriction covenant
itself. An action for damages based on the transferee's reduced produc-
tion of percentage rentals is distinguishable. Such an action would di-
rectly involve the transfer restriction breach. There is support for
damages without termination of the lease in out-of-state cases and
texts.5 91
A clause restricting transfer of the leasehold is typically worded as a
covenant by the tenant. A lease is considered to be a contract as well as a
conveyance in California.59 2 The Civil Code provides for damages for
breach of a contract covenant as follows:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the mea-
sure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by
this Code, is the amount which .will compensate the party ag-
grieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to re-
sult therefrom. 93
It seems that the lessor should be entitled to recover damages caused
by a breach of the covenant restricting transfer, unless the lessor has
waived the breach, or has engaged in conduct which estops the lessor
from asserting a breach.594
A court of appeal has stated: "Waiver is the intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right after knowledge of the facts."5 95 If we view the
lessor's failure to terminate the lease as a waiver of the breach, the lessor
would not be able to enforce a damage remedy. However, if we view it as
a waiver of a particular remedy for the breach, the lessor should be able
to enforce a different remedy-the right to damages. Termination of the
lease and collection of damages are two distinct remedies. The lessor
might waive both remedies. However, waiver of one does not necessarily
mandate the loss of the other.
Is there a compelling reason to treat the lessor's waiver of the right
590. Id. at 723, 123 P.2d at 872-73.
591. Food Pantry, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 58 Haw. 606, 615, 575 P.2d 869,
877 (1978); Wollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N.Y. 304, 312-13, 5 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ct. App.
New York, 1936); Rouiaine v. Simpson, 84 N.Y.S. 875, 875-76 (1903); Lepla v. Rogers, 1 Q.B.
31 (1893); see also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304a (1983); 1 PROPERTY, supra note
307, § 3.58.
592. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1925 (West 1982); see also Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton &
Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 418, 132 P.2d 457, 462 (1942).
593. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1977).
594. For a discussion of the relationship between waiver and estoppel, see Salton Commu-
nity Servs. Dist. v. Southard, 256 Cal. App. 2d 526, 64 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1967).
595. Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 335, 340 (1966).
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to terminate the lease as a mandatory waiver of the right to damages,
regardless of the lessor's contrary intent? This result would have the
benefit of putting an end to the transfer dispute. On the other hand, the
lessor would be forced to choose between the harsh remedy of forfeiture
or no remedy at all. The lessor may be willing to forego termination of
the lease if he remains protected by the right to recover damages for the
breach.
A decision to allow the lessor to recover damages even if the lessor
elects not to terminate will not eliminate factual ambiguities. Absent ex-
press language, it may be unclear from the facts whether the lessor in-
tends to waive one or both of the remedies. For example, the lessor's
acceptance of rent with knowledge of the transfer is a waiver of the right
to terminate the lease absent a non-waiver clause. 96 Will this also result
in an implied waiver of the right to damages? Absent other facts, the
acceptance of rent should not be treated as a waiver of the right to dam-
ages. Since the lease is not terminated, the lessor is entitled to the rent.
He or she should not have to forgo that entitlement in order to preserve
the remedy for damages.
It is curious that there are no California cases expressly dealing with
these damage issues. Perhaps this is the "sleeping dog" problem that
seldom arises. Perhaps the prospect of serious damages from the transfer
motivates lessors to elect to terminate. If that prospect is not present,
perhaps lessors prefer to ignore the situation rather than end up with an
expensive quest for nominal damages.5 97
C. Liability of Third Party
The tenant made the transfer restriction covenant to the lessor, and
is liable for damages resulting from the breach. Also, the tenant remains
liable for other breaches of the lease that occur after either an assignment
or a sublease. This is based on privity of contract between the lessor and
tenant which continues absent a release of the tenant. 9 Is the third
party also liable to the lessor for breach of the transfer restriction
covenant?
Generally, absent an assumption agreement, a subtenant is not di-
rectly liable to the lessor for breaches of the prime lease. There is no
privity of estate or contract between them.5 99 However, a subtenant can
be held liable for actual or punitive damages for wrongfully withholding
596. Id.
597. See, eg., Food Pantry, 58 Haw. 606, 575 P.2d 869.
598. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
599. Id.
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possession.t6 0
An assignee is directly liable to the lessor for breaches of the lease
occurring after the assignment. There is privity of estate between the
lessor and assignee during the time the assignee holds the leasehold es-
tate.601 However, unless there is an assumption agreement, the assignee
is not liable for a breach that occurred before he acquired the lease-
hold. °2 The act of transfer, by which the assignee acquired the lease-
hold, constitutes the breach. This is true although the damages may be
suffered later. It is not clear whether the breach will be treated as occur-
ring before or after the assignee has acquired the leasehold. It can be
argued that it is the tenant's wrongful act of transferring that constitutes
the breach, and the assignee should not be liable. On the other hand, it
can also be argued that a transfer is necessary for a breach to occur, and
the assignee must acquire the leasehold before there is a transfer. Thus,
it is the assignee's acquisition of the leasehold which completes the
breach and the tenant and assignee are co-actors in the breach.
A related problem occurs if the assignee wrongfully reassigns in vio-
lation of a lease covenant.: 3 The assignee is not liable for breaches oc-
curring after he or she has parted with the leasehold estate, absent an
assumption.' A technical argument could be made that the assignee
has parted with the estate before the transfer is perfected. However, it
does not seem realistic to adopt a theory that would absolve the assignee
from liability for a wrongful transfer where he or she is the active trans-
feror. Even though the third party may avoid liability to the lessor for
damages, the third party still risks the possibility of the lease being termi-
nated by the lessor."5
V. THE MISSING REMEDY-"DISABLING" RESTRAINT
The California cases discussed above 6 make it clear that the lessor
cannot on the one hand keep the lease in effect, and on the other hand
treat the unconsented transfer as void. It is unlikely that a lessor would
600. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1174 (West Supp. 1988); Roth v. Morton's Chefs Servs.,
Inc., 173 Cal. App. 3d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1985); Fifth & Broadway Partnership v.
Kimny, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d 195, 162 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1980); Richard v. Degen & Brody,
Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960); see also Syracuse Assoc. v. Touchette
Corp., 73 A.D.2d 813, 424 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1979).
601. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
602. CAL. CV. CODE § 1466 (West 1982).
603. There may be an issue of whether the transfer restriction obligation is binding on the
assignee. This is discussed infra at notes 912-27 and accompanying text.
604. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1466.
605. See supra notes 562-69 and accompanying text.
606. See supra notes 509-61 and accompanying text.
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draft this as his or her exclusive remedy even if it were available. How-
ever, it would be a desirable alternative remedy for the lessor. It would
allow the lessor to preserve favorable lease terms while blocking the dis-
approved transfer.
A remedy that treats an unconsented transfer as void is called a
disabling restraint on alienation." 7 Also, the use of an injunction to en-
force a promise not to transfer without the lessor's consent has a similar
disabling effect."° The disabling restriction has the obvious result of
blocking the transfer. It may also have less obvious results which can
trap the unwary. For example, the third party in unconsented possession
may not have a sufficient insurable interest to recover on his insurance
policy for fire damage."
A remedy that treats an unconsented transfer as voidable, but effec-
tive unless the lessor elects to terminate the lease, is called a forfeiture
restraint on alienation.61° California treats the restraint as a forfeiture
restraint, not as a disabling restraint. This is consistent with the tradi-
tional view that a "disabling restraint is more objectionable from a public
policy standpoint because it imposes a complete freeze on the movement
of ownership."
611
If the jurisdiction allows disabling restraints, it is technically possi-
ble to draft and enforce a transfer restriction in a manner that would
allow the lessor to block the transfer without terminating the lease.612
Whether or not a disabling restraint should be allowed as an alternate
remedy is a policy decision.
Restraints on alienation, although permitted, are a disliked interfer-
ence with commerce.613 The lessor can terminate the lease and recover
damages, or leave the lease in effect and recover damages.614 It can be
argued that the lessor is adequately protected without providing for a
freeze on the movement of leasehold ownership. On the other hand, it
607. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment c; 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.7,
at 417.
608. 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.51, at 490.
609. See Splish Splash Watersides, Inc., v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589, 307
S.E.2d 107 (1983). A Georgia statute provided that a lease of less than five years was a use
right which could not be transferred without the lessor's consent.
610. R.ESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment b; 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307,
§ 26.8, at 418.
611. REsTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment c; 6 PROPERTY, supra note 307, § 26.9,
at 419.
612. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304a at 262; 2 POWELL, supra note 11, 24611] at
372.103; 49 AM. JUR. 2D., supra note 566, §§ 408, 494.
613. See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 562-605 and accompanying text.
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might be argued that an historic perception of evil resulting from a disa-
bling restraint does not justify denial of a logical remedy to block a pro-
hibited transfer. The remedy allows the lessor to retain the benefits of
the existing lease while avoiding an unconsented transfer.
In addition to a policy of dislike of restraints on alienation, a basic
policy of contract remedies is involved in the decision. The present Cali-
fornia approach is consistent with the view that a contracting party has
the choice between performance or payment of compensation for failure
to perform. This view was concisely stated in Chief Justice Bird's con-
curring and dissenting opinion in Seaman's Direct Buying Services, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co.6 '
Indeed, the assumption that parties may breach at will, risking
only contract damages, is one of the cornerstones of contract
law. "[lit is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to
contracts, but only to require each party to choose between per-
forming in accordance with the contract and compensating the
other party for injury resulting from a failure to perform. This
view contains an important economic insight. In many cases it
is uneconomical to induce completion of the contract after it
has been breached." In most commercial contracts, recogni-
tion of this economic reality leads the parties to accept the pos-
sibility of breach, particularly since their right to recover
contract damages provides adequate protection.616
It seems that forfeiture and damages are generally adequate to pro-
tect the lessor; however, they may be inadequate in some situations. Per-
haps a reasonable compromise would treat the transfer as voidable, but
allow the lessor to nullify the transfer while keeping the lease in effect if
the lessor can show the inadequacy of the other remedies.
If California law is changed to allow the lessor to dispossess the
third party without terminating the lease, certain other statutory clarifi-
cations would be required. The lessor would have to be given the right to
bring an unlawful detainer action to dispossess the third party while rec-
ognizing the paramount right to possession in the tenant. 17 Also, the
relationship to the basic remedies code provisions would have to be clari-
fied by providing that the third party can be dispossessed without termi-
nating the tenant's right to possession. 1
615. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
616. Id. at 778, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (Bird, C.J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 55 (1972)).
617. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1161-1161a (West 1982).
618. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951.2, 1951.4 (West 1985).
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VI. DILEMMA OF THE ILLUSORY "LOCK-IN" REMEDY
California has adopted a comprehensive set of remedies for tenant
breaches.6" 9 The basic plan of the legislation, contained in California
Civil Code section 1951.2, is to have an immediate termination of the
lease and an immediate cause of action for damages. Under this basic
plan, the lease is terminated in either of the foll6wing situations:
(1) where the tenant breaches the lease and abandons the premises; or
(2) where the tenant breaches the lease and the lessor terminates the ten-
ant's right to possession.620
The tenant can unilaterally terminate the lease by committing a
breach and abandoning the property. The lessor has been given the op-
portunity to prevent the tenant from triggering termination. The lessor
can use the lock-in remedy contained in California Civil Code section
1951.4.621 If the lease specifically provides for the remedy, and the sec-
tion is complied with, the lessor can lock-in the lease. This means that
the lessor can keep the lease in effect and enforce its provisions. Relief is
provided to the locked-in tenant by requiring that the lease permit the
tenant to assign or sublet, or both, subject only to reasonable restrictions.
Consider the following sequence:
1. The tenant breaches a lease covenant other than the transfer re-
striction and abandons the premises.
2. The lessor elects to keep the lease in effect and exercises the lock-
in remedy under section 1951.4.
3. The tenant makes an unconsented transfer over the reasonable
objections of the lessor.
In this situation, the lessor can either terminate the lease and get rid
of the undesirable transferee, or leave the lease and the transfer in effect.
The lessor cannot keep the lease in effect and block the reasonably objec-
tionable transfer. The lessor, faced with the unreasonable transfer in vio-
lation of the lease, must either give up the lock-in remedy of Section
1951.4 or permit the transfer. The only way the lessor can get the trans-
feree out of possession is to terminate the tenant's right to possession. As
soon as the lessor does this, the lease is terminated.
622
This imposes a serious limitation on the effectiveness of the lock-in
remedy. A tenant might breach and abandon with the expectation of
terminating the lease. If the lessor tries to block that expectation by ex-
619. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1951-1951.6 (West 1985).
620. Id. § 1951.2(a).
621. Id. § 1951.4.
622. See id. §§ 1951.2(a), 1951.4(b).
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ercising the lock-in, the tenant might knowingly make an unreasonable
transfer so that the lessor will terminate the lease. This is not without
risk to the tactical tenant. The lessor may leave the lease and transfer in
effect and sue the tenant for damages caused by breach of the
covenant.
62 3
A possible solution would be to allow the lessor to keep the lease in
effect and nullify the transfer. However, this would involve the policy
considerations discussed above.6 24
VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Lease Termination
1. A prohibited transfer in the form of an assignment or sublease is
voidable, not void. The interest passes from the tenant to the third party,
subject to the right of the lessor to take remedial action.
2. A prohibited transfer does not automatically terminate the lease.
3. The lessor can elect to terminate the lease and recover possession
of the property.
4. If the lessor fails to terminate the lease, the transfer remains
effective.
5. A lessor's waiver of the right to terminate the lease may be ex-
press or implied from conduct.
B. Damages
1. If the lessor elects to terminate the lease, the lessor should be able
to recover from the tenant the damages suffered, if any, in accordance
with California Civil Code section 1951.2.
2. If the lessor elects not to terminate the lease, or waives the right
to terminate the lease, the lessor should be able to recover from the ten-
ant the damages suffered, if any, in accordance with the usual rules for
breach of contract.
3. It should be possible for the lessor to waive the right to terminate
the lease without waiving the right to damages.
4. The subtenant who receives the wrongful sublease from the ten-
ant is not liable to the lessor for the tenant's breach of the transfer re-
striction in the prime lease.
5. It is unclear whether the assignee, who receives the wrongful as-
623. See supra notes 577-97 and accompanying text.
624. See supra notes 619-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of policy con-
siderations.
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signment from the tenant is liable to the lessor for the tenant's breach of
the transfer restriction. There are competing arguments. This should be
clarified.
6. It is unclear whether the non-assuming assignee who wrongfully
reassigns is liable to the lessor for breach of the transfer restriction.
There are competing arguments. This should be clarified.
C. Disabling Restraint
1. The lessor is not allowed to keep the lease in effect and treat the
transfer as void. There are competing arguments concerning the allow-
ance of this remedy.
2. Consideration should be given to allowing the lessor to block or
nullify the transfer, without terminating the lease, if the lessor establishes
that other remedies are inadequate.
3. If the law is changed to allow the lessor to nullify the transfer
and dispossess the transferee, the statutes dealing with unlawful detainer
and basic lease breach remedies should be conformed with.
D. Lock-in Remedy Dilemma
1. The requirement that the lessor terminate the lease in order to
avoid a wrongful transfer places a serious limitation on the effectiveness
of the lock-in remedy in California Civil Code section 1951.4.
2. The limitation could be avoided by allowing the lessor to nullify
the transfer and dispossess the transferee, without terminating the lease.
However, allowing this remedy would involve the competing considera-
tion related to the disabling restraint type remedy.
PART 3.
TENANT REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL
ENFORCEMENT OF
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
RESTRICTIONS
I. SCOPE OF PART
This Part examines the remedies available to a tenant when, pursu-
ant to a transfer restriction in a commercial lease of real property, a les-
sor wrongfully refuses consent to an assignment or sublease by a tenant.
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. A clause in the lease restricts the tenant's ability to trans-
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fer to a third party without the lessor's consent.625 The lessor is subject
to an express or implied reasonableness consent standard.626 Later, the
tenant proposes to transfer all or part of the leasehold to a third party.
The transfer will be in the form of either an assignment to an assignee, or
a sublease to a subtenant. The lessor wrongfully refuses to consent to the
transfer. The wrongfulness of the refusal is based on the assumption that
the lessor is subject to a reasonableness consent standard, and withholds
consent unreasonably. As an alternative, the wrongful enforcement of a
transfer restriction could involve the lessor's objection, to a proposed
transfer that is not within the scope of the restriction. In this variation,
the lessor does not have the right to require consent to the proposed
transaction.627
What are the tenant's remedies in California? Should the remedies
be clarified or modified?
628
II. COVENANT VS. CONDITION
A. Distinction and Effect
This section assumes a factual situation where the lessor is subject to
a reasonableness consent standard and that he or she has unreasonably
refused to consent. Occasionally, an express consent standard is clearly
worded as a covenant by the lessor that he or she will be reasonable in
withholding consent, or that he or she will not unreasonably refuse con-
sent. For example, the clause requiring the lessor's consent for a lease-
hold transfer might say: "Lessor promises that he will not unreasonably
withhold consent." More commonly, however, the consent clause con-
tains a phrase that "consent is not to be unreasonably withheld" or that
"consent will not be unreasonably withheld" or that "consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld." Absent express covenant language, the lan-
guage imposing a reasonableness standard is subject to two different
views. One view considers the language to be a covenant by the lessor.629
625. For a discussion of the types of restriction clauses, see supra notes 24-25 and accompa-
nying text.
626. For a discussion of consent standardi, see supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
627. Due to the policy of strict construction, a transaction will generally escape the restric-
tion unless the clause expressly takes it into consideration. For a discussion of strict construc-
tion, see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
628. The same issues are involved when the transfer restriction is contained in a sublease
from the tenant/sublessor to a subtenant, and the subtenant seeks remedies against the tenant/
sublessor.
629. Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 303, 379 A.2d
508, 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 166 N.J. Super. 36, 398 A.2d 1315 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
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The other view considers the language to be a qualification or condition
of the tenant's duty to get the lessor's consent.630
There is a dramatic difference between the two views when the ten-
ant seeks a remedy. If the reasonableness standard is a covenant by the
lessor, an unreasonable refusal to consent is a breach of contract. The
tenant then has the normal breach of contract remedies, including an
action for damages. If, however, the reasonableness standard merely
qualifies the requirement to get the lessor's consent, an unreasonable re-
fusal merely eliminates the need for consent. The tenant can then pro-
ceed to transfer without the lessor's consent.
In theory, the tenant may seem to have solid remedies in either case.
In practice, the remedy for a reasonableness qualification or condition
may be akin to the tenant having contractual permission to levitate with-
out artificial assistance. The practical problems with this remedy are dis-
cussed below in Subpart IV.
631
Negotiating positions of the lessor and tenant can be strongly af-
fected by the choice of a reasonableness covenant or condition. A wrong-
ful withholding of consent in violation of a covenant can lead to an
expensive breach of contract. It is easier for the lessor to say "no" if the
tenant is unable to point out the contractual liability for damages that
will be suffered. However, if the tenant is able to show potential tort
liability,632 the lessor will realize there is an expensive risk attached even
to a reasonableness condition.
The California courts have not taken a definitive position on the
issue of a covenant versus a condition. There is dictum by a court of
appeal in the 1928 case of Kendis v. Cohn 633 that supports the view that
reasonableness is a qualification of the tenant's obligation to obtain con-
sent, not a covenant by the lessor.634 The matter has not been an issue of
consequence in subsequent decisions. Rather, subsequent to Kendis,
there has been an increasing emphasis on a lease as a contract and on the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. 635 These devel-
630. Note, supra note 392, at 521-22; Annotation, Construction And Effect Of Provislon In
Lease That Consent To Subletting Or Assignment Will Not Be Arbitrarily Or Unreasonably
Withheld, 54 A.L.R. 3D 679 (1972) [hereinafter Annotation, Construction and Effect]; Annota-
tion, Right Of Lessor Arbitrarily To Refuse Or Withhold Consent To Subletting Or Assignment
Which Is Barred Without Such Consent, 31 A.L.R. 2D 831 (1953) [hereinafter Annotation,
Right of Lessor]; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.30Mb, at 265.
631. See infra notes 652-79 and accompanying text.
632. See infra notes 680-752 and accompanying text.
633. 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
634. Id. at 64-66, 265 P. at 854.
635. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 500, 709 P.2d 837, 844, 20 Cal. Rptr.
818, 825 (1985).
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opments are consistent with treating the reasonableness standard as a
covenant.
The view that the reasonableness standard is merely a qualification
or condition seems to place a premium on semantic gamesmanship. It is
at variance with the modem emphasis on good faith performance and
reasonable expectations. It has been criticized as subjugating intent to
"technical syntax, nicety of expression or semantics" and as being "con-
trary to the modem concept of contract law.."16 36 The Restatement ap-
parently recognizes this problem, and adopts the view that the provision
for a reasonableness standard is a covenant. Under that view, the tenant
is "entitled to all the remedies available for a breach of a promise.
'637
Apparently, therefore, the majority view treats the express reasonable-
ness standard as a covenant.6 38  Naturally, the lessor wishes to reduce
exposure to damages for failure to comply with a reasonableness stan-
dard. Interpretation of the provision as a qualification or condition,
rather than as a covenant, seems to put a premium on obscurity. It
would be more appropriate to require that a limitation on the tenant's
remedies be express. 39 Such a requirement will provide notice and an
opportunity to bargain.
B. Implied Reasonableness Standard
The reasonableness consent standard can be imposed upon the les-
sor in two ways. It can either be expressly provided for in the lease, or it
can be implied.' The Restatement makes a curious distinction: if the
lease expressly provides for the reasonableness standard, it is treated as a
covenant, and breach of contract remedies are available; if the reasona-
636. Arlu Associates, Inc. v. Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 275, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291 (1961),
aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693, 185 N.E.2d 913 (1962); see also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566,
§ 7.304b, at 265 (2d ed. 1983); Note, supra note 392, at 521-22.
637. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment h.
638. Fahrenwald v. La Bonte, 103 Idaho 751, 754, 653 P.2d 806, 809 (1982); Annotation,
Construction and Effect, supra note 37. There is a statement to the contrary in a 1970 law
review note. See Note, supra note 392, at 521. However, it is likely that smart money today
would bet on the covenant view.
639. There are limitations on the ability to contract away liability for wrongful acts, partic-
ularly if they are tortious. See, eg., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1668 (West 1985); Tunkl v. Regents of
University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). This is particu-
larly true when a residential tenancy is involved. See, ,g., CAL. Ciy. CODE § 1953 (West
1985); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1978).
640. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1985). Part 1 discusses the circumstances in which the reasonableness consent standard will
be implied.
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bleness standard is implied, damages are not available.f" The soundness
of this result has been questioned.' 2
The Restatement's distinction is probably based on the belief that if
the standard is implied, the lessor does not reasonably anticipate liability
for damages. If the lessor does not have reason to believe that he or she
will be subjected to a court-imposed reasonableness standard, this belief
makes sense. The surprise liability problem could arise due to a retroac-
tive imposition of a reasonableness requirement on a clause that is silent
about the consent standard." 3 It could also arise if a court were to inval-
idate a clause expressly giving the lessor sole discretion and mandate a
reasonableness standard. On the other hand, if the lessor has reason to
expect a reasonableness standard, he or she should expect breach of con-
tract ramifications for unreasonableness.
In California, the implied reasonableness standard is the product, at
least in substantial part, of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
644
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on the reasonable
expectations of the parties. The reasonableness obligation is imposed be-
cause of a covenant not to injure the reasonable expectations of the ten-
ant. It would be incongruous if the tenant did not have contract
remedies for the lessor's unreasonable refusal to consent, as long as the
lessor has reason to know that he or she is subject to a reasonableness
standard.
III. SELF-HELP
Suppose the tenant has requested consent to a proposed transfer.
The lessor is subject to a reasonableness consent standard and has unrea-
sonably refused consent. The tenant may legally go ahead with the trans-
fer, without judicial intervention. However, this is not likely to be a
practical remedy.
The tenant faces termination of the lease and liability for damages to
the lessor if he or she is incorrect about the lessor's unreasonableness.
There is also potential liability to the third party transferee. In addition,
a knowledgeable third party is unlikely to step into the risk of litigation
and possible loss of possession if reasonable alternative sites are available.
The proposed transferee is faced with a lessor who says consent is
641. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment h.
642. Fahrenwald, 103 Idaho at 754-55 n.3, 653 P.2d at 809-10 n.3. The court left resolution
of the issue to another day because the issue was not before it.
643. For a discussion of retroactive application of a reasonableness standard, see supra
notes 379-437 and accompanying text.
644. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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required and has been reasonably refused. The tenant says that the lessor
is unreasonable and consent is not required. The propriety of the refusal
can be litigated and the reasonableness issue reduced to a judgment.
However, a knowledgeable third party will prefer a clean deal, and will
not look forward to the thrill of prolonged and expensive litigation.
There is a risk that the lessor might prevail and the transferee will have
business disruption and other problems associated with a relocation.
Also, there is the possibility that a new site will be more expensive or
more difficult to find at the time of relocation. Even if the proposed
transferee is reasonably certain of the result, and receives an indemnity
agreement from the tenant, the transferee will likely need some induce-
ment to proceed.
The tenant should not attempt to use the self-help remedy without
first asking the lessor for consent. In Thrifty Oil Co. v. Batarse, 1 5 the
California Court of Appeal held that a subtenant and third parties could
not prevail in an unlawful detainer action by the sublessor because there
was a failure to seek consent. The court commented that the request for
consent "is not a mere formality, as it affords the lessor the opportunity
to protect his interests and also minimizes the risks that a... [transferee]
will place himself in jeopardy.' It also is a hallmark of 'common cour-
tesy,' which is the cornerstone of 'good faith and fair dealing.' "I4 The
court expressly left open the issue of the necessity of a request for consent
where it would be a futile act."' The court also left open the possibility
of relief from forfeiture to prevent hardship in certain cases. The need to
rely on either of these two possibilities indicates a significant lapse in
planning by the tenant.
IV. CONTRACT REMEDIES
A lease is a contract.' 49 A lessor's unreasonable rejection of a trans-
fer is a violation of a reasonable consent covenant.65 0 This results in a
breach of the lease contract. The tenant is entitled to the normal reme-
dies for breach of contract.651,
645. 174 Cal. App. 3d 770, 220 Cal. Rptr 285 (1985).
646. Id. at 775, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
647. Id.
648. Id. at 778, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
649. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1925 (West 1985); see also Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton
& Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942).
650. See supra notes 629-44 and accompanying text regarding the covenant versus condi-
tion distinction.
651. Annotation, Construction and Effect, supra note 37, at 683-84, 693-96, 704.
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A. Excuse or Compel Consent
The tenant who has requested consent and been refused is involved
in an "actual controversy" necessary to seek declaratory relief.6 12 The
tenant is entitled to declaratory relief to establish that the lessor's refusal
to consent is wrongful and that the requirement is excused.65 3 The pro-
posed transferee may also be entitled to bring an action for declaratory
relief.
654
Additionally, the tenant should be able to obtain specific perform-
ance to compel consent.655 The code provisions dealing with specific per-
formance do not contain any impediments to such an action.65 6
Damages must be inadequate in order to obtain specific performance,
657
but real property has historically been treated as unique.658 While the
statutory presumption that damages are inadequate659 would not apply
because the action is not for breach of an agreement to transfer real prop-
erty, that presumption shows the special treatment accorded real prop-
erty. A recent California case has pointed out that although the tenant's
leasehold is an estate in real property the leasehold estate itself is not real
property.660 This historically accurate curiosity should not prevent prac-
tical minds from recognizing the close relationship between a leasehold
and real property.
B. Excuse Performance and Terminate Lease
Can the tenant use the lessor's breach of covenant as a basis for
excusing the tenant's performance, and for termination of the lease? This
presents the classic confrontation between the lease as a conveyance and
as a contract.
The New Jersey case of Ringwood Associates, Ltd. v. Jack's of Route
23, Inc.661 contains an excellent discussion of this issue.662 Traditional
652. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West 1982).
653. Annotation, Construction and Effect, supra note 37, at 679, 683-84, 693-96, 704.
654. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818
(1985). The action was brought by the proposed assignees.
655. Hedgecock v. Mendel, 146 Wash. 404, 263 P. 593 (1928); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note
566, § 7.304b; Annotation, Construction and Effect, supra note 37, at 684 n.18, 696.
656. CAL CIV. CODE §§ 3384-3395 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988).
657. Oksner, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY REMEDIES PRACTICE, Specific Performance,
§ 5.5, (Cal. CEB 1982).
658. 7 WIn, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity, § 25 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
659. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3387 (West Supp. 1988).
660. Taylor v. Bouissiere, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 241 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1987).
661. 153 NJ. Super. 294, 379 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 166 N.J.
Super. 36, 398 A.2d 1315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
662. Id. at 303-11, 379 A.2d at 513-17.
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property law doctrine, applicable to the lease as a conveyance, treats cov-
enants by the lessor and the tenant as independent. Thus, the lessor's
breach did not justify the tenant's termination unless there was an actual
or constructive eviction. This property rule limited the tenant to a dam-
age remedy. Contract law recognizes mutuality of covenants, and a sub-
stantial breach of a material covenant by one party can excuse
performance of the other party.
The court in Ringwood discussed the trend toward extending con-
tract remedies to a tenant.663 Although the trend is particularly apparent
in residential tenancies, the court recognized that it was also appropriate
in commercial leases. The parties contemplate a contractual relation-
ship, and the right to terminate for a substantial breach of a material
dependent covenant is an important remedy in that relationship. The
Ringwood decision contains an important discussion of the inadequacy of
other remedies available to a commercial tenant. 6 It is difficult for the
tenant to find a third party willing to participate in the transfer while
faced with the lessor's rejection.6 Damages are difficult to calculate.
The court concisely summed up the situation:
When a party to a lease agreement has breached his obligation
to render a certain performance [to reasonably consent] which
is a substantial benefit for which the other party has bargained
and given consideration, it would be inequitable to require the
other party to continue his performance under the lease con-
tract and hope for an adequate judicial remedy in the future.666
The approach taken in Ringwood is fair, logical, and consistent with
the trend to emphasize the contractual aspects of a lease. However, there
is a jurisdictional split on the issue. 667 The more recent cases reflect the
contract approach and allow termination. 668 The Restatement recog-
nizes that the mutually dependent covenants doctrine applies to leases
when the performance of a promise by the lessor has a significant impact
on the benefits anticipated by the tenant.6 69 It also specifically recognizes
termination of the lease as a remedy for breach of a covenant to not
663. Id. at 306-09, 379 A.2d at 514-16.
664. Id. at 310-11, 379 A.2d at 516.
665. See supra notes 645-48 and accompanying text for discussion of "Self-help."
666. Ringwood, 153 NJ. Super. at 310, 379 A.2d at 516.
667. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304b; Annotation, Construction and Effect, supra
note 37 at 701, 702, 704.
668. See, e.g., Kapiolani Commercial Center v. A & S Partnership, 723 P.2d 181, 184 (Haw.
1986).
669. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 7.1(1) and comment c.
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
unreasonably withhold consent.670
There is no California case that specifically resolves the issue of lease
termination as a remedy for wrongfully withholding consent to a lease-
hold transfer. However, California has clearly adopted the contract doc-
trine of mutually dependent covenants for residential67" ' and
commercial 672 tenancies. It therefore would be inconsistent to deny mu-
tuality with respect to the reasonable consent covenant. There appears to
be no substantial reason to deny the tenant the right to terminate upon
establishing a substantial breach of a material covenant.
The right to the contract remedy of termination depends on treating
the reasonable consent standard as a covenant rather than a condition.6
C. Damages
California Civil Code section 3300 provides:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the mea-
sure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by
this Code, is the amount which will compensate the party ag-
grieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to re-
sult therefrom.674
This is the basic California statutory provision for breach of con-
tract damages. The reasonable consent covenant is an obligation arising
from contract, so the tenant should be entitled to damages upon its
breach.675 There may be problems calculating damages, but this should
not affect the basic entitlement unless damages are too speculative.
76
Again, the right to contract damages depends on treating the reasonable
consent standard as a covenant rather than a condition.
677
670. Id. § 15.2 comment h.
671. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 635, 517 P.2d 1168, 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
716-17 (1974).
672. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1944);
Medico-Dental Bldg. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942); Groh v.
Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1963).
673. See supra notes 629-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of "Covenant vs.
Condition."
674. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1977).
675. Fahrenwald v. La Bonte, 103 Idaho 751, 653 P. 2d 806 (1982); Annotation, Construc-
tion and Effect, supra note 37, at 697-99; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, § 7.304b; RESTATE-
MENT supra note 91, § 7.1(2).
676. Ringwood Assoc. Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 312, 379 A.2d
508, 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 166 N.J. Super. 36, 398 A.2d 1315 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
677. See supra notes 629-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of "Covenant vs.
Condition."
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D. Unlawful Detainer Defense
The issues permitted in an unlawful detainer action are limited to
preserve the summary nature of the remedy.6"8 However, when a lessor
seeks to terminate the lease and recover possession based on an alleged
wrongful transfer by the tenant, the wrongful withholding of consent is
obviously in issue. A transfer without consent is not a breach if that
consent is wrongfully withheld. It is important for the tenant to actually
request the consent in order to protect his or her position.
6 79
V. TORT REMEDIES
The tenant may also be able to establish the lessor's liability on a
tort theory. This includes the possibility of recovering punitive as well as
compensatory damages.
A. Economic Interference
California recognizes the related torts of interference with contract
and interference with prospective economic advantage.180 It is not neces-
sary that an enforceable contract exist between the parties.6"' Thus, it
would not be a defense if the tenant and the prospective transferee had
only entered into a conditional contract or no contract at all. The plain-
tiff must show that the defendant intended to cause the result of interfer-
ing with the transaction.6 8 ' This should not be difficult for the tenant to
accomplish. The essence of the transaction is the proposed transfer to
the third party, and the lessor wrongfully refuses to allow the transfer.
In Richardson v. La Rancherita,6 83 the California Court of Appeal
upheld a tenant's684 judgment against a lessor based on interference with
contract. The corporate tenant and third party originally proposed an
assignment of the leasehold as part of the sale of a restaurant business
operated on the premises, and the lessor refused to consent unless the
lease was renegotiated to provide for a higher rent and future escalation
678. See generally CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE, § 7.6 (C.
Scott, G. Graham, J. Sherlin eds., Cal. CEB 1986).
679. For a discussion of Thrifty Oil Co. v. Batarse, 174 Cal. App. 3d 770, 220 Cal. Rptr.
285 (1985), see supra notes 645-48 and accompanying text.
680. 5 WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, §§ V, D, E (9th ed. 1988).
681. Seaman's Direct Buying Services, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 766, 686
P.2d 1158, 1164, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1984); Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 Cal. App. 3d 10, 223
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1986); 5 WrrUN, supra note 680, §§ 645, 652.
682. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 686 P.2d at 1164-65, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
683. 98 Cal. App. 3d 73, 159 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979).
684. Id. The successful plaintiffs were a corporate successor tenant (by way of a consented
assignment) and its shareholders.
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provision."' The parties restructured the transaction as a sale of the
corporate tenant's stock by the shareholders to the third party.68 6 The
lessor insisted that its consent was still necessary. 87 This insistence
caused a delay of about thirty days in closing the stock sale. 88
The corporate tenant and its shareholders filed an action for declara-
tory relief and for damages due to intentional interference with con-
tract. 89 The transfer restriction clause in the lease prohibited
assignment or sublease without the lessor's consent.690 Sale of stock by
the shareholders of the corporate tenant was neither an assignment nor a
sublease, so the lessor was without power to reject the transaction. 691 A
judgment for damages caused by the delay in closing was affirmed.692
Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder 69 involved a transfer restriction
clause which specifically covered a sale of voting shares of a corporate
tenant. The lessor refused consent to a sale of the corporate stock.694
When the deal failed, the prospective purchaser sued the lessor for dam-
ages, including punitive damages, on the tort theory of interference with
contract.695 The trial court sustained the lessor's demurrer without leave
to amend.696 It found that the lessor's refusal of consent was justified
and there was no tort liability.697 The court of appeal reversed. 698 The
decision appears to make the curious suggestion that a refusal of consent
that is permissible under the terms of the lease might still result in tort
liability.
The court in Hamilton v. Dixon 699 commented that it was "some-
what bemused" by this apparent inconsistency in Sade.7 ° In Hamilton,
the California Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment that the lessor's re-
fusal to consent to a sublease did not create liability to the tenant for
tortious interference with contract.70 1 This case was disapproved by the
685. Id. at 77, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 78, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. Id. at 79, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
691. Id.
692. Id. at 76-77, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
693. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1984).
694. Id. at 1178, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
695. Id. at 1177, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
696. Id.
697. Id. at 1180-81, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
698. Id. at 1181, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
699. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1985).
700. Id. at 1013, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
701. Id.
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California Supreme Court in Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.7 °2 However,
the disapproval was based on the issue of which consent standard was
appropriate to apply.70 3 The court did not specifically discuss the propri-
ety of the tort action.
The recent case of Kreisher v. Mobil Oil Corp.7°4 involved a tort
cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage,
and a jury verdict for over two million dollars in punitive damages. The
trial court entered judgment against lessor Mobil Oil, following a jury
verdict, for $214,000 compensatory damages and $2,002,500 punitive
damages.705 The tenant, a Mobil station franchisee, based his causes of
action on the lessor's failure to comply with a reasonableness standard
when the lessor refused to consent to a transfer of the tenant's leasehold
and gasoline service station franchise.70 6 The lease and franchise agree-
ments both contained a "silent consent standard" clause.70 7 That is, the
clause required Mobil's consent to transfer, but it did not specify the
standard governing consent.70 8 One third party offered the tenant
$28,000 for the transfer and another offered $31,000.709
The relationship between the parties was based on two related docu-
ments: a franchise agreement and a station lease. The relationship con-
tinued through a series of three year term contracts going back to
1971.710
The sequence of events leading to litigation is discussed in detail
above.711 The tenant then filed an action against the lessor for compensa-
tory and punitive damages based on eight causes of action.712 The three
causes of action which ultimately went to the jury and led to the judg-
ment were: breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; intentional interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage; and, intentional infliction of emotional distress.713
The refusal to consent was at the heart of all the causes of action
702. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 498, 709 P.2d 837, 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 824 (1985).
703. See supra notes 147-71 and accompanying text of the principal study for a discussion
of Hamilton v. Dixon, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 214 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1985).
704. 198 Cal. App. 3d 389, 243 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1988).
705. Id. at 395, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
706. Id. at 393-94, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
707. Id. at 395, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
708. See supra text accompanying notes 147-57 for a discussion of the "silent consent
standard."
709. Id. at 392-93, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
710. Id. at 392, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
711. See supra notes 705-09 and accompanying text.
712. Kreisher, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
713. Id. at 393-94, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
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leading to the judgment. On appeal, the court pointed out that contract
execution, consent refusal and jury verdict all occurred before the
Kendall decision was filed on December 5, 1985.714 That case subjected
lessors to a reasonableness standard, implied into a "silent consent stan-
dard" clause. The Kreisher decision reviewed the principles involved in
retroactivity, including foreseeability, reliance, public policy and fairness.
It concluded that the lessor was not required to conform to standards
that took effect after the significant events had occurred.715
The court reversed the judgment because the lower court based its
decision on the lessor's refusal to give consent. It did not question the
propriety of an interference tort cause of action based on a wrongful re-
fusal to consent. It merely held that the consent was not wrongful under
the circumstances presented.716
When considering the potential of punitive damages in cases of this
nature, it is interesting to note that the highest price offered to the tenant
for a transfer in Kreisher was $31,000. The punitive damage award was
$2,002,500. It is not possible to determine from the opinion the full ex-
tent of the facts that produced this sizeable award, or to determine the
facts of the cause of action for infliction of emotional distress which
might have contributed to it.
I have not found any California appellate decision questioning the
availability of tort actions for economic interference based on a wrongful
refusal of the lessor to consent to a transfer by the tenant. There does not
seem to be any significant policy reason that would deny such a remedy
to the tenant, as long as the cause of action can be factually established.
B. Bad Faith Breach of Contract
The reasonableness consent standard is closely related to the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in leases.717 In
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,718 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court discussed the issue of "whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a commercial contract may give rise to an action in tort.
7 19
A tort action for breach of that contract covenant has been recog-
714. Id. at 396, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
715. Id. at 404-05, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 672-73.
716. Id. at 405, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
717. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 500, 709 P.2d 837, 844-45, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 825-26 (1985). See supra notes 85-254 and accompanying text.
718. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
719. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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nized when there is a special relationship between the contracting parties.
This special relationship has been characterized by elements of public
interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.72 This relationship has
been found primarily between an insurer and insured.72" ' Seaman's rec-
ognized that there are probably similar characteristics in other relation-
ships which deserve similar treatment.722
For example, a relationship between an employer and employee
might have similar characteristics.723 Subsequent to Seaman's, a court of
appeal, in Wallis v. Superior Court,'2 held a tort cause of action had been
stated for bad faith breach of an employment related contract. The court
discussed other characteristics of contracts that may- also generate tort
liability. They are: (1) inherently unequal bargaining power; (2) a non-
profit motive for entering the contract, such as peace of mind or security;
(3) inherently inadequate contract damages because they do not make
the superior party account for its actions and they do not make the infer-
ior party whole; (4) special vulnerability because of the type of potential
harm and the need to place trust in the other party's performance; and
(5) the defendant's awareness of the vulnerability.72
The relationship between a bank and its depositor was involved in
Commercial Cotton Co., Inc. v. United California Bank.726 In an action
for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
court found sufficient similarities between banking and insurance com-
pany relationships with their customers to uphold a punitive damage
award.
727
When the relationship does not involve the special elements of a
basic dependence, it will not generally be sufficient to generate tort liabil-
ity for breach of contract. Multiplex Insurance Agency, Inc. v. California
Life Insurance Co.,728 distinguished Wallis and Commercial Cotton in an
action by an insurance agency against an insurance company for refusal
to pay commissions. 729 The court reversed a judgment for punitive dam-
ages and pointed out that the parties were both commercial enterprises,
720. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
721. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
722. 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
723. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980).
724. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
725. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
726. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
727. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
728. 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987).
729. Id. at 931-32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
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the contract was entered into for profit, there was no disparity in bargain-
ing power, and contract damages were adequate.730
The usual commercial lease transaction does not seem to involve the
special relationship which leads to a tort action for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. Although this Part does not specifi-
cally address residential tenancies, it seems that a modem urban dweller
seeking basic shelter would be a likely candidate for special relationship
protection.3
When considering extension of tort remedies beyond situations
where the special relationship exists, the California Supreme Court
pointed out that these were "largely uncharted and potentially dangerous
waters' 732 and suggested that "it is wise to proceed with caution.
'733
The court went on to recognize that even without a special relationship
tort remedies may be available against a party who denies that a contract
exists in order to avoid liability.7 34 The denial must be in bad faith and
without probable cause.735
In the typical case where a lessor wrongfully refuses to consent to a
transfer, the lessor does not deny the existence of the contract. However,
the court in Seaman's relied in part on Adams v. Crater Well Drilling,
Inc. ,736 a case decided by the Oregon Supreme Court. Adams involved a
contract to drill a water well for a price that varied depending on the soil
encountered while drilling.7 37 The driller exacted an overcharge by
threatening to sue the property owner.738 The owner was allegedly fear-
ful of the stress that litigation would cause his critically ill wife.739 The
court upheld a punitive damage award against the driller.74 ' He was a
tortious wrongdoer because he coerced payment of the money by threat
of a suit, and he knew he had no rightful claim to the money.741 The
Seaman's court referred to Adams and stated:
There is little difference, in principle, between a contracting
party obtaining excess payment in such manner, and a con-
730. Id. at 938, 940, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
731. For a description of this tenant's characteristics, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974).
732. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
733. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
734. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
735. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
736. 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976).
737. Id. at 791, 556 P.2d at 680.
738. Id.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 795, 556 P.2d at 682.
741. Id. at 794, 556 P.2d at 681.
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tracting party seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious
claim by adopting a "stonewall" position ("see you in court")
without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a
defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of con-
tract. It offends accepted notions of business ethics.742
Suppose a lessor seeks to exact an increase in rent or other premium
as the price of consent knowing that he or she is not entitled to withhold.
Suppose further that he or she threatens to bring an unlawful detainer
action to forfeit the lease and recover possession unless his or her de-
mands are met. It seems likely that the members of the court in Sea-
man's would allow a tort action.743
In Cohen v. Ratinoff,7 the tenant included a cause of action for bad
faith breach of contract based on the lessor's wrongful refusal to consent,
and sought punitive damages.745 The court reversed a judgment in favor
of the lessor on the pleadings.746 However, this case focused on the issue
of applying the reasonableness standard to the lessor's refusal to consent.
There was no significant discussion of the appropriateness of a tort cause
of action. The Seaman's case had not yet been decided. In the Kendall
case, the Supreme Court recognized the effect of the Cohen decision and
commented: "While we express no view on the merits of the claim for
punitive damages in Cohen, we note that not every breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in a commercial contract gives rise to
an action in tort."'747
It is beyond the scope of this Article to deal with the propriety of
providing tort remedies, including punitive damages, for breach of con-
tract. This is a major and complex issue. The admonition by the Sea-
man's court to proceed cautiously is good advice. However, certain
general observations can be made with respect to the wrongful denial of
consent to transfer. There does not appear to be a sufficient "special rela-
tionship" between the parties to a commercial lease to justify a tort ac-
tion for breach of contract, although that relationship might be present
in some residential tenancies. There might be tort liability without a spe-
742. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
743. The case was heard before Justices Bird, Broussard, Grodin, Kaus, Mosk, and Rey-
noso. Although Chief Justice Bird ified a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, there is
nothing in that opinion to indicate that she would be less likely to find a tort cause of action.
Justices Broussard and Mosk are the only ones of the six still on the court.
744. 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983). See supra notes 14043 and notes 331-
39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cohen.
745. Cohen, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
746. Id. at 331, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
747. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 497 n.ll, 709 P.2d at 842 n.ll, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 823 n.ll.
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cial relationship if, in order to exact a better deal than the lease provides,
the lessor: wrongfully withholds consent to transfer; threatens action to
terminate the lease; has no probable cause to withhold consent; and, is
without belief in the right to withhold consent. There is, however, no
California case expressly adopting any of these positions.
C. Other Torts
Occasionally, an overzealous lessor or agent will avoid the niceties
of due process procedures and use wrongful self-help methods to dispos-
sess a tenant and the unconsented transferee.74 Self-help methods of
recovering possession are wrongful even if the tenant is in breach.749
When there is a wrongful refusal of consent, the self-help dispossession is
a separate wrong. The situation can produce a variety of torts, such as
trespass, assault, battery, and conversion. The truly zealous lessor may
also invite an action for infliction of emotional distress.
750
D. Punitive Damages
The fact that a wrongful refusal to consent to a transfer may lead to
a tort cause of action does not necessarily mean that punitive damages
are likely. Punitive damages are reserved for odious conduct character-
ized by "oppression, fraud or malice. ' 71 The following instructions for
jurors give an excellent summary of the required foul deed:
If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a... result of
the conduct of the defendant on which you base a finding of
liability, you may then consider whether you should award pu-
nitive damages against defendant..., for the sake of example
and by way of punishment. You may in your discretion award
such damages, if, but only if, you find by clear and convincing
evidence that said defendant was guilty of [oppression] [fraud]
748. See Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal. 3d 39, 507 P.2d 87, 106 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1973). In Kassan,
after learning that the lessees had sold their leasehold interest in violation of a lease provision,
the lessor posted a notice stating his intention to reclaim the premises. Immediately thereafter
the lessor entered the premises and evicted the lessees. The court found no abandonment by
the lessees, and held that the lessor's remedy lay with the statutory 3-day notice provision and
the judicial system.
749. See Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961). Regarding residential
tenancies, see CAL. Civ. CODE § 789.3 (West 1982); Kinney v. Vacari, 27 Cal. 3d 348, 612
P.2d 877, 165 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1980); Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1978).
750. See Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976).
751. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1988).
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[or] [malice] in the conduct on which you base your finding of
liability.
["Malice" means conduct which is [intended by the de-
fendant to cause injury to the plaintiff] [or] [despicable conduct
which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and con-
scious disregard for the [rights] [or] [safety] of others.] [A per-
son acts with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others when [he] [she] is aware of the probable dangerous con-
sequences of [his] [her] conduct and willfully and deliberately
fails to avoid those consequences].
["Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a
person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of
that person's rights.]
["Despicable conduct" is conduct which is so [vile,] [base,]
[contemptible,] [miserable,] [wretched,] [or] [loathsome] that it
would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent
people.]
["Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with
the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a
person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.]
The law provides no fixed standards as to the amount of
such punitive damages, but leaves the amount to the jury's
sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to
consider the following:
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a de-
terrent effect on the defendant in the light of defendant's finan-
cial condition.
[(3) The amount of actual damages.] 52
VI. STATUTORY REMEDIES
There are statutory remedies available if the lessor wrongfully dis-
possesses the tenant and transferee. A forcible entry and detainer action
can be brought to recover possession and damages.75 Treble punitive
damages are possible in such an action when the lessor is guilty of
752. 2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS Civil § 14.71 (7th ed. Supp. 1988).
753. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1159, 1160 (West 1982), 1174 (West Supp. 1988); see also
Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal. 3d 39, 507 P.2d 87, 106 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1973).
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"malice. 754
In addition to actual damages, punitive damages of up to $100.00
per day are available to a residential tenant when the lessor seeks to dis-
possess the parties by interfering with access or utilities.7 5
VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Covenant vs. Condition
1. Absent express language of covenant; there are two views con-
cerning the effect of an express reasonableness consent standard. One
treats the standard as a covenant by the lessor. Under this view, the
tenant has contract remedies for breach of covenant if the lessor unrea-
sonably withholds consent. The other view treats the standard as a quali-
fication or condition of the tenant's obligation to obtain the lessor's
consent. Under this latter view, the tenant is excused from obtaining
consent that is unreasonably withheld, but the tenant is not entitled to
damages for breach of contract or other contract remedies.
2. It is more fair, practical and realistic to treat the express reasona-
bleness standard as a covenant.
3. An implied reasonableness consent standard is subject to the
same two views that it is either a covenant or a condition.
4. It is more fair, practical and realistic to treat the implied reasona-
bleness standard as a covenant, as long as the lessor has reason to know
that he or she is subject to a reasonableness standard.
B. Self-help
1. The tenant can proceed with the transfer if the tenant has re-
quested consent and the lessor has wrongfully denied it.
2. This remedy has serious practical limitations.
C. Contract Remedies
1. The tenant can bring an action to declare that the lessor's consent
is not required, or to compel the lessor to consent.
2. There are differing views concerning the tenant's right to termi-
nate the lease and be excused from further performance. One view, em-
phasizing the lease as a conveyance, treats the covenants as independent
and denies the right to terminate. The other view, emphasizing the lease
754. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174(b) (West Supp. 1988).
755. CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West 1982); see also Kinney v. Vacari, 27 Cal. 3d 348, 612
P.2d 877, 165 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1980); Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1978).
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as a contract, treats material covenants as mutually dependent and al-
lows termination. The better view would allow the tenant to terminate
the lease if there is a substantial breach of a material covenant.
3. The tenant's right to the contract remedy of termination depends
on treating the reasonable consent standard as a covenant.
4. The tenant is entitled to contract damages for breach of
covenant.
5. The tenant's right to the contract remedy of damages depends on
treating the reasonable consent standard as a covenant.
6. The tenant is entitled to use the lessor's wrongful refusal to con-
sent as a defense against an unlawful detainer action based on an uncon-
sented transfer.
D. Tort Remedies
1. The tenant may be able to establish tort causes of action against
the lessor for interference with contract or interference with prospective
economic advantage when the lessor's wrongful refusal to consent delays
or disrupts the transfer transaction.
2. The lack of an enforceable contract between the tenant and the
prospective transferee does not prevent recovery for economic
interference.
3. There does not appear to be a sufficient "special relationship"
between the parties to a commercial lease to justify a tort action for
breach of contract, although that relationship might be present in some
residential tenancies.
4. There might be tort liability without a special relationship if, in
order to exact a better deal than the lease provides, the lessor: wrong-
fully withholds consent to transfer; threatens action to terminate the
lease; and is without probable cause to withhold consent and without
belief in the right to withhold consent.
5. Several tort actions can be involved if the lessor wrongfully dis-
possesses the tenant and third party. For example, there may be circum-
stances of trespass, assault and battery, conversion and infliction of
emotional distress.
6. Punitive damages are only recoverable if the lessor is guilty of
oppression, fraud or malice.
E. Statutory Remedies
1. The tenant has statutory remedies available if the lessor wrong-
fully dispossesses the tenant or transferee by direct or indirect means.
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2. The statutory remedies provide for punitive as well as actual
damages.
PART 4.
INVOLUNTARY LEASEHOLD TRANSFERS:
EFFECT OF RESTRICTIONS AGAINST
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASING
I. SCOPE OF PART
This Part deals with the application of a restriction against leasehold
transfers, contained in a commercial lease of real property, to involun-
tary transfers. For convenience, the word "transfer" is used to refer to
either an assignment or a sublease.756
Certain transfers originate in a voluntary act of the tenant, but end
up as a transfer based on operation of the law rather than the specific
intent of the tenant to transfer. The following are examples: a tenant
makes a will and later dies; a tenant executes a mortgage and later de-
faults leading to foreclosure; or, a tenant files a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy leading to a transfer to the trustee in bankruptcy. These
transfers by operation of law are treated as involuntary transfers in this
Article.
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. The lease contains a clause restricting transfers of the
leasehold by the tenant. Later, an involuntary transfer occurs. Typi-
cally, the involuntary transfer will occur because of the death or financial
obligations of the tenant. The lessor seeks a remedy, usually termination
of the lease, for non-compliance with the transfer restriction. A dispute
between the lessor and the transferee ensues.
Does the transfer restriction clause entitle the lessor to terminate the
lease (or seek other remedies) based on an involuntary transfer?
II. TYPES OF INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS
The death of a tenant does not ordinarily terminate a lease. 7 7 Thus,
the leasehold, as part of the deceased tenant's estate, will be distributed
to beneficiaries of a will or intestate heirs, or be sold during administra-
tion. The transfer by operation of law, pursuant to a will, the intestate
756. An assignment is a transfer of the entire leasehold, whereas a sublease is a transfer of
only an interest in the leasehold. The distinctions between an assignment and a sublease,
although significant, are not important for the purposes of this study. For a discussion of the
distinctions, see supra text accompanying notes 11-23.
757. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1934 (West 1985).
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succession statutes, or probate administration statutes is treated as an
involuntary transfer. 758
Financial obligations of the tenant can cause a variety of involuntary
transfers of the tenant's leasehold, or temporary loss of control over the
leasehold. For example, there may be an execution sale to satisfy judg-
ment creditors, a foreclosure or trustee's sale under a delinquent mort-
gage or deed of trust on leasehold security, an appointment of a receiver
to control the property (control without transfer) while litigation is pend-
ing, or a transfer to or by a trustee in bankruptcy in connection with
bankruptcy proceeding.75 9  _
III. APPLICABLE RULES
A. In General
Restrictions against leasehold transfers, although permissible, are
strictly construed in favor of transferability. Strict construction is a
product of the policy against restraints on alienation.7" Since the lessor
may terminate the lease if a prohibited transfer occurs, 76 1 the policy
against forfeitures also leads to strict construction against the restric-
tion.762 For example, one California statute provides: "A condition in-
volving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for
whose benefit it is created.
763
Restrictions against involuntary transfers are permissible, but the
rule of strict construction requires that the restriction expressly cover the
involuntary transfer involved. As a result, a general restriction against
assignments or subleases will be interpreted to cover only voluntary
transfers. 71 The involuntary transfer restriction must be specific.
76
This is an old rule which was followed in England at an early date.766
However, a tenant cannot take advantage of this rule by attempting to
758. See infra notes 760-94 and accompanying text.
759. See infra notes 795-820 and accompanying text.
760. See supra notes 301-57 and accompanying text.
761. See supra notes 562-69 and accompanying text.
762. See Stratford Co. v. Continental Mortgage Co., 74 Cal. App. 551, 555, 241 P. 429
(1925).
763. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1442 (West 1982).
764. See Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 21 P. 955 (1889); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 91, § 15.2 comment e; 2 POWELL, supra note 11, at 372.100-372.103; 49 AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 566, § 414; Annotation, Transfer in Bankruptcy, or Otherwise in Interest of Credi-
tors or Lien Holders, as Violating Covenant in Lease Against Assignment, 46 A.L.R. 847, 847
(1927).
765. For an example of an express specific clause, see LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403,
§ 3.114.
766. See note (A) to Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke 119B, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 1111 (K.B. 1587).
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disguise a voluntary transfer as an involuntary one in order to evade the
clause.767
B. Death Transfers
Transfers caused by the death of the tenant are not covered by a
general transfer restriction.768 There is some authority for a difference in
treatment for a death transfer by intestate succession and one by will.
769
It is generally agreed that an intestate transfer upon the death of the
tenant is not covered by a general restriction against leasehold transfers.
Some cases have held that a death transfer by will is covered by the gen-
eral restriction because the will reflects the tenant's intent. It seems that
the approach taken by the cases which do not distinguish between the
two types of death transfers is more consistent, and in keeping with prob-
able expectations. California appears to treat a will transfer as beyond
the scope of a general transfer restriction.770 Language in a lease, which
includes a general transfer restriction, binding upon the heirs, successors,
executors and administrators of the tenant is usually insufficient to re-
strict a transfer upon death.
Although a death transfer is a transfer by operation of law, it is risky
for the lessor to rely only upon a clause restricting transfer "by operation
of law." Stratford Co. v. Continental Mortgage Co.7 71 is a good example
of the strictness of construction. In Stratford, a lease clause gave the
lessor the option to terminate if "any person, other than the lessee named
herein, shall secure possession of the interest of the lessee hereunder,
under execution, or by reason of any receivership or proceeding in bank-
ruptcy, or other operation of law, or otherwise ....,772 The tenant died
intestate and the administratrix sold and assigned the leasehold. 773 The
lessor attempted to terminate the lease through an unlawful detainer ac-
tion.774 Although someone other than the tenant secured possession, and
there was a transfer by operation of law, the court found that the lan-
guage was limited to solvency events and did not apply to an involuntary
767. Farnum, 79 Cal. at 581, 21 P. at 957; see also 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 415.
768. California Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 207 Cal. 600, 279 P. 664 (1929); see also 2 Pow-
ELL, supra note 11, § 246[1], at 372.102-372.103; 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Real Property § 644 (9th ed., 1987).
769. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 420.
770. Burns v. McGraw, 75 Cal. App. 2d 481, 487, 171 P.2d 148, 151 (1946).
771. 74 Cal. App. 551, 241 P. 429 (1925).
772. Id. at 553, 241 P. at 430 (emphasis added).
773. Id.
774. Id. at 552, 241 P. at 429-30.
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death transfer. 75
Burns v. McGraw776 is another example of the risks of relying on the
general phrase "by operation of law." In that case, a clause prohibited
assignment without the lessor's consent, and specifically provided that
the lease was not assignable "by operation of law."' 7 7 7 Another clause
provided that certain solvency events such as appointment of a receiver,
assignment for benefit of creditors and bankruptcy would constitute a
breach of the lease.778 The tenant died leaving the leasehold to a benefici-
ary. 79 The court determined that the beneficiary could take the lease-
hold without the lessor's consent. 8 ° The court pointed out that "the
lessor desiring... protection against the intrusion of strangers, has only
to insert in the lease 'very special' language reserving the right to termi-
nate the lease upon a tenant's death, or requiring consent to a bequest of
the lease."1
78 '
In the more recent Miller v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency
78 1
case, newspaper dealership agreements simply provided that they were
"not assignable nor transferable in whole or in part by Dealer, volunta-
rily, by operation of law or otherwise., 7 3 The court held that the phrase
"by operation of law" was sufficient to prevent transfer by will to a bene-
ficiary.7 4 The court distinguished the situation where the phrase is con-
tained in the context of language referring to the tenant's "potential
financial demise," and thus is limited to solvency events. 78 5 Even though
this case involved dealership agreements rather than leases, the court did
not treat them as personal service contracts, so the more liberal construc-
tion of the restriction cannot be explained on that basis.78 6
Horning v. Ladd78 7 also involved a simple clause which did not refer
to solvency events, but the court reached the opposite result from Miller.
In Horning, an installment sale contract provided that the contract could
775. Id. at 554, 241 P. at 430.
776. 75 Cal. App. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 148 (1946).
777. Id. at 483, 171 P.2d at 149.
778. Id. at 483-84, 171 P.2d at 149.
779. Id. at 484, 171 P.2d at 149.
780. Id. at 485, 171 P.2d at 150.
781. Id. at 488, 171 P.2d at 152.
782. 164 Cal. App. 3d 315, 210 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1985).
783. Id. at 317, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 318, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
786. A Maryland court has held that a clause which prohibited transfers by operation of
law was broad enough to cover a merger by which the tenant corporation was extinguished
and the leasehold transferred to the surviving corporation by force of statute. Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Barlow Corp., 295 Md. 472, 456 A.2d 1283 (1983).
787. 157 Cal. App. 2d 806, 321 P.2d 795 (1958).
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not be assigned by the buyer "nor by operation of law."78 The court
held that the clause did not prevent the buyer's interest from passing
upon death.789
The issue of clause coverage arose in an unusual manner in Joost v.
Castel.790 The tenant died and the representatives of his estate claimed
that lease clauses caused the termination of the lease in the event of
death.7 91 A clause entitled "Assignment and Subletting" restricted as-
signment or sublease without the lessor's consent, and specifically pro-
hibited assignment or sublease by "operation of law or otherwise. "792
The court held that this clause "clearly applied to voluntary acts" and
not the death of the tenant.793 Another clause entitled "Nontransferable
Involuntarily" provided that in the event of bankruptcy, or certain other
solvency events, the lessor had the option to terminate the lease.794 Since
this clause only applied to solvency type events, not death, and since it
was optional whether the lessor terminated or not, the court held that
this clause did not result in termination.
C. Financial Obligation Transfers
An execution sale is not covered by a general restriction against
leasehold transfers.795 In Farnum v. Hefner,796 the clause provided that
the tenant would not "underlet any portion of said premises nor assign
this lease without the written permission" of the lessor.797 The court
referred to the clause as the "ordinary kind" and held that it applied to
voluntary, not involuntary, assignments.798 The court pointed out that
the lessor can subject involuntary transfers to the restriction by express
language.799 There are, however, recent specific statutory provisions deal-
ing with execution sales of leaseholds to enforce money judgments.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 695.035 is divided into
two major parts. Part (a) provides that the leasehold can be transferred
to satisfy a money judgment if the tenant has the right to voluntarily
788. Id. at 808, 321 P.2d at 797.
789. Id. at 811, 321 P.2d at 798.
790. 33 Cal. App. 2d 138, 91 P.2d 172 (1939).
791. Id. at 140, 91 P.2d at 173.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 140-41, 91 P.2d at 174.
794. Id. at 140, 91 P.2d at 173-74.
795. Farnum v. Hefner, 79 Cal. 575, 580, 21 P. 955, 957 (1889); see also POWELL, supra
note 11, at 372.01.
796. 79 Cal. 575, 21 P. 955 (1889).
797. Id. at 577, 21 P. at 956.
798. Id. at 580, 21 P. at 957.
799. Id. at 581, 21 P. at 957.
[Vol. 22:405
LEASEHOLD TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
sublet or assign either without restriction, or subject to conditions or
standards that are met by the transferee. 8 ° If the lease requires the les-
sor's consent to an assignment or sublease, the lessor's consent is neces-
sary and the lessor is subject to the same consent standard that would
apply to a voluntary transfer. For example, if there is an express or im-
plied reasonable consent standard, the lessor would have to show a com-
mercially reasonable objection to the transfer. If, however, the clause
expressly gives the lessor the right to use sole discretion, he or she would
not have to show a reasonable objection to the involuntary transfer."' 1
Part (b) nullifies a provision restricting involuntary transfers to the ex-
tent that it would prevent the application of part (a). This statute does
not change the rule that holds an involuntary transfer is not subject to a
general transfer restriction. It merely prevents a clause that would re-
strict execution sales more severely than it restricts voluntary transfers.
The appointment of a receiver to take control of the premises is not
covered by a general restriction against leasehold transfers. This result
can be justified either on the basis that it is involuntary, or on the addi-
tional basis that a receivership does not typically involve a transfer of any
interest in the leasehold. 0 2 However, a specific restriction against receiv-
erships should generally be enforced.0 3 The recent Superior Motels case
involved the issue of whether an express anti-receivership provision in a
lease was an invalid restraint on alienation. 8 4 The disputed lease clause
provided that the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the
tenant's assets would constitute a breach of the lease. 0 5
The clause was attacked as an unreasonable restraint on alienation
in violation of California Civil Code section 711. That section provides:
"Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest cre-
ated, are void."8 6 The court said that the section only prohibits re-
straints that are unreasonable, those not necessary to protect, or prevent
impairment of, a security.80 7 The court cited Kendall and two secured
loan transaction cases 8° 8 as authority for this proposition. 80 9 The court
800. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.035 (West 1987).
801. Part I discusses the appropriate consent standard to apply. See supra notes 32-49.
802. 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 417.
803. See Urban Properties Corp. v. Benson, 116 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1940).
804. Superior Motels v. Rinn Motor Hotels, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 241 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1987).
805. Id. at 1042, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
806. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
807. Superior Motels, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
808. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978);
Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
809. Superior Motels, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
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went on to say that it cannot resolve the validity of the clause in the
abstract and there was no evidence regarding the necessity of the provi-
sion to protect security interests. °10 The question of whether there is a
need to comply with a reasonableness standard is the subject of part 1,
subpart VI of this article.""'
A foreclosure or trustee's sale under a mortgage or deed of trust on
leasehold security is not covered by a general restriction, even though the
security instrument originated in the voluntary act of the tenant."1 2
There is some question whether the tenant's execution of the deed of
trust violates a general transfer restriction in California. In the 1932
Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum813 case, the Supreme Court decision
stated that "we do not believe that a covenant against assignment con-
tained in a lease is violated by the giving of a mortgage on the lease." '14
This result can be explained either by strict construction or by the fact
that execution of a deed of trust creates a lien and does not transfer the
leasehold. The recent Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard"'5 decision by a
court of appeal mentions Chapman, but states that a clause which re-
stricts "assignment or 'transfer' of the lease, 'in whole or in part, or
[lessee's] interest' . . . is broad enough to cover transfers to secure a
loan."81' 6 The court in Airport Plaza found that the lessor's objection to
hypothecation of the leasehold was reasonable.
A voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors has been held to
be covered by a general restriction against transfer.8 17 Although it is
usually the result of financial difficulties, it is a voluntary act without
operation of law. However, California Civil Code section 1954.1 tempo-
rarily limits the lessor's right to terminate when there is a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors.818 That section allows the assignee to
occupy and to operate the business on the premises for up to 90 days
after the assignment, notwithstanding any lease provision. The assignee
is required to pay rent provided for in the lease.
A bankruptcy proceeding is not covered by a general restriction
against leasehold transfers, and this construction is generally followed
810. Id.
811. See supra notes 323-57 and accompanying text.
812. Annotation, supra note 9, IV; RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment e.
813. 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 com-
ment e and reporter's note 5.
814. Chapman, 216 Cal. at 426, 14 P.2d at 760.
815. 188 Cal. App. 3d 1594, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198,(1987).
816. Id. at 1599-1600 n.2, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 201 n.2.
817. 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 418.
818. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.1 (West 1985).
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whether the bankruptcy petition is involuntary or voluntary.8 19 The
transfer results from operation of law rather than the tenant's specific
intent to transfer. Even if the lease contains a transfer restriction specifi-
cally aimed at bankruptcy proceedings, the Federal Bankruptcy Act has
detailed limitations on and procedures for enforcement of leasehold
transfer restrictions.82
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. Restrictions on involuntary transfers of a leasehold are, with
some limitations, permitted.
2. The policies of dislike of restraints on alienation and dislike of
forfeitures lead to a strict construction against restrictions on involuntary
transfers.
3. A general restriction on transfer will be construed to apply to
voluntary, not involuntary transfers.
4. A restriction on involuntary transfers must be express and
specific.
5. The rules in this area of the law are old and well established.
6. There is some question in the cases concerning the degree of
specificity required, however the questions can be avoided by careful
drafting to express the intent and expectations of the parties with respect
to particular types of transfers.
7. There are existing statutory limitations on the enforceability of
solvency type transfer restrictions. For example: (a) it is not permissible
to impose a stricter restriction on involuntary transfers by execution sales
than is imposed on voluntary transfers; (b) when a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors occurs, there is a temporary grace period during
which the lessor cannot terminate a lease; (c) the Federal Bankruptcy
Act limits enforcement of transfer restrictions when actions under the
Act are involved.
819. 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 416; Annotation, supra note 11, at II; RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 91, § 15.2 comment e, illustration 2.
820. See particularly 11 U.S.C. § 365. For a good summary see MILLER & STARR, supra
note 404, § 27:100 (Supp. October 1987); LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.114 (Supp.
May 1988).
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PART 5.
USE RESTRICTIONS IN LEASES:
RELATIONSHIP TO RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
I. SCOPE OF PART
This Part examines the relationship between a restriction on use of
the premises and a restriction on transfer of the leasehold, contained in a
commercial lease of real property. It focuses on the specific issue
of whether the reasonable consent standard, imposed on some transfer
restrictions by the California Supreme Court in the Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc. 21 decision, also applies to use restrictions.8 22 For conven-
ience, the word "transfer" is used in this study to refer to either an as-
signment or a sublease.8 23
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. The lease contains a use restriction clause. The clause
either absolutely prohibits any use of the premises other than the one
specified, or it prohibits other uses unless the lessor consents. As an al-
ternative, the clause may either absolutely compel a specific use of the
premises, or it may compel the use unless the lessor consents to a change.
Later, the tenant proposes to change the use. As another alternative, the
tenant and a potential transferee may propose the use change in connec-
tion with a proposed assignment or sublease. The lessor refuses to allow
the change in use and a dispute ensues.
Is the lessor held to an objective standard of commercial reasonable-
ness when he or she refuses to allow a change in use of the premises?
II. TYPES OF CLAUSES
There are a variety of clauses dealing with use of leased premises.
The following are brief descriptions of the most common types.
1. Specific Use Only. The clause prohibits use of the premises for
anything other than the specified use or uses. 824 It is desirable to use
language such as "only" or "solely" to make it clear that the use is lim-
821. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
822. See supra notes 175-254 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kendall and its
ramifications.
823. An assignment is a transfer of the entire leasehold, whereas a sublease is a transfer of
only an interest in the leasehold: The distinctions between an assignment and a sublease,
although significant, are not important for the purposes of this study. For a discussion of the
distinctions, see supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text of the principal study.
824. See LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.58 at 104-05.
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ited to the specific use. Otherwise, there is a danger that the clause will
be interpreted to mean that the specified use is permitted, but that other
uses are also permitted. 25
2. Specific Use Mandatory. The clause affirmatively requires the
premises to be used for the specified use or uses. 26 This type of clause
usually compels the operation of a certain type of business, and it may
get into details of the business such as hours of operation, quality of mer-
chandise, etc. If a clause does not specifically compel operations, it will
generally not be construed to require the tenant to actually use the prem-
ises, and the tenant may cease using the premises altogether.
8 27
3. Specific Use Prohibited. This type of clause prohibits specific use
or uses of the premises.8 28
4. Specific Use Protected. This clause prohibits the lessor from us-
ing or permitting the use of the lessor's other property for specific
businesses.829
The first three types of clauses restrict the tenant's use of the prem-
ises. The fourth type of clause protects the tenant's use of the premises,
generally against competition.830 This Part considers the first three types
of clauses.
8 31
Clauses that restrict the tenant's use of the premises fall into two
general categories. The "consent" type provides that the lessor's prior
consent is required to any variation from the specific use restrictions.
832
The "absolute" type merely sets forth the restriction as an absolute re-
quirement, and there is no mention of the lessor's consent to any
variation.
8 33
825. 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:73, at 351; 7 ROHAN, supra note 11, § 6.02,
at 6-6.
826. See LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.60.
827. 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:40, at 286-87. For a discussion of the re-
quirements necessary for an implied covenant to operate, see First American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 151 Ariz. 584,729 P.2d 938 (1986); Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v.
Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 647 P.2d 643 (1982); Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44
Cal. 2d 136, 142-43, 280 P:2d 775, 779-80 (1955).
828. It may also prohibit certain general types of activities. See ROHAN, supra note 11,
§ 6.05(7), at 6-19; LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.59, at 105-06.
829. ROHAN, supra note 11, § 6.05 (12), (13), at 6-19 to 6-20.
830. For a general discussion of lease competition clauses, see ROHAN, supra note 11,
§ 6.04, at 6-10 to 6-14.
831. For a recent application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the fourth
type of clause, see Edmond's of Fresno v. MacDonald Group, Ltd., 171 Cal. App. 3d 598, 217
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1985).
832. See LEASE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.58.
833. RoHAN, supra note 11.
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III. PURPOSES
Use restriction clauses serve a variety of purposes. In a percentage
rent lease, the rent is based on the revenues produced on or from the
premises. Generally, there is a minimum base rent, and the likelihood
and amount of percentage rent varies with the circumstance. The agreed
percentage set forth in the lease is typically based on the tenant's particu-
lar type of business. There is a wide variation among rates, based on the
type of business, and a change of use of the premises can significantly
affect percentage rental income.s34 For example, a tenant might change
the use from a large general merchandise retail sales store to a warehouse
used to store goods sold elsewhere. 35
The lessor may want to preserve the drawing power of a certain type
of use in a shopping center. For example, a general merchandise retail
sales store, or a grocery store, would be expected to attract a larger vol-
ume of people than a warehouse or a racquetball facility. That drawing
power brings people to the center and generates profits for other tenants
who are paying percentage rentals. The drawing power also helps to
maintain the overall economic health of the center and facilitates renting
space in the center.
The variety and balance of tenants are other important considera-
tions to a shopping center lessor. Control over the mix can have an im-
portant effect on the degree of economic success of the center. Also, the
lessor wants to avoid violating any exclusive rights or non-competition
protection given to other tenants. The protection given one tenant de-
pends on the lessor's control over other tenants. In addition to mix, the
lessor may want to maintain a certain image for a center or a building.
This image may involve more than just a control over the general type of
business. It can involve factors such as name recognition, quality of
goods and services, ethnic character of goods and services and others.
A different use may increase the burden on the building, the com-
mon areas or the requirements for lessor services. For example, the new
use may require use of heavy equipment that causes noise and vibrations
which disturb other tenants. The change in use may require the opera-
tion of a forklift, which causes extreme bearing weight on small areas and
accelerates deterioration of pavement and floors. There may be a sub-
stantial increase in use of parking areas, elevators and other common
areas and facilities. There may be an increased demand for services fur-
834. 1987 Percentage Lease Rates, 20 THE MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES
REPORT, No. 1, at 8 (March 1, 1987).
835. See Lippman, 44 Cal. 2d at 139-40, 280 P.2d at 777.
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nished by the lessor, such as electricity, water and trash pick-up. Insur-
ance costs and availability may change with a change in use. The new
use may involve alterations to the building such as partition walls and
signs.
Continuation of a specific use may be necessary to preserve a non-
conforming use authorization under zoning or building codes. The costs
and risks of liability for hazardous substances will vary dramatically de-
pending on the particular use. In some cases, control over use may be
necessary to prevent the tenant from putting the owner into violation of a
deed restriction.
The lessor may own adjoining parcels and the particular use of the
leased parcel might complement the lessor's business on the other parcel.
The property may have been in the lessor's family and used for certain
purposes for generations, and he or she wants to keep it so. There may
be certain tax benefits derived by the lessor in maintaining a particular
use. A lessor may just personally like a certain use, or personally fear
change.
This is not intended as a catalogue of possible purposes of a use
restriction clause. It should, however, show that there are many reasons
supporting such a clause.
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
A. In General
There is a basic similarity between restrictions on leasehold transfers
and restrictions on premises uses. Absent restriction, the tenant has free-
dom to transfer 836 or change the use,837 but the lessor can validly impose
a restriction on transfers8 38 or changes in use.839 The freedom to change
use, absent an express restriction, is limited to lawful purposes and uses
that are "not materially different from that for which the premises are
ordinarily used or for which they were constructed or adapted.
' '84
However, an occasional unauthorized or unlawful use might lead only to
remedies of damages and injunction, not a forfeiture. 41 Restrictions on
836. See supra notes 2-10 and notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
837. ROHAN, supra note 11, § 6.02, at 6-6.
838. See supra notes 2-10 and notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
839. ROHAN, supra note 11, § 6.02, at 6-6; RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.1 comment
e.
840. 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:25, at 265, § 27:23, at 350.
841. See, for example, Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal. App. 2d 110, 108 P.2d 479 (1940), where
the tenant holding a lease for a restaurant in a hotel occasionally accomodated the desire of
customers to wager. This was before California made it exceptionally easy to legally satisfy
this desire.
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transfer and on use are construed in favor of the tenant.84 2
B. Reasonableness Requirement
There is a close relationship between transfer restrictions and use
restrictions when the proposed transfer involves a change in use of the
premises by the transferee. The transferee is subject to the use restric-
tions in the lease.543 If the lessor is subject to a reasonableness standard
in giving or withholding consent to a transfer, a proposed change in use
involves factors to be considered in the reasonableness test. Some of
these factors were specifically mentioned by the court in the Kendall de-
cision. They include: legality and suitability of the use; the need for al-
terations; and the nature of the occupancy; the tenant mix in a shopping
center. 8 " Thus, a lessor who wishes to restrict transfer should look care-
fully to the drafting of a use clause.8 45 Absent a restriction on use, a
lessor will have a difficult time meeting the reasonableness standard when
he or she objects to a transfer on the basis that the transferee will change
the use of the premises.8 46 If the tenant can change the use, the lessor
has no legally enforceable expectation that the use will remain the same.
Subsequent to Kendall, a court addressed the issue of reasonableness
in the context of a transfer involving a change of use that would elimi-
nate percentage rentals. John Hogan Enterprises, Inc. v. Kellogg8 47 in-
volved a percentage rent lease with a clause that limited use to a women's
ready-to-wear shop."8 The tenant had been operating at a stable profit
for several years and producing percentage rentals above the minimum
rent. 849 The tenant entered escrow to assign the lease to a third party
who proposed to operate an antique store as a hobby.850 There would
not be sufficient revenue to produce percentage rentals, so only the mini-
mum rent would be paid by the third party for the remaining nine years
842. For a discussion of transfer restrictions, see supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
Regarding use restrictions, see 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27.73, at 351; ROHAN,
supra note 11, § 6.02, at 6-6.
843. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 15.1, comment e; 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566,
§§ 450, 508.
844. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 709 P.2d 837, 845, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 826-27 (1985).
845. This is particularly true in a percentage rent lease. See infra notes 29-31 and accompa-
nying text.
846. See, eg., Roundup Tavern, Inc. v. Pardini, 68 Wash. 2d 513, 413 P.2d 820 (1966).
847. 187 Cal. App. 3d 589, 231 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1986).
848. Id. at 591, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
849. Id. at 592, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
850. Id.
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of the term.81 The third party agreed to pay the tenant $150,000.00 for
the assignment.8 2 That amount was "equivalent to the difference over
the remaining nine years of the lease between the minimum rent and the
actual rents the Lessor had historically received.
85 3
The court held that the lessor was subject to a reasonableness con-
sent standard.85 4 It then made an irrefutable comment in holding, as a
matter of law, that the lessor met the reasonableness standard.855 The
court stated that a lessor's refusal "to consent to highway robbery cannot
be deemed commercially unjustified."85 6 The'court made an important
distinction. While a lessor's refusal to consent in order to increase his or
her return above that provided in the lease is generally considered unrea-
sonable, it is reasonable to object to a transfer that would place the lessor
in a worse financial position than he or she bargained for and could ex-
pect to continue under a percentage lease.
85 7
The Hogan court did not appear to directly deal with the use clause.
The clause limited use to a women's ready-to-wear shop. The third party
intended to use the premises as an antique shop. Probably the court con-
sidered the proposed change of use issue as included in, and overpowered
by, the loss of rent issue. There does not seem to be any basis to specu-
late that the court would have allowed the change in use if there had not
been a drop in rent.
Another potential relationship between transfer and use restrictions
might exist. In the Kendall case, a clause prohibited the tenant from
transferring the leasehold without the lessor's consent. The clause did
not specifically state whether the lessor's consent was governed by a "sole
discretion" standard or a "reasonableness" standard. The court imposed
a reasonableness standard. 88 The view has been expressed that perhaps
the Kendall case might foretell the imposition of a reasonableness stan-
dard on a clause restricting use of the premises.8 59 This is discussed in
Section V below.
851. Id.
852. Id.
853. Id. at 592 n.2, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.2.
854. Id. at 593, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
855. Id. at 594, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
856. Id., 231 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
857. Id. at 593, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
858. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 496, 709 P.2d at 891, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24; see supra notes
196-204 and accompanying text.
859. See DiSciullo, Momentum for a Reasonableness Standard in Lease Transfer Clauses, I
PROBATE & PROPERTY at 32, 34 (May-June 1987); Gurwitch & Fleisher, Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc.: The Doctrines of Good Faith and Commercial Reasonableness in Commercial
Leases, 9 REAL PROP. L. REP. 61, 67 (1986).
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C. Public Policies
The imposition of a reasonableness consent standard on leasehold
transfer restrictions by the court in Kendall flowed from two distinct
public policies: (1) the policy of property law against restraints on alien-
ation; and (2) the policy of contract law in favor of good faith and fair
dealing.
86
1. Restraints on alienation
The policy against restraints on alienation, applicable to transfer re-
strictions, is not applicable to use restrictions.8 6 1 This is true even
though the use restriction impedes transfer. Even restraints on use of fee
estates have been allowed for almost any purpose, whether the restraints
be imposed as covenants,862 or as conditions which provide for forfeiture
upon violation. 61 In Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82, Independent Order
of Odd Fellows v. Toscano,864 the court pointed out that use restrictions
"have been upheld by the California courts on numerous occasions even
though they hamper, and often completely impede, alienation. 8 6- That
case involved a gratuitous conveyance of a fee simple defeasible to a fra-
ternal lodge.8 66 The deed contained a restriction on "sale or transfer" by
the lodge, and a restriction requiring "the use and benefit" for the lodge
only.8 67 After the grantors died, the lodge brought an action to quiet
title against the restrictions.8 68 The restraint on alienation was declared
void.8 69 However, the court upheld the restriction on use, which it inter-
preted as limited to lodge, fraternal and other purposes for which the
fraternal lodge was formed. 7 0 This obviously limited the ability of the
lodge to transfer the property. Similarly, a restriction that limited use of
property to the erection and maintenance of a dam in a conveyance of a
860. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 498-500, 709 P.2d 837, 843-45, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818, 824-25 (1985); see supra notes 196-204 and notes 300-78 and accompanying
text.
861. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596 (1919); Taormina Theosophi-
cal Community Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964, 190 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1983); Mountain Brow
Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 64 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1967); RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 3.4.
862. MacEllven, Land Use Control Through Covenants, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 310 (1962).
863. Simes, Restricting Land Use in California by Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Re-
verter, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 293, 297 (1962).
864. 257 Cal. App. 2d 22, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1967).
865. Id. at 26, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
866. Id. at 24, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
867. Id., 64 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
868. Id. at 23, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
869. Id. at 24, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
870. Id. at 25, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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fee simple defeasible has been upheld in California.8 7 1 Although this is
only a use restriction, there is a limited market for a dam.
It is generally accepted outside California that use restrictions are
allowed even if they impede transfer, and that the policy against re-
straints on alienation is not applicable to a use restriction. 72 Most of the
cases distinguishing restrictions on use from restrictions on alienation,
and upholding the use restrictions, involve a restriction on a fee interest.
Since a restriction on use of a fee estate is allowed, a restriction on a
smaller estate, the leasehold, is obviously allowed. Comparing a grantor
with a lessor, the lessor has a much more substantial interest in the re-
stricted property. Traditionally, the policy against restraints on aliena-
tion has been more liberal in allowing restraints on leaseholds than on
fees.
873
2. Good faith and fair dealing
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the other basis for the
imposition of a reasonableness consent standard on certain transfer re-
strictions.8 74 It seems that both restrictions on transfer and restrictions
on use are subject to the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that good faith and fair dealing man-
dates a commercially reasonable standard for restrictions on use. This is
discussed in section V(C) below.
V. VALIDITY AND CONSENT STANDARD
A. In General
Generally, as discussed in subsection IV(C)(1) above, restrictions on
use are valid. An illegal purpose may, however, invalidate the restric-
tion. Assuming that the use restriction is valid, does the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing require that the lessor allow a change in use
unless he or she has a commercially reasonable objection?
B. Purpose Invalidity
The purpose sought to be accomplished by the use restriction may
cause it to be unenforceable because of constitutional or statutory viola-
tions. An early California decision, Los Angeles Investment Co. v.
871. Johnston v. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 479, 168 P. 1047 (1917).
872. Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82, 257 Cal. App. 2d at 26-27, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
873. See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
874. See Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 500, 709 P.2d at 844, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
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Gary,8 75 discussed the distinction between a transfer restriction and a use
restriction, and upheld a deed restriction against use of the property by
anyone but Caucasians. Today, a restriction on use that has a purpose of
racial exclusion is recognized as repugnant to the constitution and
unenforceable.8 76
California Civil Code section 53 provides in part that "every restric-
tion or prohibition as to the use or occupation of real property because of
the user's or occupier's sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national ori-
gin, or blindness or other physical disability is void."'8 7 7 Taormina Theo-
sophical Community, Inc. v. Silver178 involved a community developed
for retired members of the Theosophical Society.8 79 Although the Soci-
ety was not technically considered a religion, the court held that the
broad protections against discrimination in Civil Code section 53 invali-
dated a restriction limiting use of the property to members only.880
Exclusive business use protections and non-competition use restric-
tions, although generally permissible, may at times be so broad as to run
afoul of federal or state legislation protecting free trade and com-
petition.1
8 1
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. In general
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every con-
tract in California, 8 2 and a lease is considered to be a contract as well as
a conveyance. 88 3 Good faith and fair dealing permeates the contractual
relationship, so there is little reason to doubt its application to a use re-
striction clause. That does not, however, necessarily compel a conclu-
sion that the lessor must show a commercially reasonable objection in
order to prevent a change in use by the tenant.
875. 181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596 (1919).
876. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
877. CAL. CIV. CODE § 53(a) (West Supp. 1988).
878. 140 Cal. App. 3d 964, 190 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1983).
879. Id. at 968, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
880. Id. at 976, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
881. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968); Boughton v. So-
cony Mobil Oil Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 41 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1964); LEASE PRACTICE, supra
note 403, § 2.13 (Cal. CEB 1975 & Supp. 1988).
882. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 500, 709 P.2d 837, 844, 220 Cal. Rptr.
818, 825-26 (1985); see also Seaman's Direct Buying Services, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.
3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); RESTATEMENT, supra note
359, § 205.
883. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 498, 709 P.2d at 843, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 824; see also CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1925 (West 1985).
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The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is discussed at length in
Part 1, section XII(B).884 Basically, it prevents one party from doing
something that deprives the other of benefits contemplated under the
contract. It protects the reasonable expectations of the contracting par-
ties against interference by one to the disadvantage of the other. The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not prevent the parties from
bargaining and expressly providing for restrictions.
The wording of the use restriction clause can make a significant dif-
ference in expressing the reasonable expectations of the parties. As dis-
cussed in Section B, above, the various types of use restriction clauses fall
into two general types, the "absolute" type and the "consent" type.
2. Absolute type restriction
The absolute type restriction sets forth the specific use requirements
and limitations as unqualified obligations. There is no mention of the
possibility of variations with the lessor's consent. For example, a clause
might provide that "the tenant shall use the premises only for a retail
bookstore, and not for any other purpose whatsoever." It is hard to see
how a tenant could later convince a court that this language led him or
her to expect that he or she could change the use unless the lessor had a
commercially reasonable objection. The tooth fairy may exist, but most
people look to dental insurance for real expectations. A prominent leas-
ing attorney has commented that:
[if the lessor] simply states that the sole purpose will be as spec-
ified in the lease, then arguably there can be no change without
an actual amendment of the lease. To argue otherwise would be
to say that the tenant could change any lease provision by sim-
ply requiring the landlord to be "reasonable." Why not, for
example, change the rent?885
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing thus does not open every
contractual provision to judicial renegotiation.
It should not be necessary for the lessor to justify his or her insis-
tence that the express terms of the absolute type restriction clause be
complied with. Two code sections support this conclusion. California
Civil Code section 1930 states: "When a thing is let for a particular pur-
pose the hirer must not use it for any other purpose; and if he does, he is
liable to the letter for all damages resulting from such use, or the letter
884. See supra notes 358-72 and accompanying text.
885. M. Zankel, Commercial Lease Assignments and the Age of Reason: Cohen v. Ratinoff,
7 REAL PROP. L. REP. 29, 36 (1984).
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may treat the contract as thereby rescinded." ' 6 The related section
1931(1) provides: "The letter of a thing may terminate the hiring and
reclaim the thing before the end of the term agreed upon: 1. When the
hirer uses or permits a use of the thing hired in a manner contrary to the
agreement of the parties." ' 7
3. Consent type restriction
The consent type use clause sets forth the restrictions and then
states that variations are not permitted without the lessor's prior consent.
Here, the possibility of a change in use is introduced into the language.
The issue now becomes the proper standard to apply to the lessor's con-
sent. Can the lessor withhold consent in his sole discretion, or must he
or she have an objective and commercially reasonable reason to do so?
If the clause expressly states that the lessor's consent is subject only
to a sole discretion standard, or that the lessor's consent is not subject to
a reasonableness standard, that express provision should be honored.
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing does not support an expec-
tation of a reasonableness standard in the face of express contrary lan-
guage. 88  On the other hand, if the clause expressly imposes a
reasonableness standard, for example, a provision that "consent will not
be unreasonably withheld," reasonableness is a contractual expectation.
If the standard governing consent is expressed in the clause, that
standard becomes part of the agreement concerning use of the premises.
Thus, either the express sole discretion or the express reasonableness
consent standard is consistent with California Civil Code sections 1930
and 1931(1) quoted above.
The only difficulty in determining expectations occurs when a use
clause requires the lessor's consent, but says nothing about the standard
to be applied-the "Silent Consent Standard." This was the situation
faced by the court in Kendall, except that the restriction there was on
transfer, not use.889 The court used both the policy against restraints on
alienation and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to produce the
reasonable consent standard for a transfer restraint.8 90 Since the policy
against restraints on alienation does not apply to restrictions on use, will
good faith and fair dealing alone produce a reasonable consent standard
886. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1930 (West 1985).
887. Id. § 1931(1).
888. See supra notes 358-72 and accompanying text for related discussion regarding transfer
restrictions.
889. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 494 n.5, 709 P.2d at 840 n.5, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.5.
890. Id. at 506-07, 709 P.2d at 849, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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for a use restriction? The answer depends on the reasonable expectations
of the parties. Absent an express clause one way or the other, do the
parties contemplate that the lessor is to have sole discretion or to have
commercially reasonable limitations?
A California practice text gives an example of a silent consent stan-
dard clause that requires consent, but does not express a standard. It
then comments without qualification that "[u]nder this typical basic use
clause the landlord can be arbitrary and unreasonable in refusing to con-
sent to a change in use, and the tenant has no recourse."89 This state-
ment is appropriate when referring to an absolute type clause where
consent is not mentioned, or to a consent type clause which has an ex-
press sole discretion standard; however, it seems risky advice when refer-
ring to a silent consent standard clause, especially after Kendall. The
text cites two authorities: California Civil Code section 1930, quoted
above, and Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co. 192
If a clause expressly requires that a lessor not unreasonably with-
hold consent to a change in use, the lessor could not unreasonably with-
hold consent and then take advantage of section 1930 to seek damages or
rescission. If a reasonable consent standard is imposed on the lessor by
implication, rather than by express provision, the lessor is in no better
position to unreasonably withhold consent and seek relief under section
1930.
Does section 1930 prevent an implied reasonableness standard when
the lessor's consent is required but no standard is expressed? The section
states in part: "When a thing is let for a particular purpose the hirer
must not use it for any other purpose. 8 s93 This language appears to
strictly limit the tenant. However, when the lessor agrees to a consent
type use restriction, he or she is leasing the premises either for the partic-
ular stated purpose or for an alternative purpose to which he or she con-
sented. The statute does not appear to preclude an implied
reasonableness standard for the alternative purpose. As a practical mat-
ter, this statute has not been addressed by the legislature since the year
1905, and the issue of an appropriate consent standard was probably not
considered at that time.
The mentioned California practice text also cited the Isom case to
support the lessor's ability to unreasonably withhold consent under a si-
lent consent standard clause. 94 The case is risky authority for that prop-
891. LEAsE PRAcTIcE, supra note 403, § 3.58, at 104.
892. 147 Cal. 659, 82 P. 317 (1905).
893. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1930.
894. LEAsE PRACTICE, supra note 403, § 3.58, at 104.
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osition for three reasons. First, it does not appear in the decision that a
silent consent standard clause was involved. Second, it appears that a
significant factor leading to the decision was the fact that the absentee
owner was tricked about the intended use of the property.8 95 Before the
property was leased, and unknown to the owner, the eventual tenant had
gone onto the land and determined its potential for oil drilling and ex-
traction. He then sent the lessor a letter requesting a lease for a tenement
house. Third, the use that caused the lessor to complain involved a per-
manent removal of a valuable substance from the land.
8 96
It could be argued that since a silent consent standard clause does
not expressly provide a reasonableness standard, it is an unambiguous
reservation of absolute discretion in the lessor. This argument was spe-
cifically rejected by the court in Kendall. 97
The silent consent standard use restriction seemingly requires inter-
pretation to determine the intent and expectations of the parties. The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the lessor not thwart
the tenant's expectations. The issue of whether sole discretion or reason-
ableness as an intended and expected standard can be left to a case by
case determination is a question of fact. In the alternative, a standard
can be implied based on the most likely expectation, and that standard
would control absent language to the contrary in the clause. For exam-
ple, as in Kendall, a reasonableness standard could be implied or pre-
sumed. The parties would still be free to negotiate and expressly provide
for a sole discretion standard which would displace the implied reasona-
bleness standard.
The implying of a commercial reasonableness standard for a clause
mentioning consent, as was done in Kendall, should not be done indis-
criminately. There is a danger in turning the word "consent" into a liti-
gable issue of reasonableness wherever it is encountered in a lease.
Sometimes consent may be used as a careless shorthand to indicate the
obvious proposition that the parties can modify their agreement and
change the deal if they are both willing. For example, consider a clause
that states: "This lease may not be amended without the written consent
of the parties." Surely this should not mean that if one party wants to
later change the agreement, the other party must submit to potential liti-
gation over a commercially reasonable modification. The danger of turn-
ing courts into forums for an exercise in "let's make a deal" must be
recognized.
895. Isom, 147 Cal. at 660, 82 P. at 317-18.
896. Id. at 659-60, 82 P. at 317-18.
897. Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 502-03, 709 P.2d at 846-47, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
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D. "Satisfaction" Condition
There are contract rules relating to "satisfaction" as a condition pre-
cedent to one's duty to perform. Suppose that party A does not have to
perform the contract unless A is "satisfied" with party B's performance
or with some other factor. What standard governs A's satisfaction?
There are similarities between these cases and the consent issue. How-
ever, there is a major distinction between the two.
The common approaches taken to satisfaction conditions can be
summarized as follows:
8 98
1. The parties are free to expressly provide for a sole discretion
standard governing satisfaction.
2. Absent an express standard, 'if the satisfaction involves fancy,
taste or judgment, the sole discretion standard applies.
3. Absent an express standard, if the satisfaction involves mechani-
cal fitness or utility, the reasonableness standard applies.
4. When the sole discretion standard applies, the party need not be
reasonable in expressing dissatisfaction. However, the party is still
bound by a duty of good faith. In other words, if the party is truly satis-
fied, he cannot lie and deny that satisfaction.
While similar in many respects, there is a major distinction between
the cases involving satisfaction as a condition to perform a contract, and
a potential case involving the lessor's consent as a requirement to modifi-
cation of the contract provision restricting use. If A's promise to per-
form the contract is conditioned upon A's satisfaction, is A's promise
consideration for the promise or performance of B, or is A's promise
illusory? Satisfaction condition cases typically involve this issue of con-
tract formation. As a result, courts in these cases focus on imposing
some base level minimum obligation on A to avoid an illusory promise.
When the sole discretion standard is applied to a party's satisfaction, this
is particularly a problem. As a result of the need to impose some obliga-
tion on A, courts focus on a minimum duty to act in good faith, if not
reasonably.
In the case of a use restriction, the contract is formed and the use
restriction is part of the terms of the contract. Thus, in evaluating the
lessor's consent requirement, it is not necessary to find some basic duty of
the lessor in order to have a contract. The lessor's consent is more in the
nature of a modification of the tenant's contract duty to observe the use
restriction. It is in the nature of consent to modification, rather than a
898. For a general discussion, see Wrrmu, supra note 377, §§ 729-735; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 91, § 228.
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condition to performance. Thus, it is not necessary to seek a base level
duty to uphold the contract. A binding contract can still exist even
though there is no limitation on a party's refusal to later change its
terms. The issue can be addressed as a question of intent and
expectations.
Satisfaction condition cases are thus not directly analogous to con-
sent cases. However, the two situations where a satisfaction standard is
implied (numbers 2 and 3 above) seem to conform to reasonable expecta-
tions. It might be of assistance to look at the possible application of these
rules for adopting a satisfaction standard when none is expressed to the
adoption of a consent standard when none is expressed. For example, it
might be said that:
1. Absent an express standard, if the consent to a change in use
involves subjective factors such as fancy, taste or judgment, the sole dis-
cretion standard applies. 99
2. Absent an express standard, if the consent to a change in use
involves objective factors such as mechanical fitness or utility, the reason-
ableness standard applies.
If the above approach is applied, since objective business factors -are
involved in a typical commercial lease, an implied reasonableness stan-
dard will generally result.9"° There are still obvious problems in predict-
ing what will be considered subjective or objective factors in all
situations. It is just as obvious that the selection of a particular standard
governing consent is best left to bargaining and express provision. How-
ever, if that was always done, this section would not be necessary.
VI. RELATIONSHIP TO REMEDIES LEGISLATION
A. Remedies Statutes in General
The major remedies lrovided to the lessor for a tenant's breach are
contained in California Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4.91 The
basic plan of section 1951.2 is to have an immediate termination of the
lease and an immediate cause of action for damages, including prospec-
tive rental loss damages. The contract rule of mitigation of damages is
built in by allowing the tenant to prove post-termination rental loss that
could have been reasonably avoided by the lessor. The termination of the
899. The court in Kendall states that it was not commercially reasonable to deny consent on
the basis of "personal taste, convenience or sensibility." Kendall, 40 Cal. 3d at 501, 709 P.2d
at 845, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
900. See supra notes 16-18.
901. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951.2, 1951.4 (West 1985).
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lease is triggered by either of two situations: (1) the tenant breaches and
abandons the premises; or (2) the tenant breaches and the lessor termi-
nates the tenant's right to possession of the premises.9 "2
The tenant can unilaterally terminate the lease, pursuant to section
1951.2, by a breach and abandonment.9 "3 The lessor is given the oppor-
tunity to prevent this unilateral termination and provide for a "lock-in"
remedy by section 1951.4.114 If the lease specifically provides for the
lock-in remedy, and section 1951.4 is complied with, the lessor can keep
the lease in effect and continue to enforce its provisions. Relief is pro-
vided to the locked-in tenant by requiring that the lease permit the tenant
to assign or sublet (or both), subject only to reasonable restrictions. The
relationship of the lock-in remedy to restrictions on leasehold transfer
restrictions is covered in part I, Section XV.9°5
B. Damages Pursuant to Civil Code Section 1951.2
When the lease is terminated due to the tenant's breach, the lessor is
entitled to damages pursuant to section 1951.2. The major component of
those damages is "the amount by which the unpaid rent which would
have been earned ... exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the
lessee proves could be reasonably avoided."90 6
Suppose that there will be a deficiency and damages if the lessor
relets for the use specified in the terminated lease. Suppose further that
the lessor could get more rent by leasing for a different use. How does
the use restriction in the terminated lease affect the tenant's offset for
reasonably avoidable rental loss?
There are two basic situations arising from what the tenant could
have done under the terms of the lease if it had not been terminated for
breach: first, the tenant could have changed the use without the lessor's
consent, or limited only by a requirement for the lessor's reasonable con-
sent. In this situation, it seems that the tenant is entitled to have a possi-
ble reasonable change in use considered as one of the factors in
determining the reasonably avoidable rental loss. Second, the tenant
could not have changed the use because the terminated lease contained
an absolute restriction on use or a sole discretion consent standard. It is
902. Id.
903. Id. § 1951.2.
904. Id. § 1951.4.
905. See supra notes 451-78 and accompanying text.
906. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a)(2), (3) (West 1985). The amount specified is subject to
modification to determine the "worth at the time of the award" in accordance with subsection
(b) of 1951.2.
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a policy decision whether the mitigation concept embodied in section
1951.2 allows the tenant to establish a reasonable alternate use for dam-
age purposes. However, it seems that the lessor should not be required to
give up a bargained benefit in order to reduce the damages to a breaching
tenant. If the tenant is allowed to base offsets on modifications of the
lease terms, which could not have been made absent a breach, what
would limit the modifications to the use clause?
C Lock-in Pursuant to Civil Code Section 1951.4
Section 1951.4 allows the lessor to keep the lease in effect and en-
force its terms against a tenant who has breached and abandoned. 907
This lock-in remedy is available only if the tenant is permitted to either
assign or sublet, subject only to reasonable restrictions. Does the lessor's
exercise of the lock-in remedy change the effect of a use restriction when
the tenant seeks to assign or sublet?
The essence of the lock-in remedy is to keep the lease in effect. Sec-
tion 1951.4 provides that "the lease continues in effect" and "the lessor
may enforce all his rights and remedies under the lease." 90 8 The use
clause is an integral part of the continuing lease, and it remains enforcea-
ble against the tenant and transferees according to its terms. If it allows
the tenant to change the use without restriction or with the lessor's rea-
sonable consent, the transferee would have the same freedom and limita-
tions. If the clause absolutely prohibits change, or gives the lessor sole
discretion to prevent change, both the tenant and transferee have to con-
form to those restrictions.
VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. General Relationships
1. Restrictions on the tenant's use of the premises, contained in a
commercial lease of real property, have some characteristics in common
with restrictions on the tenant's transfer of the leasehold. Absent express
restriction, a change in use (with some limitations) or a transfer of the
leasehold is permitted. Restrictions on use or transfer are allowed, but
construed in favor of the tenant.
2. Although restrictions are valid in general, those that have an ille-
gal purpose are not enforceable.
3. Use restrictions and transfer restrictions are related when a pro-
spective transferee proposes to change the use of the premises. If the
907. Id. § 1951.4.
908. Id. § 1951.4(a).
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lessor is subject to a reasonableness consent standard in connection with
the transfer restriction, the proposed use of the premises is a factor that
can be taken into consideration in testing the reasonableness of the les-
sor's objection to the transfer. The transferee is subject to the use restric-
tion in the lease. If there is no use restriction in the lease, it is less likely
that the lessor can use the proposed change in use as a basis for reason-
able objection.
B. Policies Involved
1. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. 9o9 involved a clause that restricted
transfer without the lessor's consent but failed to express a standard gov-
erning consent. The court used two public policies as the bases for im-
posing a reasonableness standard on the lessor: the policy against
restraints on alienation; and the policy in favor of good faith and fair
dealing.
2. The policy of property law against restraints on alienation does
not apply to a use restriction.
3. The policy of contract law imposing an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing applies to use restrictions, but this does not necessarily
mean that a lessor must have a commercially reasonable objection to a
change in use.
C. Application of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing prevents one party
from doing something which deprives the other of benefits contemplated
under the contract. It protects the reasonable expectations of one party
against interference by the other party.
2. Good faith and fair dealing do not prevent clearly expressed re-
strictions on use of the premises.
3. An absolute type restriction states requirements and limitations
as unqualified obligations of the tenant, and does not mention the possi-
bility of a variation with the lessor's consent. This type of clause does
not create a reasonable expectation that the lessor must have a reason-
able objection to prevent a change in use. Good faith and fair dealing do
not require such a standard.
4. A consent type restriction states requirements and limitations
and provides that they cannot be changed without the lessor's consent.
The provision for consent introduces the possibility of a change in use.
This type of clause may contain an express reasonableness standard or an
909. 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985).
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express sole discretion standard, or it may not contain any express
standard.
5. If the consent type restriction contains an express sole discretion
standard for the lessor's consent, it should be enforceable according to its
terms. This type of clause does not create a reasonable expectation that
the lessor must have a reasonable objection to prevent a change in use.
Good faith and fair dealing do not require such a standard.
6. A consent type restriction that does not contain an express stan-
dard raises the issue of the intended and expected standard governing
consent: sole discretion or reasonableness. The issue can be left to case
by case factual determinations, or it can be resolved by establishing an
implied standard to govern in the absence of an express contrary provi-
sion. This is the issue that the Kendall case resolved by establishing a
reasonable consent standard with respect to a transfer restriction.
7. If a consent standard is implied into a clause that restricts use
without the lessor's consent, but that does not contain an express stan-
dard, it seems that a reasonableness standard is most consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the tenant. The lessor is free to avoid an im-
plied reasonableness standard by bargaining and expressly providing for
an absolute restriction or a sole discretion consent standard.
8. There is a danger in extending a reasonableness standard indis-
criminately to every clause in a lease that mentions the possibility of con-
sent to a variation. Sometimes the parties may merely intend the consent
phrase to express the proposition that the agreement can be modified if
both parties are willing. For example, the application of a reasonableness
standard to a clause that provides that the lease may not be amended
without written consent of the parties would subject the entire contract
to judicial renegotiation.
9. The issues raised in this section can be substantially avoided by
careful drafting: avoid consent provisions or expressly state the intended
and expected standard when using' them.
D. Relationship to Remedies Legislation
1. If the lease is terminated due to the tenant's breach, pursuant to
California Civil Code section 1951.2 the tenant's ability to consider a
change of use in connection with proving an offset against damages for
reasonably avoidable rental loss depends on what the tenant could have
done under the lease if it had not been terminated for breach. There are
two basic situations:
A. The tenant could have changed the use without the lessor's
consent, or is limited only by a requirement for the lessor's reason-
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able consent. In this situation, it seems that the tenant is entitled to
have a possible reasonable change in use considered as one of the
factors in detemining the reasonably avoidable rental loss.
B. The tenant could not have changed the use because the ter-
minated lease contained an absolute restriction on use or a sole dis-
cretion consent standard. It is a policy decision whether the
mitigation concept embodied in section 1951.2 allows the tenant to
establish a reasonable alternate use for damages purposes. How-
ever, it seems that the lessor should not be required to give up a
bargained benefit in order to reduce the damages to a breaching ten-
ant. If the tenant is allowed to base offsets on modifications of the
lease terms, which could not have been made absent a breach, what
would limit the modifications to the use clause?
2. If the lessor uses the lock-in remedy provided in California Civil
Code section 1951.4 upon a breach and abandonment by the tenant, the
right of the tenant or the tenant's transferee to change the use of the
premises in connection with a transfer of the leasehold depends upon the
terms of the lease. The use restriction in the lease should be enforceable
according to its terms.
PART 6.
ENFORCEMENT OF LEASEHOLD TRANSFER
RESTRICTION AGAINST TENANT'S
SUCCESSOR:
SHOULD DUMPOR'S BE DUMPED?
I. SCOPE OF PART
This Part examines the enforceability of a transfer restriction against
a tenant's successor in a commercial lease of real property. It examines
the effect of the lessor's consent to a transfer by the tenant, or a waiver of
the right to object to a transfer.
Assume that a lessor and tenant enter into a commercial lease of
real property. A clause in the lease restricts the tenant's ability to trans-
fer to a third party without the lessor's consent. 91° The tenant subse-
quently assigns the lease to an assignee, either with the lessor's express
consent or with the lessor's waiver by inaction. Later, the assignee pro-
poses to reassign the leasehold.
Does the transfer restriction bind the assignee? Should the rule in
California be clarified or modified?
910. For a discussion of the types of restriction clauses, seesupra notes 11-23 and accompa-
nying text.
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II. DUMPOR'S CASE AND ITS EFFECT
Over 400 years ago, a case set forth a foolish rule. Almost as if it
were necessary to prove that the law has a sense of humor in retaining
old rules, the rule was imported from England before it could be extin-
guished, and it lives on in the United States today. That which was fool-
ish in its origin has not become sensible with time. "When the reason of
a rule ceases, so should the rule itself." ' That maxim should have a
corollary. When a rule is without a solid reason in the first place, its
demise should not be prolonged.
A -4. The Case
The rule in Dumpor's Case912 arose in the following manner. Ox-
ford College913 leased land to a tenant with the "proviso that the lessee or
his assigns should not alien the premises to any person or persons, with-
out the special licence of the lessors."9" 4 Subsequently, the lessor "li-
censed the lessee to alien or demise the land .. . to any person or
persons." 915 The tenant assigned to a man who, at his death, willed the
leasehold to his son.916 When the son died intestate, his administrator
assigned the leasehold to the defendant without the lessor's consent.917
The lessor, based on the unconsented assignment, recovered possession
and leased to Dumpor.18 The defendant assignee re-entered and
Dumpor brought a trespass action against him.919 Poor Dumpor not
only lost, but also suffered the ignominy of a foolish rule being named
after him.
According to the case, the ultimate assignee was entitled to posses-
sion under the leasehold. The lessor had no power to terminate the lease
based on the unconsented transfer. This in turn prevented the lessor
from validly leasing to Dumpor.
The rule stated to produce this result was that the first assignment
with the lessor's consent
had determined [ended] the condition, so that no alienation
which he [the assignee] might afterwards make could break the
911. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 1970).
912. 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 4 Coke 119b (K.B. 1578).
913. By its President and scholars.
914. Dumpor's, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1111, 4 Coke at 119b.
915. Id. at 1111-12, 4 Coke at 119b.
916. Id. at 1112, 4 Coke at 119b.
917. Id.
918. Id.
919. Id.
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proviso or give cause of entry to the lessors, for the lessors
could not dispense with an alienation for one time, and that the
same estate should remain subject to the proviso after.920
In other words, once the first consented assignment occurs, the restric-
tion against unconsented assignment is no longer enforceable to prevent
successive assignments. This treatment of the power to prevent an as-
signment is perhaps the origin of the phrase "use it or lose it."
It is difficult to find a reasonable rationale for the rule. The reasons
given are more in the nature of conclusions that need further support.
The court in Dumpor's Case said that since the consent to the first assign-
ment was "absolute," it was not possible for the assignee to be subject to
the restriction.921 Perhaps it could be argued that the lessor's consent to
an assignment "to any person or persons" 922 was so unrestricted as to
indicate an intent to abandon the restriction. This interpretation would
focus on the nature of the consent as a waiver of the restriction, rather
than on the nature of the restriction itself. The Dumpor's court did not
limit its rule based on the nature of the consent. Subsequent cases have
not done so either.
The court stated that a condition against assignment cannot be "ap-
portioned. ' 923 Perhaps this could be limited to refer to a lease to two or
more tenants, and support a rule that the lessor cannot consent to a
transfer by one tenant but refuse consent to the other cotenants. A case
referred to by the court involved such a situation.924 However, the
Dumpor's court did not limit the rule to a cotenant situation.
The transfer restriction is stated to be an "entire" or single condi-
tion, as distinguished from a continuing condition. 925 This appellation
generally indicates an obligation that by its nature or by the intent of the
parties is subject to a single performance or a single breach. It is not one
that is subject to successive performances or breaches. A covenant to
complete a building by a specific date is an example of an "entire" obliga-
tion.926 A covenant to pay rent is an example of a "continuing" obliga-
tion. There is nothing in the nature of a transfer restriction that would
mandate treatment as "entire" regardless of the parties' contrary intent.
920. Id. at 1113, 4 Coke at 119b-120a.
921. Id., 4 Coke at 120a.
922. Id. at 1112, 4 Coke at 119b.
923. Id. at 1113, 4 Coke at 120a.
924. Trin. 28 Eliz. Rot. 256.
925. Dumpor's, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1113, 4 Coke at 120b. For a discussion of the distinction in
the context of a transfer restriction, see Crowell v. City of Riverside, 26 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572-
73, 80 P.2d 120, 123 (1938).
926. McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384, 395 (1864).
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Rather, a leasehold is by nature subject to successive assignments. A
requirement of consent is capable of the same successive occurrences.
The intent of the parties can produce an entire or a continuing obliga-
tion. The transfer restriction in the lease from the college in Dumpor's
Case expressly applied to the tenant "or his assigns." '9 27 Since the court
treated the restriction as "entire," it must have concluded that the re-
striction by its nature could not be made "continuous." This lacks com-
mon sense and logic. It only supports the belief in mystical origins
sometimes encountered in ancient property law.
B. Variations
1. General v. Specific Consent. In Dumpor's Case, the lessor gave a
general consent for assignment to anyone. Subsequent statements of the
rule have not limited it to such a broad consent. It seems taken for
granted that consent to a transfer to a specific assignee will have the same
effect of permanent removal of the consent requirement. 928
2. Consent v. Waiver. The lessor in Dumpor's Case expressly con-
sented to the initial assignment. Subsequent applications of the rule have
not distinguished an express consent to an assignment from a waiver of
the right to object to a transfer.
929
3. Condition v. Covenant. The court in Dumpor's Case refers to the
transfer restriction as a condition. The word condition is most likely
used in the case to indicate an obligation for which termination of the
leasehold, and reentry into possession, are provided as remedies. This
conclusion is supported by the court's comment that the lessor "entered
for the condition broken. ' 930 A broken covenant on the other hand gen-
erally leads to a damages remedy. Later cases have not distinguished
between a condition and a covenant for purposes of the rule.
4. Assumption. It does not appear that the assignee in Dumpor's
Case contractually assumed the lease, so there was no privity of contract
between the lessor and the tenant with respect to provisions in the lease.
Later cases have not found privity of contract to be an important factor
in application of the rule.93 1 The lack of privity of contract does not
isolate the assignee from the obligations of the prime lease. There is priv-
927. Dumpor's, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1111, 4 Coke at 119b.
928. Annotation, Landlord's Consent to One Assignment or Sublease as Obviating Necessity
of Consent to Subsequent Assignment or Sublease, 31 A.L.R. 153, 154 (1924) [hereinafter An-
notation, Landlord's Consent]; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e.
929. Annotation, Landlord's Consent, supra note 928, at 153; RESTATEMENT, supra note
91, § 16.1 reporter's note 7; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e.
930. Dumpor's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 1112, 4 Coke 119b, 119b (K.B. 1578).
931. See Annotation, Landlord's Consent, supra note 928, at 155.
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ity of estate and the covenants that run with the estate bind the
assignee.
932
5. Lease clause variations. The restriction against transfer without
the lessor's consent usually comes with the variations set out below. A
strict application of the Dumpor's Case rule makes the restriction unen-
forceable against an assignee in all of the variations. There is authority,
discussed below, 933 that the rule will not be applied when there is an
express intent to have the restriction control subsequent transfers. This
approach allows the restriction to be enforceable against assignees if
there is an express provision that it binds successors, or that consent does
not waive the restriction on future transfers. The usual lease clause vari-
ations are the following:
a. There is no mention of successors, and there is no non-
waiver clause.
b. Successors are expressly mentioned in the restriction clause.
c. Successors are not mentioned in the restriction clause itself,
but there is a general clause to the effect that the lease provisions are
binding upon successors.
d. There is a non-waiver provision in the restriction clause.
e. There is no non-waiver provision in the restriction clause it-
self, but there is a general clause to the effect that a waiver does not
excuse future performance of the obligation waived or performance
of other obligations.
6. Conditional Consent. Sometimes the lessor will provide in the
written consent itself that the consent is not a waiver of the restriction on
future transfers. A strict application of the Dumpor's Case rule would
disregard this non-waiver provision. However, there is authority, dis-
cussed below,9 34 that the rule will not be applied when the consent is
conditioned in this manner.
C. Subleases
The rule in Dumpor's Case does not generally apply to successive
subleases by the tenant.935 In other words, when the lessor consents to
the first sublease by a tenant, he or she can still force the tenant to obtain
932. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the parties.
933. See infra notes 938-40 and accompanying text.
934. See infra notes 980-94 and accompanying text.
935. German-American Say. Bank v. Goilmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 P. 932 (1909); see also
Annotation, Landlord's Consent, supra note 928, at 157; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566,
§ 7.304e.
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consent to a subsequent sublease. This distinction between subleases and
assignments in application of the rule has been criticized as without
logic.936 It is difficult to be enthusiastic about justifying distinctions in
the application of a rule that in itself lacks a solid reason for its existence.
However, it could be justified on the basis that the lessor maintains the
same privity of estate and privity of contract relationship with the tenant
after a sublease. There has not been a transfer of the whole leasehold. A
sublease merely creates a tenancy relationship between the tenant/subles-
sor and the subtenant.937 It does not change the relationship or obliga-
tions between the tenant and lessor.
D. Expressly Binding on Successors
Some cases have focused on the intent of the lessor and tenant at the
time they enter into the lease and transfer restriction. If they intend to
have the transfer restriction bind a succession of assignees, that intent is
honored.938 This intent is typically expressed in one or both of the fol-
lowing ways. A "non-waiver" clause can provide that "a consent to one
assignment, subletting, occupation, or use by another person shall not be
deemed to be a consent to any subsequent assignment, subletting, occu-
pation, or use by another person.' 9 39 Another way of expressing the
continuous nature of the obligation is to state that it binds not only the
tenant, but also the successors and assigns. 94°
The lease in Dumpor's Case did express the intent that the restric-
tion bind assigns, but the court disregarded this in developing its rule. If
the lease had not expressed this intent, the decision could have been ra-
tionalized on the basis that intent to bind successive parties was not clear.
III. THE COVENANT "RUNNING" APPROACH
A. In General
The doctrine of covenants running with the land (and equitable ser-
vitudes) has traditionally been used to deal with the binding effect of a
936. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 16.1 reporter's note 7.
937. For a discussion of the distinctions between an assignment and sublease, and the priv-
ity relationships, see supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
938. See Crowell v. City of Riverside, 26 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572-73, 80 P.2d 120, 123 (1938);
Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 58-60, 265 P. 844, 850-51 (1928); 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra
note 404, § 195; 4 WITKIN, supra note 768, § 645 (9th ed. 1988); 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note
566, § 422; 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:92, at 415-16.
939. Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 335, 53 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336 (1966).
940. 49'AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 408, at 423.
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promise on the promisor's successor. 941 The Restatement adopted this
approach for dealing with the burden of lease promises passing to a lease-
hold transferee.942 Is the burden of the tenant's promise to refrain from
assignment without the lessor's consent binding on a successor to the
tenant promisor absent a contractual relationship between the lessor and
the assignee? This is the basic question raised by the facts in Dumpor's
Case.943
There is no reason why the answer should not be determined by the
doctrine of covenants running with the land. A privity of estate relation-
ship exists between the lessor and the assignee.9 " The assignee has re-
ceived the entire estate of the tenant.94 The burden of the obligation to
refrain from unconsented transfers of the leasehold estate certainly
touches and concerns that estate. In other words, it is related to the
leasehold in a most direct way. The assignee of the leasehold could rea-
sonably be held to notice of the provisions in the lease that created and
sustains that leasehold.
The principal factual issue is whether the lessor and original tenant
intended that the burden of the transfer restriction bind successive par-
ties.94 6 An express statement or phrase to that effect should be honored.
In certain situations, it is necessary for the intent to bind assigns to be
express.947 However, there is no intrinsic reason why that intent cannot
be implied with regard to the transfer restriction. If the intent is not
expressed, the most likely intent should govern. This is just a way of
looking at, and following, the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Suppose that the clause states that "the tenant shall not assign or
sublet without the lessor's prior written consent, which consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld." There is no express language binding assign-
ees. The clause restricts transfer without the lessor's consent. Is it likely
that the parties intended and reasonably expect that it only bind the orig-
inal tenant, and that subsequent parties are free to transfer without any
limitation? Or, is it likely that the parties intend and reasonably expect
that any and all transfers be subject to review and consent by the lessor?
It is asking much of a credulous person to expect that a one-shot restric-
tion is intended.
941. 2 POWELL, supra note 11, 246[2], especially pages 372.123-372.125, 372.114-
372.118.
942. REsTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 16.1(2).
943. 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 4 Coke 119b (K.B. 1578).
944. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
945. Id.
946. See Crowell v. City of Riverside, 26 Cal. App. 2d 566, 80 P.2d 120 (1938).
947. See, ag., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1464 and 1468 (West 1982).
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The lessor's motives for wishing to evaluate and control transfers
are no less significant after the first assignment.948 There is nothing in
the language of the clause, above, to contradict the logic of an implied
intent that the covenant be continuous. A reference to "the tenant" (or
"the lessee") does not indicate a covenant that is personal to the original
tenant. After an assignment takes place, "the tenant" is the assignee.
For example, a covenant that "the tenant" shall pay rent is binding upon
an assignee without express language of "successors and assigns.
' 949
In the unusual situation where the parties intend the restriction to
govern only the first transfer, they can expressly state that limitation. A
lessor and tenant can agree, and expressly provide, that the transfer re-
striction is personal to, and only binds, the original tenant.
B. Tenant Motivation
It might appear that tenants would welcome the limit on the effec-
tiveness of a leasehold transfer restriction. The freedom to re-assign
without the lessor's consent certainly makes the transaction more attrac-
tive to the proposed initial assignee. That attractiveness should make it
easier for the tenant to make a deal with the third party. However, ten-
ants, as well as lessors, have a reason to adopt a more rational and practi-
cal approach to the survival of the restriction. The lessor who knows
that there is just one chance at controlling a transfer is more likely to
deny consent in order to preserve that control. This increases the diffi-
culty a tenant will have in making a successful assignment.
The tenant's liability to the lessor continues even after the assign-
ment and re-assignments are made, but the assignee's liability to the les-
sor ceases upon re-assignment. 950 Thus, breaches of the lease after re-
assignment, such as non-payment of rent, can be enforced against the
original tenant, but not the first assignee.9"' The tenant has no control
over the selection of a re-assignee, and the assignee has little motive to be
selective. The tenant should hope that the lessor has, and exercises, the
right to assure a reliable re-assignee.
948. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
949. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
950. Id.
951. If, however, the assignee contractually assumes the obligations of the lease, this creates
a contractual privity with the lessor which continues after re-assignment.
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IV. MODERN STATUS
A. England
There was a grumbling acceptance of the rule in Dumpor's Case by
the English judiciary. Lord Chancellor Eldon observed:
Though Dumpor's [C]ase always struck me as extraordinary, it
is the law of the land today. When a man demises to A,...
with an agreement that if he, his executors, administrators or
assigns, assign without licence, the lessor shall be at liberty to
re-enter, it would have been perfectly reasonably [sic] originally
to say, a licence granted was not a dispensation with the condi-
tion; the assignee being by the very terms of the original con-
tract restrained as much as the original lessee.95 2
Sir James Mansfield commented: "[T]he profession have always won-
dered at Dumpor's Case, but it has been law so many centuries, that we
cannot now reverse it."953 This lack of enthusiasm is reflected in legisla-
tion in England that abolished the rule in the middle of the 19th
century.
954
B. United States
The rule in Dumpor's Case has been followed in many states, but it
has been soundly criticized and rejected in others.955 The rule has a "his-
tory of frequent and protracted criticism in the very decisions upholding
the rule as well as in legal writings." 9 6 It has been referred to as a stum-
bling block in the way of the profession, and as an artificial rule without
sound reason. 957 A 1924 Wyoming decision gave an excellent review of
the rule and determined that it was not supported by logic, reason, or
common sense.958 The court referred to the rule as a "venerable error"
and an example of the "pertinacity" of the errors of the law, and rejected
it. 9
5 9
952. Brummell v. McPherson, 33 Eng. Rep. 487, 488, 14 Ves. Jr. 173, 175-76 (Ch. 1807)
(citing Dumpor's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110, 1111, n.(A), 4 Coke 119b, n.(A) (K.B. 1578)); see
also Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 52, 265 P. 844, 848 (1928).
953. Doe v. Bliss, 128 Eng. Rep. 519, 520, 4 Taunt. 735, 736 (C.P. 1813). For additional
comments, see sources cited in M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e n.14.
954. 22 & 23 Vict., chap. 35, §§ 1-3 (1859); 23 & 24 Vict., ch. 38, § 6 (1860).
955. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e; 51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 33, at 77
(1968); 49 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 566, § 408, at 423; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 11, at 93; 2
POWELL, supra note 11, 246[1], at 372.106-372.107 n.60.
956. REsTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 16.1 reporter's note 7.
957. Kendis, 90 Cal. App. at 53, 265 P. at 848.
958. Investors' Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 P. 590 (1924).
959. Id. at 283, 225 P. at 596.
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The Restatement disapproves of the rule in Dumpor's Case and it
provides that "the assignee who comes into privity of estate with the
landlord is bound by the prohibition against assignment without the
landlord's consent. '96°
It seems that any following of the rule today in the United States is
due to precedential inertia, rather than to a belief that it logically solves
any problem. It is like a partially submerged log in a river. It can be
found, but the unwary suffer damage.
C. California
The cases in California indicate that the rule in Dumpor's Case is
discredited, and probably no longer followed, at least where there is an
express intent that successors be bound. However, the California
Supreme Court has not expressly rejected the rule, and some of the
courts of appeal have not been as emphatic as one would wish.
Kendis v. Cohn,961 decided in 1928, contains the most complete judi-
cial discussion of the rule in California. The court referred to the fact
that restrictions on leasehold assignments are regarded as fair and rea-
sonable, and that the restrictions allow the lessor to limit the right of
another to select his or her tenant.962 The court pointed out that the
Dumpor's Case rule contravenes these rules and prevents the lessor from
selecting his or her own tenants and protecting his or her reversion. 963 It
rejected Dumpor's Case in situations where the intent that it be binding
on assignees is express. 964 Also, the Kendis court recognized that it is
well settled in other jurisdictions that the rule does not apply to a sub-
lease.965 The California Supreme Court denied a hearing in the case.
966
Early California cases have been cited for the proposition that Cali-
fornia follows Dumpor's Case and treats the obligation as personal to the
original tenant.9 67 In Chipman v. Emeric,968 the court held that the re-
striction against assignment without consent was abrogated by the first
assignment. 969 However, the lease clause did not expressly state that it
960. REsTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 16.1 comment g.
961. 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
962. Id. at 54, 265 P. at 849.
963. Id.
964. Id. at 58, 60, 265 P. at 850-51.
965. Id. at 54, 265 P. at 849.
966. Id. at 41, 265 P. at 844.
967. Annotation, Landlord's Consent, supra note 928, at 153-55; 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra
note 404, § 195, nn.37, 38 at 229; 51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, supra note 955, at 77 n.29.
968. 5 Cal. 49 (1855).
969. Id. at 51.
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was intended to bind assignees. Since the court did not specifically men-
tion Dumpor's Case, the Chipman decision could be interpreted to mean
that a restraint against alienation will not be enforceable against a succes-
sor unless clear intent is expressed. 970 McGlynn v. Moore971 contains, in
dicta, a statement that covenants against assignment are not continuing
covenants. 972 The case involved a covenant to construct a building
within a certain time limit, which the court properly held to be single and
capable of but one performance and breach.973 In Randol v. Tatum,974
the Dumpor's Case issue was raised but was not dispositive. The lessor,
by conduct, waived the right to enforce the restriction.
975
Two treatises on California law cite the Baker v. J. Maier &
Zobelein Brewery976 case for the proposition that a transfer restriction is
personal and does not run with the land.977 However, there is no holding
to that effect in Baker.
In German-American Savings Bank v. Gollmer,978 the court stated:
"The assignee of a leasehold estate takes it subject to all the obligations
imposed by the lease, except that, where there is a condition against as-
signment without consent (which is necessarily single in its nature), such
condition is wholly discharged by the consent or waiver. ' 979 The court
did not explain why the covenant must by nature be single. The state-
ment is dictum because the clause itself was not drafted in a manner that
would show an intent to bind successors.
A conditional consent apparently saved the restriction from lapsing
in Rothrock v. Sanborn.98° The lessor's written consent to the initial as-
signment expressly provided that the consent requirement was not
waived and that the lease could not be assigned again without consent.
981
The court enforced the transfer restriction against the assignee, and did
not even mention the rule in Dumpor's Case.98 2
970. Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 54, 265 P. 844, 849 (1928).
971. 25 Cal. 384 (1864).
972. Id. at 396.
973. Id.
974. 98 Cal. 390, 33 P. 433 (1893).
975. Id. at 396-97, 33 P. at 435.
976. 140 Cal. 530, 74 P. 22 (1903).
977. 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 404, § 195; 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:92,
at 415-16.
978. 155 Cal. 683, 102 P. 932 (1909).
979. Id. at 688, 102 P. at 934.
980. 178 Cal. 693, 174 P. 314 (1918).
981. Id. at 694, 174 P. at 315.
982. Id.
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In Miller v. Reidy,9 3 the lease provided that "the lessee shall not
assign . .. without the written consent of the lessor.' 984 A separate
clause provided that all the lease provisions were binding on "the succes-
sor or assigns of the lessee." 9 5 The lessor consented to an assignment by
the tenant to a first assignee and a reassignment to a second assignee.
98 6
The lessor sought to terminate the lease for breach based on an uncon-
sented reassignment to a third assignee.98 7 The court stated that the
transfer restriction, which only mentioned "the lessee," was "personal,
binding upon the lessee only, and not one running with the land." 9s8 The
separate general clause about lease provisions binding the "assigns of the
lessee" did not, according to the court, extend the covenant to include
the reassignment from the second assignee to the third assignee.98 9
It seems that this linguistic alchemy would require that the clause
expressly state that it binds the tenant, the tenant's assignees, the as-
signee's reassignee, etc. The court commented that the restriction could
be made binding upon subsequent assignees "by appropriate language in
the lease itself or by a qualified consent to each assignment." 990 Probably
the lawyer who drafted the lease thought that the lease contained appro-
priate language to assure continuing covenants.
The language in Miller regarding the Dumpor's Case issue is dictum.
The lessor had waived any right to terminate by accepting rent with
knowledge of the protested transfer. The lessor's petition for hearing was
denied by the California Supreme Court based on the waiver by con-
duct.991 The court commented: "We are not to be understood as ap-
proving or disapproving what is said elsewhere in the opinion concerning
the covenant against assignment contained in the lease." 99  Taylor v.
Odel1993 also involved a waiver by the lessor's conduct, but the court
volunteered dictum that "a restriction against assignment is a personal
covenant made for the benefit of the lessor and does not run with the
983. 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 (1927).
984. Id. at 759, 761, 260 P. at 359, 360.
985. Id. at 759, 761, 260 P. at 360.
986. Id. at 760, 260 P. at 359-60.
987. The court refered to a notice from the lessor protesting the "subletting" in this last
transaction. However, the court treated it as an assignment. Id.
988. Id. at 761, 260 P. at 360.
989. Id.
990. Id.
991. Id. at 763, 260 P. at 361.
992. Id.
993. 50 Cal. App. 2d 115, 122 P.2d 919 (1942).
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land. ,994
The criticism of the rule by the Kendis court was discussed and ap-
proved in Crowell v. City of Riverside.995 Crowell makes a clear distinc-
tion between a single restriction obligation and a continuous one. If the
clause does not state the restriction to be binding on the tenant's assigns,
it is single and does not bind the assignee.996 If the clause states that it
binds the tenant and his assigns, it is continuous and enforceable against
the assignee.997 However, the case involved a sublease rather than an
assignment. The court recognized the distinction "assumed" to exist be-
tween restrictions on successive assignments and on successive subleases,
but did not decide whether that distinction was the law in California. 998
In the 1980s, two cases mentioned the rule in Dumpor's Case, but
neither of them directly involved multiple assignments of a leasehold.
Laguna Royale Owners Association v. Darger9 99 basically involved a
"time-sharing" enterprise by a unit owner in a condominium project. 101
The project was developed on land held under a long-term ground
lease."' Each of the unit "owners" received a Subassignment and Oc-
cupancy Agreement which contained restrictions against assignment and
subleasing by the unit holder."°2  The condominium association brought
an action to enforce the clause against a successor to the original unit
holder. 113 The successor argued that their interest was in essence a fee
and that restraints against fee transfers were void. 1" The court com-
mented: "It would appear that defendants' argument more appropriately
ought to be that once consent was given... [to the first transfer], the rule
in Dumpor's Case... became applicable and that thereafter no consent to
any further assignment was required.' 1 0o° There was no further discus-
sion of the rule.
In Boston Properties v. Pirelli Tire Corp.," 6 the lease contained a
restriction against assignment or subleasing without the lessor's consent,
994. Id. at 120-21, 122 P.2d at 923 (citing Laird v. McPhee, 90 Cal. App. 136, 265 P. 501
(1928)).
995. 26 Cal. App. 2d 566, 572-73, 80 P.2d 120, 122-23 (1938).
996. Id. at 572, 80 P.2d at 123.
997. Id. at 573, 80 P.2d at 123.
998. Id. at 576, 80 P.2d at 125.
999. 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
1000. Id. at 675, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
1001. Id. at 673, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 678, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
1004. Id. at 680, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
1005. Id. at 680-81 n.7, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43 n.7.
1006. 134 Cal. App. 3d 985, 185 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1982).
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and the clause contained an express non-waiver provision to the effect
that consent given would not excuse getting it for further transac-
tions." 7 The original tenant sublet to a subtenant with the consent of
the lessor." 8 The subtenant later sub-sublet to a sub-subtenant."'0 9 The
second sublease was without the lessor's consent. 1010 The lessor brought
an unlawful detainer action against the original tenant, with whom it
continued to have privity of estate and privity of contract, seeking termi-
nation of the lease and recovery of possession. 1011 The leasehold was not
transferred to an assignee and there was no issue of the binding nature of
the covenant against a successor to the tenant.
The court in Boston Properties held that the restriction against sub-
leasing without consent continued in effect and bound the original ten-
ant, the original tenant could not give the subtenant any greater rights or
freedom than it had, and the subtenant was subordinate to the terms of
the master lease. 012 The sub-sublease without the lessor's consent, and
without any effort to obtain consent, and with the original tenant's
knowledge and consent, was a breach of the master lease and the lessor
was entitled to terminate the lease.10 1 3 The court commented that
Kendis v. Cohn "makes clear that the rule in Dumpor's case is not the law
in California." 10 14 This was dictum since the court was dealing with sub-
leases, not assignments.
To summarize, in California there is language in early cases indicat-
ing, but not directly holding, that California follows Dumpor's Case with
respect to successive assignments. There is language in later California
cases criticizing, and at least one holding by a court of appeal rejecting,
the rule. There is no California Supreme Court decision expressly in-
volving the issue and either adopting or rejecting the rule. The decisions
distinguish between a restriction that is expressly made binding on as-
signees, and one that is not express. The former has been treated as a
continuing covenant which binds successors. The latter has been treated
as a single and personal covenant which binds only the original tenant.
California appears to follow the consensus that Dumpor's Case does not
apply to subleases.
1007. Id. at 990 n.1, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 59 n.1.
1008. Actually, it was a successor to the original lessor. This was not a material factor in the
case.
1009. Boston Properties, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 990, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
1010. Id.
1011. Id. at 991, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
1012. Id. at 992, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
1013. Id. at 992-94, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 60-62.
1014. Id. at 993, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
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V. DRAFTING SOLUTIONS
Various drafting solutions have been suggested to avoid application
of the rule in Dumpor's Case.l0 15 The effectiveness of most of these solu-
tions depends on at least some modification of the rule. The solutions are
based on the parties expressing intent that the obligation continue to bind
successors. The rule is based on the perceived nature of the obligation,
not the intent of the parties.
10 16
The following are suggestions that have been made:
1. An express clause in the lease making the transfer restriction
binding on assignees should be given effect.' 017 This is clearly contrary
to the holding in Dumpor's Case. It may be necessary to expressly state
that it binds not only "assigns," but also all re-assignees. 0118 Since this
suggestion is based on expressing the intent of the parties, it should not
make any difference whether this intent is expressed in a specific provi-
sion in the transfer restriction clause or in a general clause applicable to
all lease obligations.
2. An express clause in the lease stating that a consent to, or waiver
of, one assignment is not a waiver of the consent requirement for future
assignments should be given effect.' 0 19 Since this suggestion is based on
expressing the intent of the parties, it should not make any difference
whether this intent is expressed in a specific provision in the transfer re-
striction clause or in a general clause applicable to a waiver of any lease
obligation.
3. An express statement in the writing granting the lessor's consent
to the effect that consent is to the particular assignment, and is not a
waiver of the duty to get consent for subsequent assignments, should be
given effect.'0 20
There is a drafting solution that would not require a modification of
Dumpor's Case: the lessor could require, as a condition of consent, that
each assignee execute an independent agreement not to make a further
transfer without the lessor's consent.
It is unfortunate to have a rule that is illogical and impractical, and
1015. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e.
1016. See supra notes 912-27 and accompanying text.
1017. 42 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 404, § 195; 4 MILLER & STARR, supra note 404, § 27:92,
at 915-16.
1018. For a discussion of Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 761, 260 P. 358, 360 (1927), see
supra notes 983-92 and accompanying text.
1019. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 566, § 7.304e.
1020. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 16.1 reporter's note 7; see Rothrock v. Sanborn, 178
Cal. 693, 174 P. 314 (1918); see also Annotation, Landlord's Consent, supra note 928, at 155.
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that requires specific drafting to avoid. This unnecessarily perpetuates a
trap. It makes more sense to take an approach that is consistent with the
intent and reasonable expectations of the parties." 21
VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The rule in Dumpor's Case, taken from an English case in 1578,
states that once the lessor consents to an assignment of the leasehold by
the original tenant, the obligati6n to obtain the lessor's consent to an
assignment is not enforceable against assignees.
2. The rule has been interpreted to apply:
a. even if the lease expressly provides that the transfer restric-
tion is intended to bind assignees;
b. whether the lessor's consent was general (assignment per-
mitted to any party) or specific (assignment permitted to specific
party);
c. whether the initial assignment is permitted by express con-
sent or by a waiver implied from conduct;
d. whether the transfer restriction is worded as a condition or a
covenant; and
e. whether or not the initial assignee contractually assumed the
lease.
3. Subleases have generally been considered exempt from the rule.
That is, consent is required for subsequent subleases.
4. The rule has been criticized and repealed in England. Although
the rule has been uniformly criticized in the United States, some states
continue to follow it. It has been rejected by the Restatement.
5. It appears that California does not follow the rule. However,
there is dicta to the contrary in early cases, and there is no clear holding
by the California Supreme Court rejecting the rule.
6. There are drafting solutions for avoiding the rule, but most solu-
tions require a modification of the rule.
7. The rule is illogical and serves no useful purpose. It serves only
as a trap for the unwary.
8. A leasehold transfer restriction may be intended to be binding
only on the original tenant (i.e., single or personal). On the other hand,
the restriction may be intended to apply to all successors from the tenant
and to all subsequent transfers (i.e., continuous). Intent should control.
1021. See supra notes 938-51 and accompanying text.
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There is nothing in the nature of the obligation that would prevent its
treatment as a continuous obligation.
9. Intent that the obligation be continuous may be expressed by
language to the effect that it is binding on successors. Although "as-
signs" or "successors" are the words typically used to express this intent,
no specific word or words should be required. Either a provision in the
transfer restriction clause, or a separate general clause applicable to all
lease obligations, should be sufficient.
10. The intent of a continuous obligation may also be expressed by
language to the effect that a consent or waiver does not excuse the re-
quirement to obtain consent in the future. Either a provision in the
transfer restriction clause, or a separate general clause applicable to all
lease obligations should be sufficient.
11. It is most probable that, absent language to the contrary, the
obligation is intended to be continuous and that the parties reasonably
expect it to be continuous. Thus, the easiest and most logical approach
would be to presume that the restriction is continuous, absent express
intent to the contrary.
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